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A B S T R A C T 
Zo ALSULAIMI: Ph~Do Degree in Law 1990~ 
THE RISK OF THE FORGERY OF SIGNATURES AND THE PROBLEM OF 
CONFLICTING ENTITLEMENTS IN THE LAW OF NEGOTIABLE 
INSTRUMENTS - A COMPARATIVE STUDY. 
The concern of this thesis is to examine the risk of 
forgery of signatures in the context of negotiable 
instruments. The allocation of the said risk is 
submitted to represent one of the most controversial 
matters among the existing legal systems. It is believed 
that the issue under consideration has represented a major 
obstacle to the adoption of an acceptable unification of 
the law of negotiable instruments. 
The main task of this thesis is to propose an 
efficient allocation of the risk of the forgery of 
signatures.- The scope of this enquiry is confined to the 
forgery of two forms of signatures, namely, that of the 
proprietor of a blank document and that of the payee or 
indorsee of a negotiable instrument.- The forgery of such 
signatures is submitted to represent the major incident of 
the problem of risk allocation in the context of 
negotiable instruments. Its involvement affects the 
currency of such documents and ultimately, it affects the 
determination of the property right of negotiable 
instruments, as well as the enforcement of the 
incorporated contractual promises and undertakings. 
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In formulating the proposed allocation of the risk of 
the forgery of signatures» this thesis takes into account 
economic considerationsp as well as the considerations 
relevant to the institution of negotiable instruments~ 
The theory underlying such an attitude is firstly, to 
reconcile with recent developments in the law, secondly to 
accommodate the needs of modern society and thirdly, to 
promote the efficiency of a significant finance 
instrument. The promotion of the efficiency of 
negotiable instruments would necessarily promote the 
efficiency of the market. 
Finally, this thesis examines the attitude of the 
major existing legal systems in allocating the forgery of 
signatures in the context of negotiable instruments. In 
particular, it examines the attitude of the Anglo-American 
and the Continental Geneva legal systems. It examines 
the theories underlying such an attitude. It examines 
the validity of the advanced theories. It examines the 
compatibility of the attitude of the said legal systems 
with the considerations underlying the institution of 
negotiable instruments as well as those underlying 
economic reality. Ultimately, this thesis determines the 
most compatible legal system with the proposed risk 
allocation rule. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
I. Negotiable instruments are of ancient practice. 
goes as far back as the Babylonian Their usage 
civilisation. 1 Nevertheless, their form and essential 
characteristics witnessed a chain of evolutions, in a 
manner consistent with the necessities of trade until the 
12th to 13th centuries. Italy, in that period, was 
considered to be the centre of trade in Europe. The 
merchants throughout Europe came in contact with the 
Italian Lombards, through whom negotiable instrument bills 
of exchange in their present form were introduced to 
Europe. The implications of negotiable instruments 
remained relatively constant throughout Europe, until the 
end of the 17th - the beginning of the 18th - centuries. 
Thus far, the practice relating to negotiable instruments 
on both sides of the Channel was, due to the common origin 
from which negotiable instruments evolved, as well as the 
trade exchange, substantially similar. 2 Since the 17th 
and 18th centuries, the essential characteristics of 
negotiable instruments have witnessed variant treatment. 
These differences became more apparent at the beginning of 
the 19th century when, incidentally, the practice of 
negotiable instruments was incorporated in special 
codifications.4 
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II. At present~ the major codifications of the law of 
negotiable instruments could be divided into two groups. 
namely~ the Anglo-American and the Continental Geneva 
legal groups. The main codification of the latter group 
is the Geneva Conventions of 1930 and 1931. These 
conventions were the fruit of a number of international 
endeavours to unify the laws relating to negotiable 
instruments, the most significant of which was The Hague 
regulations of 1910-1912.5 The Hague regulations, 
however, did not experience success for two reasons, 
namely the large number of reservations which made the 
purpose of unification of limited value, and the outbreak 
of the First World War.6 
After the First World War, new hopes were raised, 
calling for the unification of the laws relating to 
negotiable instruments. Under the auspices of the 
economic committee of the League of Nations, a group of 
experts were assigned the duty to report on the 
possibility of codifying a uniform law on bills of 
exchange, promissory notes and cheques.7 The outcome of 
the experts' reports was in favour of unification. 8 
However, Sir McKenzie Chalmers, the British member of the 
experts team. expressed the view that it was not feasible 
for Great Britain to join the unification process. 9 A 
similar remark was made by the representative of the 
United States of America in the 1910-1912 Hague 
conferences. 10 
In the light of the experts' reports, the economic 
committee was determined to pursue the unification 
- 21-
process, the effect of which was not to apply to the 
Anglo-American group. The committee then assigned the 
duty to draw up a draft convention on the uniform laws on 
bills of exchange, promissory notes and cheques, to 
another team of experts. 11 This draft convention was 
intended to be the basis for subsequent deliberations. 
In 1930, the committee convened a conference to 
discuss the experts' draft convention. However, it was 
decided that the conference should discuss the unification 
of the laws relation to bills, notes and cheques in two 
separate sessions. The 1930 session was concerned with 
bills of exchange and promissory notes. The 1931 session 
was, by comparison, concerned with cheques. Both 
sessions were held in Geneva. Each session came with 
three conventions. The conventions of the first session 
were the Conventions on the Uniform Laws Relating to Bills 
of Exchange and Promissory Notes (G.U.L. Bills), 12 the 
Convention on the Settlement of Some Problems of the 
Conflict of Laws Relating to Bills of Exchange and 
Promissory Notes13 and the Convention on Stamp Charges. 14 
The conventions of the 1931 session were, the Convention 
on the Uniform Law on Cheques (G.U.L. Cheques),15 the 
Convention on the Settlement of Some Problems of the 
Conflict of Laws Relating to Cheques16 and the Convention 
on Stamp Charges.l7 The six above-mentioned conventions, 
in particular those relating to the Uniform Law and those 
relating to the Conflict of Laws were ratified by the 
majority of the European legal systems and became a part 
of their respective national laws. 18 
- 22-
The major codification in the Anglo-American group is 
the English Bills of Exchange Act (1882) B.E.A. 19 The 
draftsman of this Act, Sir McKenzie Chalmers' main task 
was to codify the English Common Law as it then stood 9 20 
in order to secure the approval of Parliament. However 9 
the B.E.A. was not the first codification of law relating 
to negotiable instruments, nor did it repeal all previous 
codifications in this field. In particular, Section 19 
of the 1853 Stamp Act 21 remains operative. The B.E.A. 
remains, in its major part, the law applicable to 
negotiable instruments, as far as the English municipal 
law is concerned. 
In 1957, in the light of the Mocatta committee's 
report, an act relating to cheques and other analogous 
instruments was passed. It is purported to be a 
supplement to the B.E.A, apart from Section 4 which 
repeals Section 82 B.E.A. 22 The purpose of the 1957 
Cheques Act was to afford the banking industry more 
protection. Collecting bankers were to benefit most from 
such protection.23 
The influence of the B.E.A. was not confined to the 
English legal system. Rather, it travelled across the 
Atlantic and beyond the Continent. Canada and the 
Commonwealth countries adopted the B.E.A. wholly or 
partly. In the United States, the B.E.A. has also been 
consulted. The draftsmen of the 1896 Uniform Negotiable 
Instruments Law (N.I.L.), the first United States 
negotiable instruments codification, borrowed a great deal 
from the B.E.A. At the close of the first half and the 
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beginning of the second half of the 20th century, it was 
felt that the N.I.L. necessitated review. The New York 
Commission on Uniform Laws included in the Uniform 
Commercial Code, two articles relating to negotiable 
instruments. One article was concerned with regulating 
the rules relating to commercial paper (Article 3) and the 
other was concerned with bank collection (Article 4). 
Both Articles, in their current version, were approved in 
1962. 24 They constitute the municipal law of all states 
of the United States apart from Louisiana which still 
retains the N.I.L. 
The draftsmen of Article 3 u.c.c. did not, however, 
intend to change the major portion of the N.I.L. 
provisions. Their intention was to recodify the 
provisions of the N.I.L. in order to clarify the 
uncertainties created by the latter, keep the standard of 
codification in line with modern standards and regulate 
new matters not covered by the N.I.L. 25 In summary, the 
rules of Article 3 in their major part were but old wine 
in a new bottle. 
III. The issue of unifying the rules regulating negotiable 
instruments was also raised in the United Nations. In 
1969, the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Laws (UNCITRAL) expressed its desire to consolidate the 
rules regulating negotiable instruments in a uniform law. 
However, it was recommended that the scope of the intended 
uniform law should be confined to international negotiable 
instruments and it should be of optional application. 26 
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That is to say that in instances w·here the parties to a 
negotiable instrument intend to subject their document to 
the rules of the uniform law, they would have to manifest 
their intention in express termso 
In carrying out the above-mentioned desire, UNCITRAL 
circulated a questionnaire among banks, the trade 
institutes and other interested organisations. Later, it 
asked the Secretary General, in the light of the deposited 
replies and with the assistance of its study group, to 
prepare a draft uniform law on international bills of 
exchange, together with a commentary. 27 In 1972 UNCITRAL 
formed a special working group and assigned to it the duty 
to: 
(1) revise the draft uniform law, 
(2) modify and extend the scope of the said uniform law to 
international promissory notes, and 
(3) consider the possibility of drafting a parallel 
uniform law applicable to international cheques. 28 
In 1977, the scope of the draft uniform law on 
international bills of exchange was modified so as to 
apply to international promissory notes.29 Later, 
UNCITRAL decided to incorporate the rules regulating 
international negotiable instruments in a convention 
rather than a uniform law. It also decided that, due to 
the differences in the function of the various forms of 
negotiable instruments, the rules formulating the document 
in question, 
conventions. 
should be regulated in two separate 
One convent ion should be concerned with 
regulating the rules relating to international bills of 
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exchange and international promissory notes~ whilst the 
other convention should be concerned with regulating the 
rules relating to international cheques.30 It was 
emphasized again that the application of the said 
convention should be optional. In 1982 the Secretary 
General, with the assistance of the study group of 
UNCITRAL produced two draft conventions on international 
bills of exchange, international promissory notes and 
international 
commentaries. 31 
cheques respectively, together with 
UNCITRAL circulated the two draft 
conventions with their commentaries among the member 
states for comment. In light of the deposited replies, 
the commission decided to confine its efforts momentarily 
to the task 
international 
of unifying the rules 
bills of exchange and 
relating to 
international 
promissory notes.32 From 1984 until 1987, the working 
group on international negotiable instruments engaged in 
revising the draft convention on International Bills of 
Exchange and International Promissory Notes.33 In 1987 
UNCITRAL submitted the final version of the draft 
Convention to the General Assembly for approval. In 
1988, the General Assembly approved the draft Convention. 
Accordingly, it invited all member states to ratify, 
accede, accept or approve, the Convention on International 
Bills of Exchange and International Promissory Notes. 34 
It set 30th June 1990 as the last date for depositing 
documents of ratification, accession, acceptance or 
approval. By virtue of Article 86 of the Convention, for 
the Convention to come into force, twelve ratifications, 
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accessions, acceptances or approvals would have to be 
deposited within the time mentioned above. 
Apparently, the Convention on International Bills of 
Exchange and International Promissory Notes, has failed to 
obtain the necessary ratifications, accessions, 
acceptances or approvals. Until the 9th May 1990, only 
one country had deposited its document of ratification to 
the Secretariat of the United Nations.3 5 
IV. A major obstacle which restrained the Anglo-American 
legal systems from joining the Geneva Conventions and 
which restrained the member states of the United Nations 
from joining the Convention on International Bills of 
~~./' 
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the risk of the forgery of signatures. This is due to 
the fact that the risk in question involves a large number 
of competing interests. Its determination affects the 
relationship of the competing parties, the rights and 
liabilities arising from the negotiable transaction as 
well as the function of negotiable instruments. 36 The 
erosion of the controversy surrounding the allocating of 
the risk of the forgery of signatures is relatively old. 
Its evolution37 could be traced back as far as the 17th, 
18th and 19th centuries. 
V. The issue of allocating the risk of the forgery of 
signatures still occupies the law in the various legal 
systems. In the United States, since the promulgation of 
the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), several legislative 
- 27-
enactments and proposals were intended to address this 
very issue. Examples of these enactments and proposals 
are the Federal Regulation J,3B the Uniform Consumer 
Credit Code (UCCC), 39 and the Uniform New Payment Code 
(UNPC).40 Currently the American Law Institute (A.L.I.) 
and the United States National Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) are engaging in reviewing 
the present version of Articles 3 and 4 u.c.c. The new 
Articles 3 and 4 are expected to be approved in the second 
half of 1990. The aim of reviewing the said articles is 
related to the manner of allocating the risk of the 
forgery of signatures.41 
In the United Kingdom, urgent calls have been raised 
to review the manner in which the English legal system 
treats the problem of the forgery of signatures. It is 
thought that the said treatment is incompatible with 
modern real! ty. The Consumer Credit Act (CCA) is not 
considered to have a great impact on the English legal 
system, especially in the manner in which risk allocation 
has been treated.42 Therefore, the new calls urge that 
dealing in negotiable instruments should be reviewed to 
follow the new changes.43 
The subject of risk allocation in general has also 
been the concern of legal literature. Since the 1950's, 
a growing tendency has been witnessed, the aim of which is 
to examine the problem of risk allocation with reference 
to market needs.44 More specifically, the tendency has 
been to allocate risk in a manner compatible with economic 
efficiency. This tendency was initiated in the United 
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States and~ in recent years, it has been imported 
to the The significance of economic analysis 
considerations in allocating risk have been influencing 
the problem of risk allocation in the context of 
negotiable instruments& Federal Regulation J» the UCCC~ 
the UNPC, the new Articles 3 and 4, as well as th.e urgent 
calls for renewal in the U.K.45, are all directed to apply 
economic analysis considerations in formulating their 
respective risk allocation rule. 
VI. Due to the growing tendency on the legislative as 
well as the legal literature scale to determine the issue 
of risk allocation on the basis of economic analysis, this 
thesis intends to examine the problem of the risk of the 
forgery of signatures in the context of negotiable 
instruments. It intends to determine the efficient 
manner in allocating the risk under consideration. It 
intends to examine the attitude of the Anglo-American and 
the Continental Geneva legal systems in allocating the 
said risk. Ultimately, it intends to determine the 
compatibility of the attitude of the legal systems under 
consideration with the proposed risk allocation rule. 
The value of this work is of relevance in the context 
of the European Economic Community (E. E. C.). It 
supplements 
community. 
the harmonisation process in the said 
The objective of harmonising the rules of law 
is significant in the commercial context. It reduces the 
element of uncertainty among the members of the commercial 
community. Accordingly, the objective of harmonising the 
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rules of law in the commercial context facilitates the 
engagement in commercial transactions. Such an objective 
is essential for the introduction and promotion of a 
single European market. It enhances the efficiency of 
such an institution. 
A significant ingredient in shaping an efficient 
market is the introduction of an efficient finance 
instrument. This is because the finance instrument is 
the means through which the monetary obligations arising 
from the engagement in the market are settled. Since 
negotiable instruments are a significant finance 
instrument, the rules regulating their dealings must be 
efficient. They should be designed toenable such 
documents to fulfil their intended function. It is 
submitted that the reules relating to the allocation of 
the risk of the forgery of signatures play an important 
role in determining the nature of negotiable instruments. 
Ultimately, the rules under consideration are relevant in 
determining the efficiency of such documents. There, in 
order to prescribe an efficient negotiable instrument, the 
rules regulating the allocation of the risk of the forgery 
of signatures should be efficient. They should be 
designed to promote the economic function of negotiable 
instruments. 
From the foregoing, it could be concluded that the 
formation of an efficient rule in allocating the risk of 
the forgery of signatures enhances the efficiency of the 
market. Thus, it is hoped that this enquiry would be 
taken into consideration at the European Economic 
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Community level o Such an attitude would go along with 
the intention to introduce a single European market as 
well as the desire to introduce a single European 
currencyo 
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CHAPTER TWO 
'' (, !'I.· 
THE LIABILITY ON NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS. 
INTRODUCTION 
(i) The concept of negotiable instruments is of a wide 
application. It involves every document that features 
three distinctive and inter-related attributes. Firstly, 
the holder of the document in question possesses an 
enforceable right in his own name. Secondly, the prima 
facie regularity of the document relieves the holder of 
the burden of establishing his claim, and finally, the 
holder of the document possesses a perfect and 
unimpeachable title. 1 The latter attribute is the 
most significant attribute of all. Its application 
distinguishes negotiable instruments from other forms of 
chose in action. 
Two types of documents could, in the light of the 
foregoing application, qualify as negotiable instruments, 
viz. •documents of title• and •money documents•. Examples 
of the former are the bill of lading and warehouse 
receipts. Examples of the money document are bills of 
exchange, share certificates and treasury bills. 
The main distinction between the above two mentioned 
types of documents lies in the right incorporated in the 
document in question. The document of title e.g. bill of 
lading, incorporates an obligation to deliver tangible 
property to a third party i.e. the consignee. The 
possession of the document in question conclusively 
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presumes in favour of its lawful possessor, his 
entitlement to the said property. Thus the lawful 
possessor, i.e. holder of the bill of lading, may force 
the carrier, i.e. the issuer of the bill, to deliver to 
him the specified property. 2 
The money document, by comparison, incorporates a 
monetary obligation. The issuer of the document promises 
to pay to a third party a specified sum of money or 
arranges with another that payment of a specified sum of 
money shall be made in favour of a third party. 3 The 
possession of the money document conclusively presumes in 
favour of its lawful possessor, i.e. holder, a property 
right to the document. Accordingly the lawful possessor 
may force the issuer, or any other person to whom the 
payment order is directed, to make payment to him. The 
possessor, i.e. holder of the document, establishes a 
property right to the monetary claim incorporated in the 
document in question. 
Notwithstanding the above distinction, the two types 
of document are deemed to qualify as 
instruments, in the sense mentioned above.4 
negotiable 
The holder 
of the document, be it a money document or a document of 
title, possesses an interest enforceable in his own name, 
a prima facie presumption of regularity and an 
unimpeachable title to the document in question. 
(ii) By comparison with the wide application of the 
concept of negotiable instruments, the term under 
consideration, in this thesis, involves a narrower 
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application. The concept of negotiable instrument» in 
its strict sense» is used to connote what the modern 
literature terms "commercial paperw.5 Generally 
speaking~ a commercial paper could be defined as an 
unconditional promise or order in writing, to pay a third 
party a specified sum of money, on demand or at a future 
time. 
The narrow application of the concept of negotiable 
instruments necessarily excludes documents of title. The 
obligation incorporated in documents of title is not 
monetary in nature. The issuer of the document in 
question undertakes to deliver the shipped property to the 
named consignee, or to any person to whose favour the 
delivery order is directed, i.e. the holder of the 
document. 
Furthermore, for a document to qualify as a 
commercial paper, i.e. a negotiable instrument in the 
strict sense, the general mercantile custom of the land 
must accept the document in question as a commercial 
paper. The mercantile custom is deemed to be the 
determinative factor as to the admissibility of the 
various forms of commercial paper; it is submitted to be 
the creative source of such documents. Although share 
certificates, treasury bills and other securities might 
satisfy the general definition of negotiable instruments 
in the strict sense, 
mercantile custom, 
they might 
qualify as 
not, in the 
commercial 
eyes of 
paper. 6 
Thus the main characteristic of negotiable instruments 
i.e. the fact that the holder of the instrument obtains 
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an unimpeachable title (so termed the negotiability 
characteristic)~ may be subject to limitations which may 
not be applicable had the instrument in question been 
interpreted as commercial paper.7 
(iii) Some doubts have been cast upon personal cheques~ 
bills of exchange and promissory notes as proper 
negotiable instruments in the strict sense of the term. 8 
The essence of these doubts is based upon comparing 
negotiable instruments with real money. Negotiable 
instruments in this sense are confined to those documents 
the purchasing power of which is definite. That is to 
say that for a document to satisfy the true definition of 
negotiable instrument the enforcement of the monetary 
claim incorporated in it must be certain and absolute. 9 
Personal cheques, bills of exchange and promissory notes 
are not negotiable instruments in this sense. Their 
enforcement could be disturbed by the occurrence of 
various events, e.g. the issuance of cheques etc. against 
insufficient or non-existing funds, and the issuance of 
stop payment orders. Negotiable instruments, in the 
suggested sense of the term, as could be noted from the 
foregoing, would be confined to bank notes, cashiers 
cheques and other analogous instruments.lO 
To approach a proper conception of the term 
negotiable instruments, reference to this effect should be 
made to the creative source of such documents i.e. the 
general mercantile custom. 
that merchants, through 
It is by no means evident 
the practice of whom the 
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mercantile custom was established, have intended that the 
concept of negotiable instruments shall denote real money. 
Had the merchants designed such intention, the purpose of 
facilitating the transmission of money would failo The 
instances in which money would be easily transferable 
would have been severely limited, especially in the 
period when the business of banking had not taken its 
proper shape. 11 
In conclusion the term negotiable instrument, as used 
in this thesis, and upon which the essence of this thesis 
is based, will be construed in its proper restricted 
application i.e. to denote commercial paper. 
The Creation of Negotiable Instruments 
The creation of negotiable instruments in the proper 
strict sense presupposes the existence of one or more 
independent transactions. The number of the presupposed 
transactions varies 
instrument involved. 
according to the form of the 
If the instrument in question was a 
simple two party document, such as an ordinary promissory 
note, one independent transaction underlies the creation 
of the instrument. If, however, the instrument involved 
was a three party document such as a cheque, bill of 
exchange or a domiciled promissory note,12 two independent 
transactions would underlie the creation of the instrument 
in question. 
In both instances, the presupposed transaction or 
transactions, such as a contract of sale, give rise to a 
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debtor/creditor relationship, the primary obligation of 
which is to pay a fixed sum of money. By way of 
discharging the underlying monetary obligation, the debtor 
in the independent transaction issues, accepts or indorses 
a negotiable instrument. By engaging on the instrument, 
the debtor "promises" to pay or "undertakes" the payment 
of the instrument, the face value of which is equal to the 
original debt arising from the underlying independent 
transaction e.g. the contract of sale. The said 
undertaking, in order to discharge the underlying 
obligation, runs in favour of the creditor. 
In the two party form of instrument, where a single 
independent transaction underlies the creation of the 
instrument, the debtor in the independent transaction, by 
way of discharging his underlying obligation, issues the 
two party instrument, e.g. promissory note in favour of 
his creditor. The debtor's engagement on the instrument 
takes the form of "making".l3 His signature operates in 
two capacities, namely, issuance and acceptance. By 
virtue of the latter, the obligor undertakes to pay the 
instrument on its day of maturity. 
In the three party form of instrument, by comparison, 
where two independent transactions underlie the creation 
of the instrument, the creator, i.e. issuer of the 
instrument, acts in a double capacity if the two 
independent transactions are taken together. He, in one 
of them acts as a creditor, whilst he acts as a debtor in 
the other. In his capac! ty as a creditor, the issuer 
draws a bill of exchange or cheque on his debtor, e.g. a 
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bank. In his capacity as a debtor~ he negotiates the 
bill or cheque, as the case may be, to his creditor» 
whereby the latter becomes the beneficiary» i.e. ~payeeR. 
Thus» in the three party instrument, the issuer must 
always be in credit. He must put the person upon whom he 
intends to draw the instrument in funds. However, by 
issuing the instrument in question the issuer or drawer 
engages to secure the payment of the instrument to the 
payee i.e. beneficiary. That is to say that the 
issuer /drawer guarantees that the "drawee" shall honour 
the instrument. Should the latter fail, the issuer 
undertakes to pay the payee the face value of the 
instrument, plus any incurrable expenses.14 
The Relationships arising out of 
the Creation of Negotiable Instruments 
The relationships arising out of the creation of 
negotiable instruments are closely connected with those 
arising out of the independent transactions underlying the 
creation of such documents. Thus, in instances of the 
two party instrument, the relevant relationship is that 
between the maker of the instrument and its payee. Since 
the making of the instrument necessarily incorporates its 
acceptance, due to the double capacity of the issuer as a 
maker and acceptor, 15 a direct relationship is created 
between the maker and the payee. 
supplementary to that established 
It is analogous, but 
in the independent 
underlying transaction. That is to say, that a 
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debtor/creditor relationship is created by virtue of the 
making. The maker accepts to pay the payee a fixed sum 
of money on the day of maturity. 
As to the three party instrument, a distinction must 
be made between .. immediaten and "remote" parties. The 
determinative factor in this connection is, again, the 
independent transactions underlying the creation of the 
instrument in question. The parties are deemed to be 
immediate if there is a direct relationship connecting 
them. If, by comparison, no direct relationship exists, 
the parties in question are deemed to be remote. Since 
the two independent transactions underlying the creation 
of the three party instrument are independent, the direct 
relationship evolving from the issuing or drawing is 
confined to that between the drawer and drawee on the one 
hand and to that between the drawer and the payee on the 
other. Here too, the relationship in both instances is 
of a debtor/creditor nature. In the first, the drawer is 
the creditor whilst the drawee is the debtor. In the 
second, the drawer is the debtor whilst the payee is the 
creditor. Since, due to the independent nature of the 
underlying transaction, the drawee and payee are remote, 
no relationship could be established between them. The 
only remedy according to which the payee may force the 
drawee to make payment, is to base his cause of action on 
the negotiable instrument. This would not be established 
unless and until the drawee accepts the instrument.16 
The act of acceptance creates a direct relationship 
' vis-a-vis the drawee and the payee, whereby the former 
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undertakes to pay to the latter the instrumento 17 That 
is to say, by virtue of the acceptance, a debtor/creditor 
relationship between the drawee and the payee comes into 
existence a 
The Liability on the Underlying Obligation 
From the foregoing, it could be noted that negotiable 
instruments are means of securing payment. They operate 
as a means of discharging monetary obligations arising out 
of independent transactions. The debtor in a particular 
transaction transfers his monetary claim against his 
debtor in the said transaction to his creditor in another 
transaction. The monetary obligation on the instrument 
is a mere representation of the monetary obligation 
created by the independent transaction. 
Since the creation of a negotiable instrument 
presupposes the existence of an independent transaction or 
transactions, it is essential to examine in particular the 
relationship between the obligations arising from the 
independent transaction or transactions, with that arising 
from the negotiable instrument transaction. 
The Nature of Negotiable Instruments 
The nature of negotiable instruments can be realised 
by making reference to their creative source, i.e. 
mercantile custom.l8 Merchants, through their practice, 
noted the risk of theft involved in the transmission of 
money. Their bilateral engagements, especially on the 
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international sphere became~ accordingly~ vulnerable to 
the evolving risk. To promote international trade~ it 
was felt that a substitute for money was essential. For 
the intended creation to fulfil its intended function, 
it had to possess some of the attributes of money. In 
particular, the intended creation had, firstly, to be 
freely transferable and, secondly, it had to operate as a 
means of discharging monetary obligationse 
Bills of exchange were elected to serve the above 
mentioned function. The historical evolution of 
., 
negotiable instruments clearly illustrates the bill of 
exchange's transformation of function in international 
trade. In the early stages, bills of exchange were used 
to facilitate foreign exchange transactions. A merchant 
who intended to do business in one locality arranged with 
a money exchanger in his locality to provide money in the 
currency of the former locality, to an amount equal to a 
specified sum of money. The exchanger, upon receipt of 
the money intended to be exchanged ordered, in writing, 
his agent based in the local! ty to which the merchant 
intended to travel. to make payment to the latter of a sum 
of money in the currency of that locality, equal to the 
sum of money deposited with him i.e. the exchanger.l9 
At present, bills of exchange are vested with the 
payment attribute. They are used to facilitate 
international sale contracts. The overseas seller, by 
way of securing the proceeds of the sale, i.e. the price 
of the sold goods, draws a bill of exchange payable to his 
order and presents it to the corresponding bank for 
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payment, acceptance or guaranty. In instances where the 
bill was payable at a future date, the bank's acceptance 
served as a security to the seller. Thusp if he elects 
to cash the bill before its day of maturity, he may 
discount it with a third party, or he may use it as 
security in a back-to-back credit. 
To state the obvious, the function of the bill of 
exchange in the early history and its function in the 
international sale contract are not synonymous, although 
they are both presumed to facilitate international trade. 
In the early part, the function of the bill of exchange 
was to exchange one specie of a particular genus for 
another specie of the same genus. That is to say that 
the bill of exchange operated to exchange money in one 
currency for money in another currency. In the 
international sale contract, the function of the bill of 
exchange is to secure payment of the price of the sold 
goods. The acceptance or guaranty of the corresponding 
bank enables the payee i.e. drawer/seller to transform the 
bill of exchange into money immediately, or use it as 
security, i.e. to attribute to it the characteristics of 
money. 
A further illustration of the negotiable instrument's 
payment attribute is its capacity of being liquidated into 
money immediately. Cheques are the common types of such 
instruments. They are firstly drawn on a bank and 
secondly they are payable on demand. Cheques are 
submitted to be an offspring of bills of exchange, the 
first known form of negotiable instrument among 
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merchants. 20 However~ bills of exchange may also be 
liquidated into money immediately. Like cheques they may 
be drawn on a bank and payable on demand.21 A common 
type of such an instrument is the domiciled bill.22 
Although negotiable instruments are intended to 
substitute money, the resemblance between the two 
instruments is not absolute. There are two major 
distinctions between negotiable instruments and money. 23 
In the first place, money possesses an absolute and 
certain purchasing power. The possessor may realise the 
credit incorporated in it exclusively to his favour. The 
holder of a negotiable instrument, by contrast, might not 
possess an !dent !cal right. His right of enforcement 
could be frustrated by the interposition of defences and 
claims or by the issuance of stop payment orders. 24 
In the second place, money affords in favour of its 
tenderer an absolute discharge. It is deemed to be the 
legal tender of the land. The acquirer of money forfeits 
his rights of recourse against the giver. By comparison, 
the tenderer of a negotiable instrument does not establish 
in his favour an absolute discharge. Negotiable 
instruments are not legal tender. Their acquisition 
suspends the operativeness of their discharge until their 
date of maturity. If the instrument was finally paid, 
the obligations incorporated in the instrument would be 
discharged. The effect of their discharge runs 
retroactively to the day of engagement. Since the 
obligations on the negotiable instruments are the creation 
of obligations incurred under an independent transaction, 
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the discharge on the instrument would normally discharge 
the obligation incurred in the independent transaction. 2 5 
If, however, the instrument in question was 
dishonoured, the obligation incurred on it, as well as on 
the independent transaction, revives.26 The holder then 
possesses two causes of action against his immediate 
transferor. The first is based on the negotiable 
instrument, whilst the second is based on the independent 
transaction. 
The thesis underlying the creation of double cause of 
action in favour of the holder of a negotiable instrument 
is twofold: 
1) to afford the creditor a second chance to protect his 
claim. For an example, if the time allowed for suing on 
the instrument was barred, the holder/creditor may be 
successful in resting his action on the original 
obligation, which time of prescription is normally 
longer, 27 and 
2) to avoid the occurrence of unjustified enrichment. 
Unjustified enrichment occurs if the party liable on 
the instrument was afforded an absolute discharge by 
reason that the holder fails to enforce his instrument 
within the time prescribed. The absolutely discharged 
party in this instance would then be allowed to receive 
value, i.e. consideration, without giving something in 
return. He would be allowed to keep the purchased value 
of the instrument upon which he engaged, as well as the 
monetary credit incorporated in it, against which the 
holder fails to satisfy his interest timely, where, by 
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contrast, the defaulting holder would be deprived of the 
value which he offers as a consideration for the purchased 
instrument, as well as the monetary credit incorporated 
in it. The exchange of consideration is essential in 
bilateral contracts, such as negotiable instruments. The 
consideration of one party is presumed to be the 
inducement for the other party's promise to perform. 28 
Nevertheless, there are instances whereby the holder 
of the instrument would be deprived of the availability of 
double cause of action in the event of non-payment. The 
obligation incurred under the independent transaction 
could be impaired by virtue of the effect inflicted upon 
the obligation incurred on the negotiable instrument. 
The discharge of the latter may discharge the former. 
The focal issue of these instances is the injurious 
misbehaviour of the holder towards the party against whom 
the right of recovery is sought to be enforced.29 
Since the obligation incurred under the independent 
transaction and the obligation incurred on the instrument 
are inter-related it would be in order to examine the 
liability established on negotiable instruments. 
The Liability on Negotiable Instruments 
The liability on negotiable instruments may be 
divided into "primary" and "secondary" liability. 
Primary Liability 
(i) The term primary liability has different 
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connotations. It could mean that liability which is 
attached to the principal debtor in the transaction in 
question. In other words, the primarily liable person is 
the ultimate debtor who cannot recoup his losses from any 
other party in the transaction. For an example, the 
drawer of a negotiable instrument is primarily liable on 
it if he fails to make the fund from which the instrument 
is to be paid, available in the hands of the drawee. 
The term primary liability could also mean that 
liability which is attached to the person from whom 
creditors seek their debts, without following procedural 
requirements for establishing their claims against the 
debtor. For an example, the acceptor and maker of a bill 
of exchange and promissory note respectively, are 
primarily liable on the bill or note. The payee/creditor 
or holder may proceed against the said acceptor or maker, 
notwithstanding the observance of the statutory duties of 
presentment, drawing up protest or giving notice of 
dishonour. Their liability crystallises on the day on 
which the instrument falls due. 
( ii) The two senses of primary liability need not, 
however, be present in one person simultaneously. He 
could be primarily liable in the first sense, but not the 
second and vice versa. For an example, the drawer of a 
bill who fails to make funds available in the hands of the 
drawee is not primarily liable on the instrument, as far 
as the Geneva legal group is concerned. Article 53 of 
the G. U. L. (Bills) expressly dismisses the right of the 
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negligent holder who fails to procure timely presentment~ 
protest and notice of dishonour, of recourse against the 
drawero 30 
This article reads in part ooo 
"After the expiration of the time limits fixed: 
for the presentment of a bill of exchange drawn 
at sight or at a fixed period after sight, 
for drawing up the protest for non-acceptance 
or non-payment~ 
for presentment for payment in the case of a 
stipulation 'retour sans frais' 
the holder loses his rights of recourse against 
the indorsers, against the drawer and against 
other parties liable, with the exception of 
the acceptor •••• " 
By contrast, the accommodation party in the case of 
an accommodation instrument is primarily liable in the 
second sense, despite the fact that he is not the 
principal debtor, as between himself and the accommodated 
party. The accommodation acceptor is deemed to be 
primarily liable on the instrument as between himself and 
the holder of the instrument. The latter may proceed 
against the former, notwithstanding the observance of the 
statutory duties mentioned above. 31 
(iii) In the context of negotiable instruments, the 
concept of primary liability denotes the second sense of 
the term, i.e. to that attached to the party against whom 
the enforcement of the instrument is initially demanded. 
Such interpretation approaches a compatible and uniform 
application. On the one hand, there are instances, due 
to the special nature of the instrument involved or due to 
a special arrangement, whereby the principal debtors are 
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deemed by law or by agreement to have intended themselves 
not to be bound primarily on the instrument, such as the 
drawer of a cheque and the drawer of an accommodation 
instrument o 32 Their engagement on the instrument, as 
drawers for example, manifests their intention, in the 
light of the special circumstances to provide a security 
in their favour and ultimately stand in a suretyship 
status. 
On the other hand, the four corners of the instrument 
do not, it is submitted, name the principal debtor. Its 
appearance prima facie implies that the drawer is 
secondarily liable. For the holder to preserve his right 
of recourse against all signatories, he, in practice, 
proceeds initially against the drawer. When and only 
when the instrument is dishonoured, the true identity of 
the principal debtor may be revealed. Accordingly, the 
relationship between the holder of the instrument and the 
latter may be formulated 
Secondary Liability 
Secondary liability is the liability which is 
attached to parties who are liable when and only when the 
primarily liable party does not meet his obligation. 
The liability of the drawer, generally speaking and 
the indorsors of a negotiable instrument is an 
illustration of secondary liability. It is not called 
into question unless and until the holder of the 
instrument first proceeds against the primarily liable 
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party e.g. the drawee. 33 However, the initial recourse 
against the primarily liable party does not suggest that 
the holder must exhaust all available remedies against the 
primarily liable party, in order to exercise his right of 
recourse against the drawer and other indorsors, i.e. the 
secondarily liable parties. A demand of payment and 
subsequent refusal by the primarily liable party is 
sufficient to raise the liability of the drawer and 
indorsors. 
Finally, in order to enforce the liability of the 
secondarily liable parties, the holder must show that the 
initial demand for payment from the party primarily liable 
has been met with refusal, and should communicate such 
refusal to the party whose liability is intended to be 
enforced. Thus, the legal systems under consideration 
impose upon the holder statutory duties to that effect. 
The holder must draw up a certificate of protest and/or 
give notice of non-payment. The failure to observe the 
said duties could cost the holder's forfeiture of his 
negotiable instrument remedy.34 
Primary and Secondary Liability Distinguished 
The difference between primary liability and 
secondary liability is that persons under the second form 
of liability stand as sureties. They are liable only 
when the primarily liable party fails to honour the 
instrument presented to him, and in the second place their 
liability is only called into question when the holder 
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carries out his obligations ioeo presentment, protest and 
giving notice of dishonour. Whereas the primarily liable 
party is liable, notwithstanding the observance of the 
duties set out aboveo 
The Status of the Parties to Negotiable Instruments 
A person becomes a party to a negotiable instrument 
by expressing 
engagement on 
the fixing of 
his engagement. The manner by which 
a negotiable instrument is expressed is 
equivalent act.35 signature or other 
Signatures appearing on negotiable instruments may take 
various forms. They may take the form of making, 
issuance, drawing, indorsement or even acceptance. Each 
of these signatures imposes upon the signatory in question 
certain liability. The type of the liability involved 
depends on the status of the signatory in question. As 
to the indorsors and acceptors, it is submitted that the 
former undertake secondary liability, whilst the latter 
undertake primary liability. 36 As a result, indorsors 
stand in a suretyship capacity. Their liability does not 
crystallise until the principal debtor refuses payment. 
Acceptors, by comparison stand as principal debtors. 
Their liability remains operative either to the holder or 
to the surety payor, until the former, i.e. the principal 
debtor, pays the instrument. 
The status of the maker and issuer of negotiable 
instruments is not as obvious as the indorsor's or 
acceptor's. Their status varies according to the type of 
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instrument involved. The maker and issuer of a 
negotiable instrument are collectively referred to in this 
chapter as the drawer. 
The Status of the Drawer of a Promissory Note 
The drawer of a promissory note is commonly known as 
the "'maker'"'. A promissory note is defined as an 
unconditional promise in writing, undertaken by one 
person, to pay a certain sum of money on demand or at a 
determinable future time, to, or to the order of a 
specified person, or bearer e 37 It is notable from this 
definition that the promissory note involves two parties, 
namely the maker of the promise and the beneficiary, i.e. 
the payee. Unlike the bill of exchange and cheque, there 
is no third party on whom the note could be drawn. The 
maker issues the note and promises to honour it at its 
date of maturity. Thus the issuance and payment of a 
note is entertained by one person only viz. the maker. 
Thus it is submitted that the maker of the note assumes 
primary liability. In his capacity as the issuer and the 
acceptor, the maker firstly becomes the principal debtor 
on the note and secondly, the holder need not observe the 
statutory duty, in order to preserve his right of recourse 
against him. The liability of the maker is established 
on the day on which the note falls due. 
Nevertheless, the maker of a note could assume 
secondary liability in one instance only. The maker of a 
note may stipulate that the note shall be paid at the 
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locality of a third partya This is known as the 
"domiciled note" It is substantially similar to the 
domiciled bill mentioned abovea 38 There, the liability 
of the acceptor is shifted from primary to secondary 
liability, whereas in the case of a domiciled note it is 
the liability of the maker which is shifted. In this 
instance, the maker acquires the advantages of parties 
secondarily liable.39 
The Status of the Drawer of a Bill of Exchange 
( i) A bill of exchange is defined as an unconditional 
order in writing, signed by the drawer addressed to 
another, directing him to pay to a third party a specified 
sum of money on demand or at a future time.40 
For one person to draw a bill of exchange on another, 
he must be in credit as to the latter. The basis of the 
said credit could be "causal" or ndepository". Examples 
of the former are the contract of sale or loan, whereby 
the intended drawee becomes indebted to the supposed 
drawer for a sum of money equal to the face value of the 
bill intended to be issued. An example of the depository 
basis is the contract of deposit between a bank and its 
customer, whereby the latter puts the former in fund to an 
amount equal to the face value of the instrument intended 
to be drawn. 
If there was no credit available in the hands of the 
intended drawee, there would be no basis, in the absence 
of a special arrangement, to expect that the intended 
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drawee shall honour the supposed drawer's payment order. 
The supposed drawer, in this instance, occupies the status 
of the principal debtor. His engagement on the bill 
imposes upon him primary liabilityo Thus» the holder of 
the bill may exercise his right of recourse against the 
drawer, notwithstanding the compliance with the statutory 
duties of prompt presentment, drawing up protest and 
giving notice of dishonour. 
The Anglo-American and the Continental Geneva legal 
systems are in agreement that the defaulting holder, in 
the instance under consideration, does not forfeit his 
right of recourse against the drawer. His right of 
recourse against the drawer is preserved either on the 
basis of the bill of exchange or on the basis of the 
general provisions of the law. Examples of the former 
are Section 46 B.E.A. and Article 170 of the French Code 
de Commerce. Section 46 reads in part: 
It 
•••• (2) Presentment for payment is dispensed with 
(c) As regards the drawer when the drawee or 
acceptor is not bound as between himself and 
the drawer, to accept or pay the bill and the 
drawer has no reason to believe that the bill 
would be paid if presented." 
Article 170 reads: 
"La meme d'ch&ance a lieu contre le porteur et 
les endosseurs a l'egard du tireur lui-meme, 
si ce dernier justifie qu'il y avait provision 
a l''cheance de la lettre de change .~.". 
An example of the right to exercise the right of 
recourse based on the general provisions of the law is the 
German legal system. By virtue of Article 53 of the 1933 
law the holder forfeits his right of recourse against the 
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indorsors as well as the drawer, if he fails to comply 
with the duty of making timely presentment and drawing up 
protest.41 Nevertheless, the holder may, on the basis of 
the concept of unjustified enrichment, have recourse 
against the drawer who does not make the fund from which 
the bill is to be paid, available in the hands of the 
drawee.42 
(ii) The drawer's status shifts into a party secondarily 
liable if, by comparison: 
1) the drawer makes the fund from which the bill is to be 
payable, available in the hands of the intended drawee, or 
2) secures in a special arrangement the acceptance of the 
intended drawee. 
Making funds available in the hands of the drawee 
signifies the existence of a credit in favour of the 
drawer. It illustrates the drawer's desire to discharge 
his monetary obligation by way of assigning his monetary 
right to his creditor against his debtor. If the holder 
were to ignore the drawer's instructions, the holder's 
conduct would, firstly, render the purpose of issuing 
negotiable instruments as a means of assigning debts, 
superfluous and secondly, it would create a situation of 
multiplicity of action. 
Two actions would be needed to settle the monetary 
obligation incorporated in the instrument. The first is 
based on the holder's right of recourse against the 
drawer, whilst the second is based on the drawer's right 
of recourse against the principal debtor, i.e. the drawee. 
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If, by comparison~ the holder was bound to proceed 
initially against the drawee, the actions involved in 
settling the monetary obligation could be condensed into 
one~ namely~ that based on the holder's right of recourse 
against the drawee immediatelyo 
(iii) The acceptance based on a special arrangement is 
illustrated in the accommodation bill situation. This 
occurs when a person lends his name to another for the 
purpose of assisting the latter to raise money. The 
accommodated party draws a bill of exchange on the 
accommodation party, who fixes his acceptance in order to 
facilitate the negotiation of the bill and ultimately the 
raising of money. 
To illustrate, assume that John Alex is the sole 
owner of a small brewery. John Alex intends to buy 
modern machinery to promote his business and compete in 
the market. Due to his financial instability, the bank 
refuses to lend him money. To secure the bank's loan, 
the applicant, John Alex must provide a security to the 
bank. The deposit of a simple bill of exchange would not 
satisfy the bank. Since the drawer is financially 
unreliable his engagement on the bill does not serve as a 
security. Thus, the drawer, John Alex may provide the 
necessary security by arranging with a reputable merchant 
to fix his acceptance on the bill. The bank may then 
accept to take the bill as a security for a loan. If the 
drawer does not pay the bill on the day of maturity, the 
bank may proceed against the reputable merchant/acceptor 
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immediately. The latter's acceptance affords the bank, 
i.e. the holder, a primarily liable solvent party from 
whom it can satisfy its interest. 
The reputable merchant in the above illustration is 
the accommodation party. The drawer, John Alex, is the 
accommodated party. Although the acceptor does not 
receive consideration from the drawer, his acceptance 
imposes upon him primary liability as between himself and 
the holder, who upon the former's acceptance, took the 
instrument. By comparison, although the drawer did not 
provide funds with the drawee, he possesses secondary 
liability as between himself and the holder. The latter, 
accordingly, may not proceed against the former unless and 
until he initially proceeds against the drawee/acceptor. 
In the event of non-payment, he must observe the statutory 
duties of drawing up protest and/or giving notice of 
dishonour. 
The Status of the Drawer of a Chegue 
A cheque is a bill of exchange payable on demand and 
drawn on a bank. 43 The deposit of money with a bank 
gives rise to a dual relationship as between the bank and 
its customer/depositor. In the first place, by crediting 
a sum of money with the bank, a creditor and debtor 
relationship is created. The bank is deemed to be the 
debtor, whilst the customer is deemed to be the 
creditor.44 In the second place, by withdrawing the 
credited money by way of issuing a negotiable instrument, 
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an agency relationship is createdo The bank is deemed to 
be the agent, whilst the customer is deemed to be the 
principalo45 By honouring the issued cheques, the drawee 
bank is presumed to appropriate so much money of the 
customer's credit equal to the face value of the 
instrument, to discharge the latter o In effect, the 
proceeds of the paid instrument are deemed to be the 
property of the customer. 
Due to the special nature of the relationship 
vis-~-vis the bank and its customer, it is arguable that 
the drawer of a cheque possesses a primary liability o 
Since the funds against which he draws his cheques are 
deemed to be his, he is presumed to be the principal 
debtor in the negotiable instrument transaction. 
To state the obvious, the concept of primary 
liability in the context of negotiable instruments in 
general, need not necessarily be acquainted with the 
principal obligor. There are instances in which 
principal debtors are released from the burden of primary 
liability. Their liability on the instrument does not 
crystallise on the day of maturity per se. The holder 
should observe the statutory duties of presentment, 
drawing up protest, and/or giving notice of dishonour.46 
On the contrary, primary liability could be attached to 
persons not intended to engage on the instrument in 
question. Primary liability, in the context of 
negotiable instruments, as has been indicated above,47 is 
attached to a person whose liability is called into 
question per se on the day when the instrument falls due. 
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The primarily liable party thus is 1) the acceptor and 
2) the drawer, who fails to provide funds with the draweeo 
The drawer of a cheque is not primarily liable in 
this senseo His provision of funds with the bank affords 
him an immunity from the burdens of primary liability o 
The drawer of a cheque, like his counterpart in bill of 
exchange transactions, occupies a secondary liability. 
His liability does not crystallise unless and until the 
holder observes the statutory duties of prompt 
presentment, drawing up protest and/or giving notice of 
dishonour. 
The Essence of Liability on Negotiable Instruments 
Negotiable instruments are money documents. Their 
creation is a fulfilment of the desire to discharge 
monetary obligation arising out of the independent 
transaction. Like the independent transaction, the 
principal obligation incorporated in the negotiable 
instrument is the payment of a specified sum of money. 
The essence of the said obligation is contractual. 
The party in question, by virtue of his making, issuance 
indorsement or acceptance, promises or undertakes to pay 
the specified sum of money. The legal basis of the said 
promise or undertaking is the affixing of the signature on 
the instrument. The act of signing prima facie presumes 
the signatory's willingness to engage on the .instrument in 
question. 
The engagement on the negotiable instrument takes the 
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form of an undertaking, when its performance is primarily 
intended to be made by other than the signatory. This 
occurs when the order to pay the monetary obligation is 
addressed to a third party, i o eo the drawee. In this 
instance the signatory in question stands as a surety on 
the instrument. His liability crystallises when and only 
when the party to whom the payment order is addressed, 
i.e. the drawee, refuses to honour the mandate. 4 8 
Examples of such signatories are the drawer and the 
indorsors. 
The engagement takes the form of a promise if the 
incorporated monetary obligation was to be performed 
by the maker of the promise. By signing, the maker 
renders himself the principal obligor. His liability 
crystallises on the day on which the instrument falls due. 
The promise or undertaking runs primarily in favour 
of the "holder". The holder of the negotiable instrument 
is the party who establishes his possession to the 
instrument from or through regular or a prima facie 
regular chain of negotiations i.e. transfers. Thus the 
holder of a negotiable instrument is its payee, the 
subsequent possessor to whose order the instrument is 
indorsed, or the bearer. 
The promise or undertaking might run to someone other 
than the above defined holder. It might run to any person 
who bona fide pays the holder of the instrument the 
monetary obligation incorporated in it. Thus, it could 
run in favour of the prior indorsor who, in the event of 
recourse against him, was compelled to make payment to the 
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holder.49 The indorser~ by paying, stands in the shoes 
of the holder e He may recoup the face value of the 
instrument from the principal obligor or any sureties 
preceding the payor indorsor. 
Finally, the monetary obligation, the performance of 
which discharges the promise or undertaking incorporated 
in the instrument is, in principle, the face value of the 
instrument, i.e. the amount for which the instrument is 
originally drawn. However, the enforceable monetary 
obligation could run higher than the face value of the 
instrument. The added value would normally be the result 
of the delay in the enforcement of the instrument. 
Examples of the added value are interest, in instances of 
delay, and the expenses of drawing up protest or giving 
notice in instances of non-payment.50 The party who is 
entitled to the amount due would be the holder or the bona 
fide payor acting in a surety capacity. 
Discharge of Liability 
The liability on negotiable instruments is discharged 
by 1) making proper payment, or 2) causing financial 
injury to an innocent party against whom the enforcement 
of the instrument is sought to be directed. 
The Injurious Behaviour of a Third Party 
The behaviour injurious to parties liable on 
negotiable instruments could take various forms. It 
could take the form of depriving the party against whom 
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the instrument is sought to be enforced of available 
securities; it could take the form of foregoing 
opportunities to prevent the occurrence of damage, or it 
could take the form of creating a situation of double 
liability. 
(i) The first form of misbehaviour is illustrated in the 
holder's 
parties 
renunciation of the right of 
liable to the party against 
intends to enforce the instrument. 
recourse 
whom the 
against 
holder 
The act of 
renunciation is an arrangement between the renouncing and 
renounced party. The former chooses not to sue the 
latter, whereby the renounced party would be absolutely 
discharged on the negotiable instrument as well as the 
underlying obligation. The act of renunciation operates 
as a form of injurious misbehaviour because it could 
impair the rights of the party against whom the negotiable 
instrument is intended to be enforcedG It could deprive 
the said party of recouping the enforced value from a 
valuable security. 
To illustrate, suppose that a bill of exchange is 
drawn by John Alex on Jimmy Johnbow. The drawer, John 
Alex issues it to David Dove. Dove endorses the bill to 
Willy Williams. Williams finally endorses the bill to 
Billy Barnes. Suppose, moreover, that Barnes, the 
holder, presents the bill to Jimmy Johnbow for payment. 
The drawee disputes his indebtedness to John Alex and, 
accordingly, refuses payment. Billy Barnes then arranges 
with the notary public to draw up a certificate of protest 
- 66-
and communicates it to the chain of indorsors and drawera 
The renunciation is presumed to be injurious if the 
holder Billy Barnes renounces the right of recourse 
against David Dove 9 the first indorsor 9 where by 
comparison he intends to enforce the bill against the 
second indorsor, namely Willy Williams. 
In the context of negotiable instruments, the order 
in which parties secondarily liable appear, on the 
instrument, is immaterial. They are jointly and 
severally liable. The holder may enforce the full face 
value of the instrument against any party regardless of 
the order of his liability.Sl 
David Dove, in the example under consideration, 
precedes Willy Williams in the chain of indorsements. 
The liability created by his indorsement runs in favour of 
each subsequent party. If the holder was allowed to 
renounce Dove's liability, Williams would lose a valuable 
security. He would be deprived of exercising his right 
of recourse against Dove. Thus, in order to prevent the 
occurrence of such injurious behaviour, it is submitted 
----- .. ~_,__,_.,...----~~ .... -
that the act of renunciation should be given a limited 
application. Its effect should not run beyond the 
renouncing party. That is to say, that if the holder 
elects to renounce the liability of a named party, it 
should be interpreted as a special arrangement between the 
renouncing party i.e. the holder and the renounced party. 
Other parties who might be injured by such renunciation 
should not be affected, otherwise they would be discharged 
as we11. 52 
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Finally, should the renunciation be given a wider 
application, the discharge from liability does not run in 
favour of all parties. Its effect is confined to those 
who might be injured by the renunciation. Thus, the 
drawer John Alex would not be discharged if Billy Barnes 
renounces the liability of David Dove. Dove is not 
liable to Alex on the instrument, thus his discharge would 
not injure Alex, the drawer. 
The discharge resulting from the renunciation 
could have an overall impact if it was intended to be 
established in favour of the principal debtor such as the 
the drawee Jimmy Johnbow in the above example. 
The renunciation of his liability would damage the 
indorsors as well as the drawer. They stand as sureties. 
The liability of the principal debtor operates as a 
security in their favour. Renunciation of that liability 
deprives the sureties of their security. Thus, they 
would be discharged to that effect. 
(ii) The "foregoing opportunity" form of misbehaviour is 
illustrated in the holder's laches. The holder of a 
negotiable instrument, who intends to enforce his 
instrument against parties secondarily liable, in 
particular the drawer, must observe the statutory duties 
of securing timely presentment, drawing up protest and/or 
giving notice of dishonour. If the principal obligor 
e.g. the drawee acceptor fails in the interval, the 
holder's right of recourse against the secondarily liable 
parties could damage the party against whom the instrument 
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is sought to be enforcedo The resulting damage is 
illustrated in causing the party in question to forego the 
opportunity to recoup the face value of the dishonoured 
instrument from the principal debtor during his solvency, 
which he would have been able to do had the holder 
observed the above mentioned statutory duties. 
To illustrate, assume that John Alex draws a bill of 
exchange on Jimmy Johnbow, payable on 31st May 1989. He 
issues the bill to David Dove whereby the latter indorses 
to Billy Barnes. On the 3rd June 1989 the court declares 
the drawee Jimmy Johnbow bankrupt. On the 6th June Billy 
Barnes learns of the bankruptcy and presents the bill for 
payment. Due to the drawee's insolvency, the appointed 
receiver refuses payment. On the following day, the 
holder draws up a certificate of protest followed by a 
notice of dishonour, and communicates the two documents to 
the indorsor David Dove and the drawer John Alex. 
{s -L(- c,..t' uJh~., ·' It is submitted that presenting the bill for payment 
"""""\.. ___ ---·---
six days after its day of maturity is too late. The 
drawing up of protest and giving a notice of dishonour is 
likewise deemed to be too late.5 3 On the other hand, the 
failure of the principal debtor Jimmy John bow, i.e. the 
drawee, would necessarily entail the composition of his 
debts. The drawee's creditors will then get a portion of 
their credits. If the holder, Billy Barnes, was allowed 
to exercise his right of recourse against the indorsor and 
the drawer, he, due to his negligence, would, in light of 
the insolvency proceedings instigated against the 
insolvent drawee, involve the said parties in the 
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composition arrangemento Accordingly, they would not be 
able to recoup the full face value of the bill from the 
bankrupt drawee. Had the holder secured timely 
presentment and so forth, the drawer against whom he would 
have exercised his right of recourse would be successful 
to recoup the full face value of the bill from the drawee, 
before the latter would be declared bankrupt. 
However, the party secondarily liable is not, by 
reason of the holder's negligence discharged from his 
liability on the negotiable instrument absolutely. He is 
discharged to the extent of the damage. Thus, it is 
submitted that the holder is subrogated to the insolvent 
drawee. He participates with the other creditors in the 
composition arrangement. The portion with which he comes 
out from the composition is deemed to signify the face 
value of the instrument.54 
(iii) The creation of a double liability situation as a 
form of misbehaviour, is illustrated in the holder's 
negligence in the custody of the instrument. Negotiable 
instruments are a form of chose in action. They possess 
some of the attributes of chattels. Their possession 
establishes in favour of the bona fide acquirer a prima 
facie good title. Their possession presumes ownership 
in favour of the possessor. Thus, the holder of a 
negotiable instrument must take adequate care in respect 
of the custody of his instrument. He must ensure that 
the instrument shall not come into the possession of a 
third party who could qualify as the protected holder, 
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i.e~ to whose favour a prima facie ownership of the 
instrument could be established. The failure to provide 
such care could result in subjecting the principal debtor 
or his sureties to double liability. The first is based 
on the underlying obligation in favour of the true owner 
from whose custody the instrument escapes and the second 
is based on the negotiable instrument in favour of the 
third party into whose possession the instrument comes. 
To illustrate the instance in which the negligence of 
the holder of a negotiable instrument in the safe custody 
of his document, could result in an injury to an innocent 
party, assume that John Alex issues a cheque payable to 
bearer. By way of discharging his indebtedness to David 
Dove, he delivers the cheque to the latter. David Dove 
receives the cheque shortly before the company's board 
meeting. Dove places the cheque on his desk and leaves 
the office to attend the meeting. The cleaner, Willy 
Williams, enters the office to do the routine cleaning. 
In the course of his job, Willy Williams notices the 
cheque lying on the desk. Due to his financial 
difficulties, he decides to misappropriate the cheque. 
To conceal his dishonesty, he negotiates the cheque for 
value with Billy Barnes, a bona fide third party. 
The bearer form of negotiable instruments is an 
example of those documents the possession of which could 
create a good title in favour of the bona fide acquirer. 
Bearer instruments such as the cheque in the above 
example, are equivalent to money as far a-s their free 
transferability is concerned. They do not specify a 
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particular person to whose order the monetary claim 
incorporated in them shall be payable. They indicate 
that they are payable to bearer. The status of bearer 
may be satisfied by mere possession of the instrument. 
In the light of the special nature of bearer instruments 
as chattels, on the one hand, and as money on the other, 
the bona fide acquirer of such instruments, Billy Barnes, 
for an example, could qualify as their lawful holder. 
He, accordingly, may enforce the instrument in his own 
name and he may, moreover, transfer good title to bona 
fide third parties. 
In the Anglo-American, as well as the Continental 
Geneva legal systems,55 the finder or thief of a bearer 
instrument, such as the cheque in the above example, may 
pass good title in favour of bona fide third parties. 
Since Billy Barnes derives his title to the cheque from a 
person possessing a prima facie good title, he may qualify 
as the lawful holder of the cheque. He, firstly, 
establishes a good title to the cheque and secondly, he 
may enforce the monetary claim incorporated in it, against 
the obligors e.g. John Alex, the drawer. 
The instance which led the instrument to come into 
the possession of a third party capable of satisfying the 
lawful holder status is the original true owner's, i.e. 
David Dove's negligence, in the custody of his instrument. 
Had he taken the necessary precautions, he would have 
prevented its escape from his possession in the first 
place. Thus, it is submitted, that the negligent true 
owner of the instrument may not exercise his right of 
~-· 
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recourse against his immediate or remote obligor eo go 
John Alex, either on the instrument or the underlying 
obligation. 56 By securing the delivery of the bearer 
instrument in favour of the former party, the prior 
obligor is presumed to have foregone the opportunity to 
exercise an effective control on it and ultimately he is 
presumed to have foregone the opportunity to provide 
against its misuse. If the original true owner in such 
an instance was entitled to exercise a right of recourse 
against the prior obligor, the risk arising from the 
fraudulent misuse of the instrument in question would be 
allocated to an entirely innocent party, whilst the 
relatively negligent party i.e. the original true owner 
would escape liability. In order to avoid approaching 
such an inefficient and unjust rule the original true 
owner in the instance under consideration should be 
disentitled from exercising a right of recourse against 
the prior obligor whilst the latter party should be 
afforded a valid discharge of his obligation by mere 
delivery of the instrument to his creditor. 
Proper Payment 
A negotiable instrument is deemed to be discharged if 
properly paid. Proper payment occurs if the payor 
complies strictly with the mandate of his creditor, i.e 
the instrument. 
it must be made: 
Thus, for a payment to qualify as proper 
1) to the holder of the instrument, and 
~ 73-
2) on or after the day of maturity.57 
The non-compliance with the mandate could damage its maker 
i.e. drawer or issuer of the instrument. 
Payment to other than the holder, damages the maker 
of the mandate, in the sense that it does not discharge 
him as between himself and the lawful holder. The maker 
remains liable, either on the instrument or on the 
underlying obligation to his creditor i.e. the lawful 
holder. The damage resulting from the payment before the 
day of maturity is illustrated in charging to the maker, 
undue obligation. The maker of the mandate against whom 
the payment is charged would either forfeit the advantage 
of available credit or the advantage of available 
security. 
To illustrate, assume that John Alex purchases 
an advertised secondhand car from David Dove. By way 
of guaranteeing that the purchased secondhand car is 
reasonably reliable, John Alex arranges with Dove to pay 
him a post dated cheque. If the drawee bank was allowed 
to pay Dove the cheque on the day of presentment, he 
would be discharging John Alex's security. Should the 
secondhand car prove to be faulty before the post dated 
day, the issuer, John Alex, would forfeit the advantage of 
countermanding payment. 
The Holder's Conundrum 
It has been alluded to above58 that the essence of 
the promise or undertaking incorporated in negotiable 
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instruments is to pay the nholderw of the instrument its 
face value. Payment to the holder discharges the parties 
to the instrument absolutely. They are discharged as to 
their negotiable instrument transaction, as well as their 
underlying obligations arising out of the independent 
transaction to which they were parties. 
The term holder, applies to any person to whose 
favour the property of the instrument is established. It 
is equivalent to the concept of owner in the law of 
property. The party to whose favour the property of the 
instrument is established, is the party to whose favour 
the negotiability characteristics of negotiable 
instruments run. He, firstly, possesses an enforceable 
right in his own interest. Secondly, he enjoys the 
advantages of a prima facie regularity. Finally, and 
more significantly, he obtains a good title to the 
instrument or to the paid proceeds. He may enforce the 
instrument against all signatories. He may retain the 
proceeds of payment and he may negotiate his instrument 
with third parties. 
The status of the holder in the area of negotiable 
instruments, like the law of property, could be the 
subject of conflicting claims. Two parties may each 
claim to satisfy the holder status. An example of such 
instance is the theft of bearer instruments. The party 
from whom the instrument was stolen and the party into 
whose hands the instrument comes, claim to satisfy the 
holder status. The purpose of such claim is to assert 
the exclusive right to the instrument and to the rights 
.·; 
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evolving from it. 
The determination of the holder status necessarily 
involves the allocation of risk. The rule proposed, in 
-----~-~~..--~ ·---~~ .. ~ -"'"--- ......... 
determining the holder, would necessarily deny the holder 
status to one of the competing parties, whilst it 
establishes it in favour of the other. The party against 
whom the rule operates would be left to suffer the 
resulting loss. He either would be denied the right to 
enforce the monetary obligation incorporated in the 
instrument, or the right to retain its proceeds. 
The determination of the party to whose interest the 
holder status should be established and ultimately the 
party to whom the evolving risk should be allocated, must 
be founded on rational bases. The relevant interests 
should be taken into account in formulating the rule. 
The interests relevant to formulating the risk allocation 
rule are those compatible with policy considerations of a 
rational legal system. The relevant interest, as well as 
the rational policy considerations are discussed more 
fully in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
BACK NOTES 
1. For the wide application of the concept of negotiable 
instruments in general see Byles on Bills of Exchange 
(1983) 25th Edtn., p.3 • 
See also McLoughlin, Introduction to Negotiable 
Instruments, (1975), p.24. 
2. For the negotiability attribute of negotiable 
instruments and its main characteristics see 
Schmitthoff's EXPORT TRADE, (1986), 8th Edtn., pp.481-482. 
3. For the general definition of money document and its 
various forms see pp.37-40 infra. 
4. See p.36 supra. 
5. For example, the draftsmen of the United States 
Uniform Commercial Code (U. C. C.) depart from the formal 
Negotiable Instruments Laws method of regulating the rules 
relating to negotiable instruments. They separate 
between the various forms of such instruments. In 
Article 3, they regulate the rules relating to Bills of 
Exchange (drafts) Cheques, Promissory Notes and Bankers 
Deposit Receipts. Article 7 regulates the rules relating 
to Documents of Title. Article 8, by comparison, 
regulates the rules relating to Investment Securities~ 
In distinguishing the type of instrument regulated under 
Article 3 from the various forms of negotiable 
instruments, the draftsmen of the u.c.c. collectively 
refer to the said instruments as Commercial Paper. 
6. The u.c.c. illustrates the restricted application 
of the concept of commercial paper. Article 3 regulates 
four types of commercial paper. See Note 5. It 
excludes share certificates, treasury bills and other 
forms of investment securities from its application. 
They are regulated under a separate article i.e. 
Article 8. Similar to the u.c.c. are the Continental 
Legal systems where share certificates and other analogous 
investment securities are not deemed to form a type of 
commercial paper. 
7. For the liberal interpretation of the negotiability 
characteristic, see part II of this thesis. 
8. J.S. Rogers. The Irrelevance of Negotiable 
Instruments Concepts in the Law of the Check-Based Payment 
System, (1987), 65 Texas L. Rev. 929. 
9. Ibid. 
- 77-
10. Examples of negotiable instruments analogous to 
cheques are certified cheques o They are similar to 
cashiers' cheques in the sense that they incorporate the 
drawee's acceptance. Accordingly, the drawee acceptor 
engages primarily to pay the holder of the instrument its 
face value. He may not, on the one hand, raise against 
the holder, personal defences which the acceptor possesses 
against his immediate creditor, nor may the acceptor issue 
a stop order to prevent the cashing of the instrument a 
The holder acquires, against the acceptor, a certain and 
absolute right of enforcement. 
11. The involvement of a bank on a negotiable instrument 
is essential to clothe the instrument in question with the 
attributes of real money. The liability of a bank in 
favour of the holder directly, provides to the latter a 
certain and absolute security. The bank's direct 
engagement with the holder estops the former from 
challenging the validity of its liability. Accordingly, 
the payment of the instrument is almost always certain. 
12. The main distinction between a domiciled promissory 
note and an ordinary promissory note is that the latter is 
a two party instrument. The maker of the note promises 
that on the day of maturity, he shall pay the holder of 
the note its face value. The domiciled note, by 
comparison, is a three party instrument. The maker of 
the note specifies a third party to whom the note shall be 
presented and from whom payment shall initially be 
demanded. For a definition of the domiciled promissory 
note, and the status of the parties arising out of it, see 
pp.55-56 infra. 
13. See p.55 infra. 
14. cf. Section 57 B.E.A. Article 48 G.U.L.(Bills). 
15. See p.55 infra. 
16. In the French legal system, however, the drawee may 
be liable to the holder on the i.nstr.ument.; even in the 
absence of the former's acceptance. His liability is 
based on the application of •ta provision• doctrine. By 
providing funds with the drawee, the drawer transfers to 
the holder of the instrument a property right to the 
cover. In the event of the drawer's failure the holder 
may proceed exclusively against the drawee to satisfy his 
right to the instrument, from the credit available with 
the drawee. In the event of the drawee's failure i.e. 
insolvency, the holder may proceed against the former. 
He acquires a priority right to the credit in the hands of 
the drawee. The drawee's creditors may not compete with 
the holder for the credit arising out of the cover which 
the drawer made available with the drawee. 
This right of action is not recognised in either the 
Geneva or the Anglo-American legal systems. In the first 
i.e. the Geneva legal systems, the issue of provision has 
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been excluded from the Conventions because it has been 
established that ( 1) such subject is not susceptible to 
unification and (2) it is not a matter closely related to 
the law of negotiable instruments. By comparison, it is 
related to the law of bankruptcy. Therefore it was 
submitted that the right of a holder to the provision and 
matters relating to the availability of it, shall be the 
concern of the national laws of the individual countries, 
rather than the Conventions. 
See Hudson and Feller, The International Unification of 
Laws Concerning Bills of Exchange, (1931), 44 Harv. L.Rev. 
For an overview of "la provision" doctrine see -
Amos & Walton, Introduction to French Law, (1966), 3rd 
Ed., p.366. 
L~onie M. Mitchell, The British Conception of 
Negotiable Instruments v. the French, (1928), 10 J.Comp 
Legal & Int'l Law (3rd Ser) p.242. 
Newman, Law of Negotiable Instruments in France, Unity 
of Law, (1978), p.110. 
In the Anglo-American legal systems, both the B.E.A. 
and the u.c.c. expressly provide that the negotiable 
instrument shall not operate as an assignment of funds in 
the hands of the drawee. 
See Section 53 B.E.A. and corresponding Article u.c.c.~ 
17. cf. section 54 B.E.A. and Article 28 G.U.L.(Bills). 
18. See p.39 supra. 
19. For a fuller account of the historical evolution of 
bills of exchange, the ancient form of negotiable 
instruments see pp.223-231 infra. 
20. For the nature of cheques and their evolution from 
bills of exchange see Holden, History of Negotiable 
Instruments in Early English Law p.220. 
21. cf. Section 10 B. E.A. and 
G.U.L.(Bills). 
Articles 2 and 33 
22. Domiciled bills are defined as those documents in 
which their drawer or drawee stipulates that they shall be 
payable at the locality of a third person. The drawer or 
drawee of such documents normally indicates a banker as 
the third person in whose locality the domiciled bill 
should be payable cf. Section 19 B.E.A. and Article 4 
G.U.L.(Bills). 
23. There are other distinctions between money and 
negotiable instruments. For example, the former is a 
bearer instrument, it passes from hand to hand by mere 
delivery, whereas negotiable instruments could be issued 
to bearer or to order. In the latter situation, the 
instrument passes from hand to hand by signature and 
delivery. In the second place, money is not subject to 
time prescription. 
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24o See p.39 supra. 
25. cf. Article 3-802 u.c.c. and 
Allen v Royal Bank of Canada (1926) 134 L.T. 
Kearslake v Morgan (1794) 5 T.R. 
Stedman v Gooch (1793) 1 Esp. 
26. Ibid. 
27. For an example, in the Continental Geneva legal 
systems and by virtue of Article 70 G.U.L.(Bills) the 
holder forfeits his right of action on the bill of 
exchange against his immediate indorser, if he fails to 
proceed against the latter within one year following the 
day of protest. By comparison, if the holder of the 
instrument proceeds against his immediate indorser on the 
basis of the underlying obligation in question, the time 
allowed within which the holder may bring his action could 
run up to fifteen years. 
28. cf. G.L. Kock, Negotiable Instruments and the 
Doctrine of Consideration, (1961-62), 36 Tulane L. Rev., 
p.271. 
29. See pp.64-72 infra. 
30. In the Anglo-American, as well as some of the 
Continental Geneva legal systems, the drawer who fails to 
provide funds with the drawee, remains primarily liable 
on the instrument in favour of the holder. Thus the 
holder may exercise his right of recourse against the 
drawer, notwithstanding observance of the statutory duties 
of timely presentment, protest and notice of dishonour. 
cf. Section 46 B.E.A. and Article 170 French Code de 
Commerce cited infra p.57. 
As far as the Continental Geneva legal systems 
adopting Article 53 G.U.L.(Bills), although they discharge 
the drawer who fails to provide funds with the drawee, 
from liability on the instrument, they, with reference to 
the application of the general principles of the law, hold 
him liable on independent bases. For an example, the 
German legal system holds the defaulting drawer liable to 
the negligent holder on the basis of unjustified 
enrichment, ibid. 
31. For more detail concerning the accommodation bill 
see pp.59-60 infra. 
32. See pp.59-60 and 61-62. 
33. By analogy, the liability of general partners in a 
partnership does not crystallise unless the creditor of 
the partnership first proceeds against the said 
partnership, and only in the event that the partnership 
fails to pay its debt, may the creditor proceed against 
the general partners. It is submitted that their 
liability is of a secondary nature. 
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35. Examples of acts equivalent to signatures are 
fingerprints stamps and corporate seals. 
36o The acceptor 7 howeverp may in instances of qualified 
acceptance, shift his liability into secondary liabilityo 
If the acceptor stipulates on the instrument that the 
instrument shall be presented and paid at a particular 
locality only, na bank normally" the holder must observe 
prompt presentment and notice of dishonour to preserve his 
right of recourse against the acceptor o The status of 
the acceptor would be likened, as far as the necessity to 
observe the statutory duties of presentment, notice of 
dishonour and/or protest is concerned, with the status of 
a drawer of a bill of exchange. cf. N.39 and authorities 
cited there. 
37. cf. Section 83 B.E.A. 
38. cf. pp.46-47 supra. 
39. By virtue of Section 89 B.E.A., Part II of the Act, 
i.e. that concerned with bills of exchange, shall be 
applicable to promissory notes. By virtue of sub-section 
4, the maker of a note is treated as the acceptor of a 
bill. Since by Sect.19 B.E.A. the acceptor may qualify 
his acceptance as to the place of presentment and payment 
and by virtue of Sect.52 in instances of qualified 
acceptance, the holder in order to preserve his right of 
recourse against the acceptor, must observe the duty of 
procuring prompt presentment and giving notice of 
dishonour, the maker of a promissory note is entitled to 
qualify his making as to the place of presentment and 
payment as well as the right to require the compliance 
with the statutory duties of presentment and giving notice 
of dishonour. 
See Halstead v Skelton 1843 5 QB 86 
Chalmers - Bills of Exchange 13 Edtn. p.175-176, 1964. 
cf. Art.3-121 u.c.c. and 
Stone, u.c.c. in a Nutshell, (1975), p.219. 
As to the German legal group, by virtue of Article 
78 G.U.L.(Bills), the status of a maker is presumed to be 
tantamount to that of the acceptor. Since, by virtue of 
Article 27, the acceptor may stipulate a different 
locality than that of his where presentment for payment 
should be procured; there is no sound argument to 
prevent the maker from stipulating the same. 
40. cf. Section 3 B.E.A. 
41. Article 53, 1933 German law is identically worded to 
Art.53 G.U.L.(Bills). For the provision of Article 53 
G.U.L. see p.51 supra. 
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42. See reply of German delegation to Questionnaire 
circulated at the Geneva Conference on the Unification of 
Laws relating to Bills of Exchange, Promissory Notes and 
Cheques, First Session 1930, p.27. 
43. cf. 73 B.E.A. 
44. Foley v Hill 1848 2 HL Cas 28 [ 1843-60] All E. R. 
Rep 16. 
45. Westminster Bank v Hilton (1927) 136LT 43 T.L.R. 
46. By comparison, the liability of the party primarily 
liable crystallises on the day of maturity. The holder 
need not observe the duty of procuring timely presentment, 
drawing up protest or giving notice of dishonour to 
preserve his right of recourse against the former. 
cf. p.SO supra. 
47. Ibid. 
48. For an example, if John Alex issues a cheque for the 
amount of £750 to David Dove in consideration for a 
secondhand car purchased from the latter and Dove indorses 
the cheque to Billy Barnes in discharge of a pre-existing 
debt. Barnes may not enforce the cheque against Dove or 
Alex unless he presents the cheque to the drawee bank for 
payment and the latter fails to honour it on its day of 
rna turi ty. By virtue of the order incorporated in the 
cheque, the drawer, e.g. John Alex and the subsequent 
signatories e.g. David Dove, stipulate that the monetary 
obligation incorporated in the cheque i.e. the £750, shall 
be paid by the drawee. By way of such stipulation they 
are deemed to guarantee the payment of the cheque by the 
latter. In their capacity as guarantors i.e. sureties, 
their liability on the instrument e.g. cheque, would not 
crystallise unless the prima facie principal debtor, i.e~ 
the party to whom the payment order is addressed fails to 
behave in a manner consistent with it. 
See Article 3 413 (2) and 3 414 u.c.c. 
and Articles 9 and 15 G.U.L.(Bills). 
cf. Section 55 B.E.A •• 
49. cf. Section 55 B.E.A. and Article 47 G.U.L.(Bills). 
50. cf. Section 57 B.E.A. and Article 48 G.U.L.(Bills). 
51. cf. Article 47 G.U.L.(Bills). 
52. cf. Section 62(1) B.E.A. which reads in part • .-. 
"When the holder of a bill at or after its maturity 
absolutely and unconditionally renounces his rights 
against the acceptor, the bill is discharged •••• " 
See also Article 3 - 606 (1) u.c.c. 
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53. In the English legal system presentment for payment 
would be too late if it was made after the day on which 
the instrument falls due, cf. Section 46 B.E.A., and the 
giving of notice of dishonour is deemed to be too late if 
it is made on the day following the day after dishonour 
cf. Section 49 (12) B.E.A. 
As far as the above illustration is concerned, the 
presentment of the bill of exchange is deemed to be late 
in the English Legal system if it is made after 31st May 
1989 whilst the giving of notice of dishonour is deemed to 
be late if it was made after 1st June 1989. 
As far as the Continental Geneva legal systems are 
concerned, the presentment for payment is deemed to be 
late if it was made after the elapse of two days following 
the day on which the instrument falls due, cf. Article 38 
G.U.L.(Bills), and the drawing up of protest is deemed to 
be late if it was made beyond the said date. 
cf. Article 44 G.U.L.(Bills). 
As far as the above illustration is concerned, the 
presentment for payment and the drawing up of protest 
would be late in the Geneva legal systems if they were 
made after 2nd June 1989. 
54. For the Anglo-American legal systems -
cf. Article 3-502 1(1b) u.c.c. and 
Grist v Osgood 90 Nev 165 521 p.Zd 368 14 (1974) 
u.c.c. 100. 
Some of the Continental Geneva legal systems 
approach the subrogation rule outlined in the text above 
by applying "la provision" doctrine. "La provision" 
as mentioned in n.16 above affords the holder of the 
instrument a property right to the funds in the hands of 
the drawee. The drawer, by drawing the instrument to 
the payee or holder assigns to the latter the said right. 
The holder may then satisfy his claim on the instrument 
from the drawee directly. The significance of "la 
provision" doctrine materialises in instances where the 
drawer is discharged on the instrument as to its holder. 
In such an instance the holder's only remedy to recover 
the face value of the instrument would be to base his 
cause of action against the drawee on the fund which the 
drawer made available with the latter. 
In other Continental Geneva legal systems, which 
do not adopt "la provision" doctrine, the subrogation rule 
is approached by applying the general principles of the 
law such as unjustified enrichment. An example of such 
legal system is the law of Germany, see authorities cited 
in n.30 above. 
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55. For the Anglo-American authorities 
cf. Articles 1, 201-219 and 3, 306 u.c.c. 
See also Charles v Blackwell 2 CPD 151 (1877) 
Peacock v Rhodes (1781) 2 Doug 633 
Miller v Race (1758) 1 Burr 452. 
As for the Continental Geneva legal systems' authorities 
cf. Articles 20 and 21 G.U.L.(Cheques). 
56. Charles v Blackwell ibid. 
57. cf. Sections 59 and 60 B.E.A. 
58. cf. pp.62-64 supra. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
COMPETING INTERESTS 
INTRODUCTION 
The problem of competing interests, generally 
speaking arises in instances of disturbances of the 
performance of contracts. Contract disturbance 
negatively affects the reasonable expectation of partiesi 
It alters the circumstances in reliance on which the 
parties in question consented to be bound. Such 
alteration in the basic circumstances may affect the 
original undertaking of the parties a Accordingly, the 
reasonable expectations of the parties involved in the 
original undertaking might not be reconciled. The role 
of the law in this instance is to determine the party 
whose interest would be favoured. In determining the 
favourable interest the law should take account of certain 
material considerations, the application of which would 
approach a rational rule. 
For an example assume that Dove and Co. is a mail 
order business. It markets its merchandise by way of 
doorstep delivery of its catalogues. The company 
encloses with the catalogue an offer slip. The customer 
indicates in the slip the particulars pertaining to the 
required merchandise. The customer then posts his offer 
to the company in its provided envelope. The company 
packs the requested merchandise and arranges for the 
doorstep delivery to its customer. The customer may 
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then try the delivered merchandise. In the event of 
satisfaction, the customer should arrange for paymente 
Assume further that John Alex, a customer of Dove and 
Coo» is satisfied with the delivered merchandiseo By way 
of payment» John Alex posts a cheque equal to the face 
value of the merchandise to Dove and Coo as payee. Due 
to postal mis-delivery, the cheque is delivered to another 
Dove and Co., a small grocery shop carrying out business 
in the same locality as that of Dove and Co., the mail 
order business. Assume, finally, that the former, Dove 
and Co. misappropriates the cheque. Willy Williams, the 
sole manager of the grocery shop indorses the cheque in 
the business's name and deposits it in the firm's account 
for collection. The collecting bank presents the cheque 
to the drawee bank for payment. The latter, accordingly 
honours the cheque and pays its proceeds to the collecting 
bank. 
The enforcement of the negotiable instrument i.e. 
cheque is disturbed in two respects. Firstly, the 
payment instrument is delivered to someone other than the 
intended holder. The cheque is delivered to Dove and 
Co., the grocery shop instead of Dove and Co._ the mail 
order business. Secondly, payment is made in favour of 
someone other than the intended payee. The drawee bank 
paid the proceeds of the cheque to the agent of Dove and 
Co. the grocery shop, whilst the maker of the mandate 
intended payment to be made in favour of Dove and Co., the 
mail order business. 
The delivery of the cheque to the grocery shop and 
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the subsequent payment to its favour are inconsistent with 
the reasonable expectation of the drawer of the cheque 
i e e a John Alexa He neither intended to deliver the 
cheque to the grocery shop, nor did he intend that the 
latter should possess an interest in the instrument~ 
Thus, if the payment to Dove and Co., the grocery shop, 
was upheld, and ultimately John Alex was denied the right 
of recovery, the latter would, in effect, be bound by a 
contract to which he did not assent. Since, on the other 
hand the instrument, cheque, did not reach the intended 
payee i.e. Dove and Co., the mail order business, the 
purchaser drawer i.e. John Alex would remain liable on the 
independent transaction which gave rise to the issuance of 
the cheque in favour of the intended payee. If the 
drawer John Alex was denied the right of recovery against 
Dove and Co. the grocery shop, he would be liable for 
double payment, viz. that arising from the instrument in 
favour of the grocery shop, and that arising from the 
independent transaction in favour of the mail order 
business. As far as the first payment is concerned, it 
is submitted that upholding the entitlement of the grocery 
shop to the erroneously paid proceeds is incompatible with 
the application of the general principles of the law.-
The intention of the parties should be taken into 
consideration, so far as it is not inconsistent with the 
application of other material principles. 
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The Causes of Contract Disturbance 
(i) The enforcement of contracts is disturbed by either 
the mistake, 1 or the misconduct of the parties to the 
transaction in question~ or by the intervention of an 
extraneous element. An example of the parties' 
misconduct as a cause of contract disturbance is the 
employer's negligence in the policing of his business. 
The lack of policing is illustrated by the employer's 
failure to provide: 
1) Effective selection test of employees. 
2) Effective supervision, and 
3) Periodic examination of statements, invoices 
and accounts prepared by employees. 
To illustrate the instance in which the employer's 
lack of policing could cause a situation of contract 
disturbance assume that John Alex is the sole proprietor 
of a construction firm operating under the name of Alex 
Euro-Construction. The firm engages with Jessor Ltd., 
whereby the latter provides to Alex Euro-Construction 
machinery and construction equipment, as well as 
maintenance for its supplies. Alex recruits David Dove, 
a young inexperienced and recently hired employee, in the 
post of financial secretary. 
settles the firm's accounts. 
As financial secretary Dove 
In his capacity as such he 
is empowered to issue cheques in the firm's name, in the 
light of the invoices prepared and filed by Willy 
Williams, the firm's accountant. 
Willy Williams, aware of Dove's inexperience, decides 
-s~~(~p 
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to misappropriate the firm's funds to settle his gambling 
debts. He fraudulently prepares invoices in favour of 
Jessor Ltde He then files the said invoices for David 
Dove to arrange for payment to be made in favour of Jessor 
Ltd G, equal to the face value of the forged invoices e 
Dove, in ignorance of the true facts, issues cheques to 
the supposed creditor and hands them to Williams for 
delivery. As Willy Williams does not intend that Jessor 
Ltd. shall have an interest in the issued cheques, he 
forges the payee's indorsement and makes the cheques 
payable to his order, whereby he may cash the cheques and 
misappropriate their proceeds to his personal interest. 
The disturbance evolving from the fraudulent practice 
of Willy Williams is twofold. In the first place, the 
firm, through its financial secretary, was fraudulently 
induced to issue cheques in favour of a party not entitled 
to the proceeds. In the second, the proceeds of the 
cheques were diverted from their normal currency. They 
were paid to a party not intended prima facie to possess 
an interest. 
Although the disturbance was the direct cause of 
fraud practised by an independent party, namely Willy 
Williams, in the above example, the proprietor's 
negligence in not providing an effective selection test 
and supervision, as well as not arranging for a periodic 
examination of invoices etc., 
/ 
,..----
facilitated the occurrence of fraud. Due to the 
-· .... ·- - --~· 
... -. -- .. 
-----
recruitment of inexperienced and unreliabie senior 
employees, as well as the failure to review statements, 
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invoices and accounts prepared by them, the perpetration 
of fraud is made more likely. 
(ii) The extraneous element, the intervention of which 
causes contract disturbance, is illustrated in the 
involvement of an independent party. His involvement 
disturbs the enforcement of the contract in question 
in the sense that his intervention affects the normal 
currency of the contract. His involvement may render the 
enforcement of the original terms of the contract more 
onerous to the parties in question. Or it may render the 
enforcement of the contract inconsistent with the 
intention of the parties. 
In the context of negotiable instruments, the 
independent party, the intervention of whom disturbs the 
negotiable instrument transaction, is usually a fraudulent 
person. He could be a stranger, in the full sense, to 
the negotiable instrument transaction, or he could be a 
party not intended to possess an enforceable interest, 
such as a trustee.2 In both instances, the disturbance 
of the normal currency of the instrument takes the form of 
unauthorised disposal. The unauthorised disposal of the 
instrument or its proceeds is perpetrated by intercepting 
the instrument or by the commission of a fraudulent 
practice. The intervention of the stranger illustrates 
the interception of the instrument, whilst the 
intervention of the trustee illustrates the commission of 
the fraudulent practice~ 
The fraudulent person, be he a stranger or a trustee, 
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disturbs the normal currency of the instrument in question 
by transferring it to a bona fide third party, whereby he 
diverts the property of the instrument, as well as its 
proceeds. The property would be diverted by transferring 
it to a bona fide third party whose involvement was not 
intended in the first place. By transferring the 
instrument to the bona fide third party, the fraudulent 
person is deemed to have divested the property of the 
instrument from its original true owner e.g. the 
principal, and vested it in favour of the transferee, i.e. 
the bona fide third party. The proceeds of the 
instrument would be diverted by cashing the instrument 
with the bona fide third party. The fraudulent person, 
by cashing it, pockets the proceeds of the instrument. 
His unauthorised fraudulent cashing either leaves the bona 
fide third party with a worthless piece of paper, or he 
impairs the right of the original true owner of recouping 
the proceeds of his instrument. 
To illustrate, assume that David Dove runs a take-
away restaurant. The number of staff in his employ are 
three, two cooks and a cashier, Willy Williams. The 
latter during the twenty years of service demonstrated 
devotion and honesty. Every three years, Dove leaves 
with his family for a two weeks short holiday. Whilst he 
is away, Dove entrusts Williams with the job of managing 
the financial affairs of the restaurant. He deposits the 
business's cheques and settles its obligations. As a 
trustee, Willy Williams does not possess an enforceable 
interest in cheques issued in favour of the restaurant.-
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His authority is confined to depositing the cheques in the 
business's account and when appropriate~ discharging its 
obligation by way of cheques or otherwiseo 
Thus P if Willy Williams misappropriates his 
principal's cheques~ by re=indorsing them in the 
restaurant's name in favour of his accomplice P for the 
purpose of facilitating the cashing of the cheques, he is 
deemed to have disturbed the normal currency of the 
chequeso He, firstly, diverts the property of the 
cheques from his principal to a third party, namely, his 
accomplice. Secondly, he diverts the proceeds of the 
deposited cheques to his favour through his accomplice. 
His unauthorised transfer of the cheques is a form of 
intervention. Since the said intervention lacked 
authority, it is deemed to be made fraudulently.3 It is 
submitted that the perpetration of fraud is solely 
attributable to the trustee. No negligence as such could 
be attributed to the principal.4 
~ f . IL "- ? ~\.. ~ (\""' -~·i.-ZAfh.tt. (,.~f~ktj~ ' 
The Scope of Contract Disturbance 
( i) The disturbance of contracts does not only affect 
the relationship of immediate parties; its effect runs 
to other parties whose involvement is foreseeable. An 
example of such contracts is negotiable instruments. The 
fraud perpetrated by an independent party does not disturb 
the relationship between the maker/drawer of the 
instrument and its immediate payee, or between the 
indorsor and the immediate indorsee, rather the fraud 
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disturbs the relationship between the drawer and drawee, 
the drawer and the remote indorsee/holder as well as that 
between the drawee and the holder to whom the proceeds of 
the instrument were paido 
The involvement of a multitude of parties is due to 
the special nature of negotiable instruments. On the one 
hand, they are mainly three party instrumentso Their 
creation presupposes the existence of two independent 
transactions. The drawer of the instrument functions 
in a double capacity. As 
instrument in question on 
a creditor, 
his debtor 
he issues the 
in the first 
transaction. As a debtor, he issues the instrument to 
his creditor in the second transaction, whereby the latter 
becomes the payee. 5 On the other hand, negotiable 
instruments are freely transferable, they pass from hand 
to hand by indorsement and/or delivery. They could be 
transferred more than one time, so far as it occurs within 
the maturity of the instrument. Thus, remote third 
parties may qualify as the lawful holder of the 
instrument. 
(ii) Since negotiable instruments are multi-party 
documents, each involved party possesses a valid interest. 
Briefly speaking, the interest of the drawer of a 
negotiable instrument is to be accountable for a single 
payment. The interest of the original true owner is to 
have the property of the stolen instrument restored to 
him. The interest of the subsequent bona fide acquirer 
is to have the property of the instrument established in 
his favouro The interest of the drawee is to have 
himself either discharged from his obligation or afforded 
the right to recover the erroneously paid proceeds from 
the recipiento6 
The said interests~ however» arise from the 
reasonable expectation of the parties in questiono The 
interest of the drawer to be accountable for a single 
payment arises from his reasonable expectation that 
payment shall be made to the proper holder, namely the 
specified payee or someone to whose order the instrument 
is properly indorsed. The original true owner's interest 
to have his property restored to him arises from the 
reasonable expectation that his property shall be 
protected. The bona fide acquirer's interest to have the 
property right to the instrument established in his favour 
arises from his reasonable expectation that his bona fide 
engagement with prima facie, bona fide parties and in a 
prima facie regular transaction shall be secured • 
Finally, the drawee's interest of having himself either 
discharged or having conferred upon him the right to 
recover erroneous payments arises from his reasonable 
expectation that payment is made in favour of the proper 
holder or that the proceeds of the improper payment shall 
revert to him. 
(iii) In instances of disturbance, the satisfaction of 
the above mentioned 
$ 
interest!. may not be reconcilable. 
Where a negotiable instrument, due to the mistake or 
misconduct of the parties in question, or due to the 
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intervention of the fraudulent party, is diverted from its 
normal currency and comes into the hands of someone other 
than the intended holder, the interest of the original 
true owner ioeo the party from whose possession the 
instrument escapes P and the interest of the bona fide 
acquirer i o eo the third party into whose possession the 
instrument comes, in particular would compete. Each of 
the parties is interested to have the property right to 
the instrument in question, conferred exclusively upon 
him. 
The interest of the remaining parties e~g~ the drawer 
and drawee, is closely associated with determining the 
party to whose favour the property right to the instrument 
is established. If the property right to the instrument 
is established in favour of the original true owner and 
accordingly, he is declared to be the holder, the rights 
arising from the negotiable instrument transaction will 
run in his favour. The bona fide acquirer would be left 
with a worthless piece of paper. He neither possesses an 
enforceable right on the instrument nor does he possess a 
right to the proceeds of the instrument. Thus, the bona 
fide acquirer may not exercise a right of recourse against 
the drawer, 
The denial 
nor may he demand payment from the drawee. 
of the right of recourse to the bona fide 
satisfies the drawer 1 s interest of being acquirer 
accountable for a single payment only, i.e. 
established in favour of the original true owner. 
that 
The 
denial of the right to demand payment, on the other hand, 
satisfies the drawee 1 s interest. His liability to make 
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payment would run in favour of the original true owner 
If payment is erroneously made to the bona fide 
acquirer, the drawee payor would be entitled to demand the 
recovery of the improperly paid proceeds from the 
recipient, acquirero 
By comparison, if the property right of the 
negotiable instrument is established in favour of the bona 
fide acquirer whereby he is declared to be the holder, the 
rights arising from the negotiable instrument transaction 
will run exclusively in his favour. The original true 
owner would be divested of the holder status. He would 
forfeit his enforceable rights on the instrument as well 
as on the independent transaction. Because the original 
true owner forfeits the holder status, he may not exercise 
his right of recourse against the drawer, nor may he 
demand payment per se7 from the drawee. The denial of 
the right of recourse satisfied the drawer's interest. 
He would be accountable for a single payment, namely, that 
established in favour of the bona fide acquirer .- The 
denial of the right to demand payment satisfies, on the 
other hand, the drawee's interest. His liability to make 
payment is established in favour of the bona fide acquirer 
only. Should the said payment be made, the drawee is 
deemed to have been discharged on the instrument. 
(iv) Interests may also compete in instances where the 
property right of the negotiable instrument is not the 
concern of conflicting claims. An example of such 
instances is the fraudulent making of negotiable 
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instruments, whereby the drawee pays the fraudulently made 
instrument to its bona fide acquirer and charges the 
purported maker's account with the face value of the 
instrumento For instance~ the theft of a cheque from the 
cheque book of another, the forging of the latter's 
signature as issuer, the issuing of the cheque in favour 
of the thief/forger and finally, the cashing of the cheque 
with a bona fide third party, gives rise to a problem of 
competing interestse 
To illustrate such an instance, assume that Willy 
Williams breaks into John Alex's office, forces the locked 
drawer open and steals a cheque from Alex's cheque book~ 
Williams, next fills in the stolen cheque, makes it 
payable to his order and forges the signature of John 
Alex. By the said fraudulent practice, Williams makes 
the cheque read as if it was originally issued in his 
favour. As payee, Willy Williams then indorses the 
cheque for value to David Dove, the proprietor of a small 
grocery shop, in consideration for the purchased food. 
Dove then deposits the forged cheque with his bank for 
collection. The latter presents the cheque to the drawee 
for payment. Due to the clever execution of the forgery, 
the drawee fails to detect the fraud. Accordingly, the 
drawee settles the cheque and charges Alex's account with 
the face value of the cheque. 
In this instance, there is no negotiable instrument 
in the strict sense. For an instrument to qualify as 
negotiable, it must be signed by its maker.-8 In the 
above example, the purported maker, John Alex, did not fix 
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his signature9 The signature appearing on the cheque is 
neither his~ nor is it made with his authority. Since 
the fraudulently drawn instrument is not a cheque and~ 
ultimately, is not a negotiable instrument, the purported 
makerp John Alex does not possess a property interest in 
it. As far as he is concerned, the fraudulently 
made instrument is a worthless piece of paper. It 
incorporates no rights in favour of third parties. 
As to the bona fide acquirer, David Dove, the 
instrument purports to satisfy the negotiable instrument 
concept. It is presumed to be a valuable piece of paper~ 
It purports to confer upon the proprietor, i.e. holder, 
enforceable rights. 
is interested to 
Accordingly, the bona fide acquirer 
establish a property right to the 
instrument. Since he is the only party whose interest 
runs to the property in the instrument, the problem of 
conflicting claims to property in the instrument would not 
emerge. 
The interests competing in this instance are that of 
the drawee and that of the acquirer/recipient. The 
interest of the purported drawer is not related to the 
negotiable instrument transaction. As between himself 
and the drawee, the interest of the drawer is related to 
the contractual relationship vis-a-vis himself and the 
drawee, whereby the latter engages to discharge the 
former's obligation in a manner consistent with his 
mandates. In light of the said contractual relationship, 
the purported drawer, in the instance under examination, 
is interested not to have the instrument interpreted as a 
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mandate authorising the drawee to charge the face value of 
the instrument to the drawer. The charge back made in 
reliance on the fraudulently issued instrument would then 
be interpreted as inconsistent with the underlying 
contract. 
The interest, as between the drawer and the holder, 
is likewise of a contractual nature. The drawer is 
interested to deprive the instrument of its value~ 
Accordingly, he is interested to have himself 
unaccountable for the promise or undertaking purported to 
be incorporated in the instrument. The holder would then 
forfeit an enforceable right of recourse against the 
drawer. 
As far as the interests of the drawee and the bona 
fide acquirer/recipient are concerned, they are, by 
comparison, related to the negotiable instrument 
transaction. The drawee is interested to have the holder 
status denied to the bona fide acquirer/recipient, whereby 
he would have the right of recovering the proceeds of the 
improper payment, conferred upon him. The bona fide 
acquirer/recipient is interested to have the holder status 
conferred upon him, whereby he would have the right to 
retain the proceeds established in his favour. The 
property right to the instrument in question is, likewise, 
the determinative factor in reliance on which the various 
interests arising from the negotiable instrument 
transaction may compete. 
The denial of the property right to the acquirer 
recipient raises the interest of the drawee, whilst the 
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establishment of such right to the acquirer/recipient 
raises the interest of the lattero 
The Allocation of RiskArising from Contract Disturbance 
The disturbance of the performance of contracts 
normally involves riske The risk is illustrated by the 
probability that the reasonable expectation of the parties 
in question will not be satisfied. Since reasonable 
expectations signify interests, in instances of contract 
disturbance, the satisfaction of the relevant interests 
might not be reconcilable. The law, in like instances, 
should intervene to allocate the risk in question.9 To 
this end, the law making body should determine the 
interest, the protection of which is paramount •. 10 
Accordingly, the proposed risk allocation rule should run 
in favour of the interest intended to be protected. The 
determination of the paramount interest should be made 
with regard to a number of important considerations. 
In the context of negotiable instruments, risk would 
arise when the normal currency of the instrument in 
question is disturbed, either due to the mistake or 
misconduct of the parties involved, or due to the 
intervention of an independent party. The reasonable 
expectation of the parties would be likewise disturbed 
because the entitlement to the claim incorporated in the 
instrument, or to the retention of the proceeds, would be 
in dispute. Accordingly, the interests arising from the 
reasonable expectation of the parties might not be 
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reconcilable a 
Since the interests, the conflict of which is under 
consideration, are intertwined with the property right to 
the instrument, the risk allocation rule should run in 
favour of the person to whom the property right to the 
instrument is establishedu Nevertheless, in identifying 
the person in whose favour the property right to the 
instrument is established, the law should take into 
account considerations compatible with the promotion of 
the institution of negotiable instruments, the interests 
of the community involved, the interest of the public at 
large, the allocation of risk in an economically efficient 
manner and the notions of fairness and equity. The 
holder status of negotiable instruments should be defined 
in the light of those considerations. Ultimately the 
risk allocation rule should be formulated in a manner 
compatible with those considerations. 
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The Significance of the Proposed Considerations 
in Determining Risk Allocation in 
the Context of Negotiable Instruments. 
I. The Interest of the Institution 
of Negotiable Instruments 
The necessity to promote the institution of 
negotiable instruments arises from the need to finance 
transactions other than by money.ll It is submitted that 
the institution of negotiable instruments is a convenient 
device for the provision of finance. The mercantile 
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custom recognised the convenience of negotiable 
instruments as a finance institutiono It devised the 
oonegotiabilityR rule to promote the finance by negotiable 
instruments a It conferred upon the bona fide 
acquirer/holder a perfect titlep independent from the 
title of prior transferor so It afforded him the 
advantages of the free of equity doctrineo The title of 
a bona fide acquirer /holder could not be impeached by 
personal defences and claims between two prior parties 
where he had no knowledge of their significance. 
The major legal systems recognised the necessity of 
promoting the institution of negotiable instruments.-
They incorporated in their laws the negotiability rule as 
devised by the mercantile customo The bona fide 
acquirer/holder is afforded an unimpeachable title as 
against prior partieso12 The application of the 
negotiability rule, accordingly, became the main 
characteristic which distinguished negotiable instruments 
from other choses in actiono However, the convenience of 
negotiable instruments outweighs that of its main rival, 
the "institution of credit cards'". In light of the 
millions of payment transactions concluded every day by 
way of issuing, negotiating, accepting and honouring 
negotiable instruments, the institution of negotiable 
instruments is submitted to function as the real currency 
of the realm. 
fold. 
The convenience of negotiable instruments is three 
On the one hand, their utility could be enjoyed by 
every person. Negotiable instruments, in particular 
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chequesp may be purchased on the market for the purpose of 
financing a single transactione Thus, the poor consumer 
may enjoy the utility of negotiable instruments by 
purchasing them from a banko On the other hand 
negotiable instruments could be involved in every 
transaction for the purpose of facilitating financeo 
They could be involved in face to face transactions or in 
transactions concluded by mail. They could be involved 
in transactions concluded by two individuals, as well as 
in transactions the parties to which are small and large 
businesses, or a combination of individuals and 
businesses. They could be involved in arranged 
transactions and transactions the finance of which is 
intended to be made on the spot. The involvement of 
negotiable instruments does not require other than the 
consent of the parties in question to accept the 
instrument as a means of discharging payment. 
Finally, the application of negotiable instruments 
safeguards the interest of the parties involved in the 
negotiable instrument transaction. In the first place, 
the theft of a blank instrument would not prejudice its 
original proprietor. If the stolen instrument bore the 
proprietor's forged signature, he would not be liable for 
the promise fraudulently attributed to him. The drawee 
would not be able to debit the proprietor's account with 
the face value of the instrument, should it be erroneously 
paid.13 The proprietor may compel the drawee/payor to 
restore his account as if payment had not occurred. 
In the second place, the proprietor of a negotiable 
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instrument is afforded measures sufficient to protect 
himself against instances in which third parties might 
claim an advantage detrimental to his interest o The 
proprietor~ by way of "'restricting&a or "negatinga the 
negotiability attribute of the instrument in question, 
subjects the third party acquirer /payor to defences and 
claims, the application of which could deny them the 
protection they would have obtained had the negotiability 
attribute been fully applied in their favour~ 1 4 The 
proprietor would then be able to challenge the entitlement 
of the acquirer/recipient to receive or retain the 
proceeds of the instrument and he would be able to 
challenge the validity of the drawee's act of payment.-
In the third place, the bona fide third party to whom 
the instrument comes in its full negotiability 
characteristic, may be availed an enforceable right.- His 
acquisition or payment in reliance on its apparent 
regularity may afford him a good title or a 
valid discharge.15 His reasonable expectation would, 
accordingly be satisfied. 
Lastly, the application of negotiable instruments 
protects the economic interest of the ordinary consumer.-
The purchasing power of which the ordinary consumer could 
avail himself, by way of issuing negotiable instruments, 
is valued by reference to the actual credit available in 
his account. His capacity to issue negotiable 
instruments would be restricted to the extent of the 
existing credit. Thus, the ordinary consumer would 
utilise the available credit to satisfy his most urgent 
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needs. The credit would be utilised to finance whatever 
the ordinary consumer most values. 
The Institution of Credit Cards 
Credit cards, by comparison, are incapable of 
substituting money and ultimately they are inconvenient 
for functioning as a finance instrument in the full sense; 
on the one hand they are not, literally speaking, 
available to every person. The poor consumer might not 
be offered a credit card. His inability to repay the 
credit would discourage the card issuer from offering him 
a credit facility. On the other hand, credit cards are 
not involved in financing every transaction. Their chief 
involvement is in the face-to-face transaction and 
transactions conducted through the telephone. They are 
not normally involved in transactions concluded by mail. 
The insertion of the credit card number in a letter could 
involve the risk of fraudulent misuse of the authorisation 
provided by the card holder in favour of the merchant. 
The credit card number may be used to debit in excess of 
the authorised amount, or it could be used by other than 
the intended merchant. 
A further illustration of the credit card's 
restricted utility as a means of finance is that credit 
cards are not involved in transactions, the parties to 
which are individuals. For a credit card to function as 
a finance device, the party to whom it is offered as such 
must be a merchant authorised by the card issuer to accept 
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the credit card in questionG Merchants would be 
authorised to accept a given credit card if they subscribe 
to the credit card scheme in question. To this end, the 
credit card issuer charges the merchant certain fees. 
Small businesses, because of the chargeable fees, do not 
wish to become parties to the credit card schemea Others 
are in favour of introducing their own credit cards. Due 
to the above restrictions, the utility of credit cards in 
general would be limited to financing transactions, one of 
the parties of which is a merchant authorised to accept 
the offered credit card. 
Finally, the application of credit cards could create 
inconvenience to their proprietors i.e. holders. The 
holder of the credit card would, in instances of theft, 
bear part of the risk evolving from the unauthorised use 
of his card, even if no blame could be attributed to him 
in not safeguarding his card. The card issuer, as the 
current legislation and banking practice stands, may 
charge to the holder a portion of the unauthorised use of 
the card. 
In the second place, due to the special nature of 
credit cards, the card holder does not enjoy absolute 
control 
holder 
of his 
cannot 
card. Once 
effectively 
characteristics of the card. 
the card is acquired, the 
alter the general 
He can not at all times 
prevent the card from being misused by an unauthorised 
person. He cannot prevent the card from being used to 
indu~e the bona fide merchant to accept it. He has no 
means of alerting the merchant to the fact that the user 
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of the card is an unauthorised fraudulent person., 
Accordingly~ he cannot challenge the merchant's 
entitlement to retain the proceeds of the sale~ or his 
entitlement to receive the same or to challenge the 
validity of the card issuer's act of payment in favour of 
the merchant., 
Lastly, credit cards may create economic 
inconvenience to the ordinary consumer, card holder. 
Because of the credit available to the holder, the 
ordinary consumer might be led to engage in transactions 
in excess of his actual purchasing power. Ultimately, he 
might be led to engage in transactions, the utility of 
which are less valuable to the card holder. 
The Institution of Electronic Fund Transfer 
The regulation of the rules of electronic fund 
transfers has not taken its final shape.16 There are 
difficulties relating to legal questions which have yet to 
be resolved, in particular, that relating to the manner of 
allocating risk in instances where the transfer of funds 
occurs in excess of, or in breach of the mandate.17 
Electronic fund transfers, on the other hand, are 
chiefly involved in financing arranged transactions. 
They are not by comparison, involved in transactions the 
finance of which is intended to be made on the spot. The 
purchaser, i.e. the party who intends to finance the ad 
hoc transaction by way of an electronic fund transfer 
device, would not be able to vest his finance with 
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confidentiality a The code number which he has to quote 
for the purpose of facilitating the electronic fund 
transfer might be intercepted by a strangero 
Finally P for electronic fund transfers to operate 
efficiently as a finance device would require the 
existence of advanced technologyo At present P the said 
technology might not be available for every jurisdictione 
Ultimatelyp electronic fund transfers would not be 
available to every person and to finance every transaction 
in every jurisdiction~ 
IIo The Interest of the Commercial Community 
The necessity of protecting the interest of the 
commercial community involved in the negotiable instrument 
transaction arises from the need to promote the 
institution of negotiable instrumentso Once the interest 
of the proprietors, acquirers and payors of negotiable 
instruments were protected, negotiable instruments would 
be freely marketableo 
It has been argued that since negotiable instruments 
are not often transferable more than once, the interest of 
remote third party acquirers would not arise .18 Should 
it however occur, no great reliance would exist between 
the acquirer and the remote transferor or purported 
transferor. The third party in his acquisition relies on 
his immediate transferor, the party with whom he engages 
in an independent transactionol9 
In reply, it could be stated that the mere fact that 
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negotiable instruments are not often negotiated to remote 
third parties does not 
negotiable instrument 
render 
by a 
the acquisition of a 
remote third party, 
unforeseeableo Because of the special nature of 
freely transferable negotiable instruments 9 they are 
unless their transferability is negated or restricted~ 
Thus any member of the public may, in the particular time, 
acquire from the market a negotiable instrument in 
circulation. 
As to the second argument, it is submitted that 
negotiable instruments as chattels transfer with them the 
incorporated 
undertakings. 
undertaking 
promise or promises, undertaking or 
The liability arising from the promise or 
runs in favour of the acquirer/holder~ 20 
Each promise or undertaking serves as a security in favour 
of the acquirer. The signatory in question promises or 
undertakes to pay the acquirer /holder the face value of 
the instrument. The more promises and undertakings are 
incorporated in the instrument, the more security would be 
provided and ultimately, the more marketable the 
instrument becomes. 
The party who acquires the instrument does not, for 
the purpose of enforcing the face value of the instrument, 
rely on the promise or undertaking incurred by the 
immediate transferor only. He places an equal reliance 
on the other promises or undertakings, especially that 
negotiable instruments in general do not confer upon the 
acquirer an absolute and certain credit. The drawee 
might, for one reason or another dishonour the presented 
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instrumento For the purpose of enforcing the face value 
of the instrument~ the acquirer would need to exercise his 
right of recourse against the signatories in questiono 
The significance of the promises or undertakings of remote 
signatories arises when the immediate transferor at the 
relevant time would not financially be able to satisfy the 
interest of the acquirer /holder o The acquirer /holder 
considers the said promises or undertakings as securities, 
the purpose of which is to satisfy his interest in full.-
III. The Interest of the Public and 
the Notion of Fairness and Justice 
( i) The necessity of protecting the interest of the 
public at large and to allocate risk in an equitable and 
just manner arises from social needs. The community at 
large is interested to avoid accident occurrence. 
Accident involves cost assumption. Cost, in instances of 
avoidable accidents, is deemed to be a form of wealth 
misallocation. Wealth is deemed, in the eyes of the 
community, to fulfil an economic function9 It is 
intended to satisfy the community needs. The incurring 
of cost in avoidable accidents is inconsistent with 
community needs. 
The need to avoid accident occurrence becomes more 
apparent in instances where accidents are facilitated 
by the perpetration of a crime. An example of such an 
instance is the diversion of the normal currency of 
negotiable instruments. Its occurrence is normally 
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perpetrated by the criminal behaviour of an independent 
partyo The latter diverts the negotiable instrument from 
its normal course by, firstly, divesting its property from 
its original true owner and secondly, by forging the 
latter's signatureo 
Crime is submitted to be an evilo 
~---~-~"'-=-~ -~ ·--~" '~:::.c:__-;:-~-;:="-::::-------~ 
The society may 
accordingly impose upon itself a moral duty to punish or 
deter the wrong-doer.21 More important is the prevention 
of the crime. Every member of the society should take 
adequate precautions to avoid the perpetration of crime~ 
Once crime was made impossible or more onerous, accident 
occurrence would be minimised and ultimately social needs 
would be satisfied. 
(ii) The doctrine of fairness and justice is an ancient 
principle. Its source is submitted to be the application 
of the general principles of nature. Its validity 
remained sacred throughout the ages.- Almost every 
civilised legal system engrafted in its laws the policy 
to approach an equitable and just rule.-22 However the 
doctrine of fairness and justice might prove to be vague. 
In order to remove such vagueness the application of the 
said doctrine might need to be associated with more 
concrete doctrines. 
The necessity to devise an equitable and just rule in 
the general sense may prove to be unavailing, in instances 
where the manner of allocating risk arises from situations 
where the involved competing parties are innocent. 
Justice would be undone by allocating the evolving risk 
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to either partyo An example of such an instance, as far 
as the risk of negotiable instrument fraud is concerned, 
is the postal mis-delivery of a negotiable instrument in a 
properly addressed registered mail to a person bearing a 
name identical to that of the intended payee, and the 
fraudulent negotiation of the said instrument to a bona 
fide third party, neither the sender i.e. original true 
owner, nor the bona fide third party acquirer could be 
blamed for the fraudulent negotiation of the mis-delivered 
instrument. The former is deemed to have observed 
reasonable care, once he properly addresses the letter and 
secures a reliable means of delivery. The third party 
acquirer is deemed to have observed reasonable care once 
he accepts a negotiable instrument, the form of which does 
not raise the least suspicion as to its regularity or 
genuineness. Injustices would be done if the risk of 
fraud was allocated to either party. 
However, in this and like instances, the risk 
allocation rule could be brought very close to an 
equitable and just application. This could be approached 
by comparing the gravity of the hardship of the risk 
allocation rule to the competing party in question.23 
The risk allocation rule would be closest to the principle 
of fairness and justice if it was allocated to the party 
who would suffer the least hardship.-24 
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IVo Economic Efficiency as a Mechanism for Risk Allocation 
(i) The necessity of forming a risk allocation rule in a 
manner compatible with economic efficiency arises from the 
needs of the market. 'The market' is the institution 
through which a significant portion of commercial 
engagements are conducted and it is the institution 
through which the relationship of the commercial 
community is finally settled. Thus it is essential for 
the rules of the market to be admissible as finalising the 
relationship of the involved parties that they should 
satisfy the interest of the commercial community. It is 
submitted that one of the main objectives of the 
commercial community is value maximisation. 
The doctrine of value maximisation promotes the 
utility of the particular entitlement. It empowers the 
commercial community to derive the maximum utility from 
the said entitlements. Ultimately it enables the 
community in question to invest the derivable utility to 
satisfy its most urgent needs. The value of a particular 
entitlement would be maximised if it is allocated in its 
proper channels. Value will be allocated in its proper 
channels when its allocation generates the optimal 
utility. 
Rational persons, through their behaviour engage to 
maximise value. They incur expenses when and only when 
the item or service which they intend to purchase 
generates to them a utility at least equal to its face 
value. Rational persons in their purchases endeavour to 
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incur the least expense on an item of a given utilityo 25 
The doctrine of value maximisation also finds support 
in the various rational legal systemso They endeavour to 
protect persons unable to allocate value in its proper 
channels a The mentally incapacitated and the 
inexperienced are protected against economic exploitation~ 
The transactions in which they engage are rendered void or 
voidable in a manner compatible with their interests~ 26 
(ii) The significance of economic efficiency became more 
apparent in the second half of this century.27 Several 
attempts were made to justify legal principles and rules 
on economic bases. 28 In particular, the concept of 
negligence, 29 the rules relating to it, as well as the 
rules relating to automobile accidents,30 product 
liabilility, 31 respondeat superior32 and consumer credit33 
were based on economic arguments. The problem of 
determining the manner of risk allocation was the centre 
point of the above studies.34 
Theories in Value Maximisation 
Since the essence of the economic efficiency approach 
as could be noted from the foregoing is to maximise value, 
several theories have been advanced in determining the 
most efficient test for value maximisation. The 
advocates of the following theories utilised their 
selected value maximisation test in settling the problem 
of risk allocation in situations of competing 
entitlements. They allocated the entitlement, which is 
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the subject matter of conflicting claims~ in a manner 
which they believe would achieve most efficiently the 
objective of value maximisationo 
maximisation are as followso 
The theories in value 
The Posnerian Theory 
(i) This theory derives its title from its author and 
prime advocate Professor Richard Ao Posnero35 It deems 
the party's willingness to pay more to acquire a 
particular entitlement the determinative test for 
maximising the value of the said entitlemento It is of 
the view that the value of a particular entitlement would 
be maximised when more value was allocated for its 
acquisition a· In instances where the said entitlement was 
the subject of a conflicting claim, the Posnerian Theory 
allocates it to the party who values it most.36 From the 
foregoing it could be inferred that the Posnerian Theory 
tends to allocate the property right to the entitlement, 
the subject matter of a conflicting claim, in instances 
where the needs of the said party are as significant as 
those of the other competing party, in favour of the 
wealthier partyo Accordingly, it could result in 
allocating the risk arising from such a situation to the 
relatively poor party. 
(ii) To illustrate the Posnerian concept of value 
maximisation and its application as a test for allocating 
entitlements, assume that John Alex and Billy Barnes are 
in dispute over a barrel of water in a desert o The 
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theory of value maximisation initially allocates the right 
to the barrel of water to the party who is willing to pay 
more to obtain ito If John Alex was richer than Billy 
Barnes, he would be willing to pay more for the barrel of 
watero Thus, the right to the barrel of water would be 
initially allocated to John Alexo 
The allocation of the right to an entitlement to the 
richer party would maximise the value of the said 
entitlement in the sense that, the subject matter of the 
entitlement would not be given away unless the party to 
whom it is initially allocated demands in return a value 
equal to that which he applies to it. Thus, if Billy 
Barnes intends to buy the barrel of water from John Alex 
i.e. the party to whom the right to the barrel of water is 
initially allocated, he would have to "bribe" the latter. 
The value of the bribery would be computed by reference to 
that which John Alex applies to the barrel of watero-
By analogy, if the property right to a negotiable 
instrument was in conflict, the Posnerian Theory of value 
maximisation allocates the entitlement to the negotiable 
instrument in favour of the party who is willing to pay 
more for it. If the original true owner, the party from 
whom the instrument was stolen, was richer and he was 
willing to pay more than the bona fide acquirer, the 
entitlement to the instrument would be allocated to the 
former. 
(iii) The main defects of the Posnerian Theory of value 
maximisation are twofold. Firstly, it allocates 
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entitlements in a socially undesirable manner; 
to prefer the rich over the poor~ it 
entitlements in favour of the former partyo37 
the said theory is economically incohesiveo 
application allocates to the party against 
it tends 
allocates 
Secondlyp 
Its 
whom it 
operates i~eo the relatively poor party~ the duty to incur 
coste The said cost is illustrated in the bribery which 
the said party would have to invest to induce the richer 
party to give up the entitlement in conflict to him. In 
such an instance, the costs incurrable might not generate 
an enforceable value in favour of the relatively poor 
party. Accordingly, it would operate against him as a 
misallocation of wealth~38 
The economic invalidity of the Posnerian Theory of 
value maximisation becomes more apparent in the context of 
negotiable instruments. The value of such documents is 
always fixed. It is determined by reference to the 
contractual promises and undertakings to pay a certain sum 
of money incorporated in them. The need for maximising 
the value of a negotiable instrument in instances where 
its entitlement becomes the subject matter of a 
conflicting claim would then be economically undesirable 
and even meaningless. The investment of an additional 
value to its face value in order to establish the party's 
entitlement to it might not generate value in favour of 
the said party. His investment of an additional value as 
such could result in a misallocation of wealth to him. 
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The Coase Theorem 
(i) This theory derives its title from the name of its 
author 9 Professor Ronald Coaseo39 It deems the 
allocation of entitlements by way of private settlement as 
the efficient test of value maximisation. It is of the 
view that competing parties through negotiation are better 
able to determine the value of the entitlement in 
conflict. Thus, the theory under consideration does not 
consider the initial allocation of the entitlement in 
conflict to either of the competing parties of a 
particular significance.40 In instances where the 
entitlement in conflict was allocated to either of the 
competing parties, the other competing party, through 
negotiation can purchase the said entitlement from his 
adversary and ultimately, through such behaviour, he can 
re-allocate the entitlement in question to his favour. 
The Coase theorem, however, bases its application on two 
general assumptions. Namely, that social wealth is 
distributed equitably among the members of the community 
in which the situation of conflicting entitlements arises 
and that the process of negotiation does not involve 
transaction costs.41 
(ii) To illustrate the Coase theorem application as a 
test for value maximisation, assume that John Alex engages 
in manufacturing penicillin and other drugs. His factory 
is located on the River Y, in which it dumps its waste. 
Assume further that a residential estate is located on the 
other side of the River Y. The tenants of that estate 
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take their water from the rivero Assume finally that the 
current of the River Y runs in the direction of the 
residential estateo It takes with it the contaminated 
chemical materials. Ultimately, it pollutes the water 
consumed by the tenants of the residential estateo 
It could be noted that the foregoing illustration 
represents a situation of conflicting entitlements. This 
is demonstrated in the tenants of the residential estate 
and John Alex's entitlement to a quiet enjoyment of the 
River Y. The former are interested to have their only 
source of water uncontaminated. John Alex, by 
comparison, is interested to have the right of dumping the 
waste in the river maintained and ultimately, he is 
interested to resume conducting his business, in the same 
manner as before, at no additional expense. 
The Coase theorem resolves the above mentioned 
conflict by allocating the function of establishing the 
entitlement in question to the competing parties 
themselves. It is of the view that the competing 
parties, such as the tenants of the residential estate and 
John Alex, are better situated to determine the value of 
the free access to the River Y. In such an instance, and 
by reference to the allotted value, the entitlement in 
question could finally be allocated. The party who 
values the free access to the River Y most, by increasing 
his asking price for giving up the said entitlement or by 
offering a large bribe for its acquisition, may establish 
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the entitlement to a quiet enjoyment of the River Y in his 
favour. 
(iii) The main defects of the Coase theorem are 
threefoldo In the first place~ its application is based 
on the assumption that social wealth is distributed 
equitably among the members of the community in which the 
situation of conflicting entitlements arises and that the 
process of negotiation does not involve transaction cost~ 
It is submitted that the foregoing assumptions are 
hypothetical. In reality and practice, the process of 
negotiation does not always resolve the conflict between 
the competing parties. In many instances, the 
negotiation process comes to a halt. Ultimately, the 
competing parties would have to settle their dispute in 
court. Court settlement, as could be noted, involves 
transaction cost. Such cost constitutes added expenses. 
Its assumption might not generate an enforceable value in 
favour of the party to whom it is allocated. Transaction 
cost, as could be concluded, results in a misallocation 
of wealth. Its involvement accordingly '\'TOuld be 
economically undesirable. 
As to the second assumption, namely that related to 
the equitable distribution of social wealth, it is 
submitted here also that social wealth is not always 
distributed equitably. In such an instance the competing 
parties would not be similarly situated. The wealthier 
party is presumed to be better situated to establish the 
entitlement in conflict to his favour • This he can 
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maintain by increasing his asking price for giving up the 
entitlement in question to his adversary in instances 
where the said entitlement was allocated initially to him 
and by offering an affordable offering price so as to 
induce his adversary i.e. the party to whom the 
entitlement in conflict was initially allocated, to give 
it up to him. From the foregoing, it could be concluded 
that the Coase theorem, in instances where social wealth 
was not distributed equitably is socially unjust. It 
favours the rich over the poor.4 2 
In the second place, by throwing the burden of 
allocating entitlements on the involved parties, the Coase 
Theorem encounters two difficulties as to its theoretical 
application. On the one hand, it does not determine with 
predictability the party to whose favour the entitlement 
in conflict should be allocated. It determines such a 
question by reference to the outcome of negotiation~ The 
process of negotiation, as could be noted, involves time~ 
It is submitted that the involvement of time is 
undesirable in commerce. It compels the parties involved 
in the process of negotiation to disturb their commercial 
engagements, the performance of which is dependent on the 
outcome of their private negotiation. Accordingly, it 
prevents the said parties from satisfying their commercial 
interests in a timely and efficient manner. 
From the foregoing, it could be concluded that the 
Coase Theorem is inconvenient as a risk allocation theory 
in instances where the situation of conflicting 
entitlements arises in commercial transactions, such as 
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those underlying the issuance, indorsement and acceptance 
of negotiable instruments. Due to its reliance on the 
process of negotiation in determining the party to whose 
favour the entitlement in conflict should be allocated~ 
its application prevents the parties from determining 
their entitlements in a predictable and speedy manner. 
Ultimately, it prevents the said parties from satisfying 
their commercial interests in an economically efficient 
manner.4 3 
On the other hand, the application of the Coase 
Theorem as a test for allocating entitlements does not 
crystallise until the situation of conflicting 
entitlements arises. It does not attempt to provide 
against the occurrence of such a situation. Ultimately, 
its application could result in allocating the duty to 
incur costs for the purpose of purchasing the entitlement 
in conflict to the party who is in no position to derive 
an enforceable value from it, or absorb it. That is to 
say that the Coase Theorem could result in a misallocation 
of wealth. 
An example of the instance where the Coase Theorem 
could result in a misallocation of wealth is that 
illustrated in the context of negotiable instruments. In 
instances where a stolen or lost negotiable instrument 
comes into the possession of a bona fide third party for 
value and the original true owner i.e. the party from whom 
the instrument in question was stolen or lost, blocks its 
payment by ordering the drawee, with the assistance of the 
initial maker, i.e. the former's customer to dishonour the 
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said document» the bona fide third party acquirer would 
have to bribe the drawee's customer and ultimately 9 he 
would have to bribe the original true owner in order to 
establish in his favour the property right to the stolen 
or lost negotiable instrument and have its proceeds 
released in his favour G 44 The bribery which the bona 
fide third party acquirer would have to offer the original 
true owner in order to induce him to give up his property 
right to the stolen or lost negotiable instrument, 
represents a cost. The bona fide third party acquirer, 
due to his status as such is not, as will be shown 
below, 45 in the position to derive an enforceable value 
from it nor is he in the position to absorb it~ 
Accordingly, the allocation to the bona fide third party 
acquirer of the duty to bribe the original true owner is 
economically invalid. Its application results in a 
misallocation of wealth to him. 
In the third place, by stating that the initial 
allocation of the entitlement in conflict to either of the 
competing parties is insignificant, the Coase Theorem is 
submitted to be conceptually incorrect. The party to 
whom the entitlement in question is initially allocated 
would apply to it a higher value than that which he would 
apply had it been in the hands of another party. That is 
to say, that the asking price for giving up a particular 
entitlement does not necessarily correspond with its 
offering price. Accordingly, the party to whose favour 
the entitlement in conflict is initially allocated may, by 
increasing his asking price, prevent his adversary who may 
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be a potential competing partyg from reallocating the said 
entitlement in his favour o 46 -; £.,..'"' ')_,.... k, Dttl ( · ·'" 
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The Theory of Cost and Benefit Analysis 
(i) The essence of this theory is to allocate 
entitlements in a manner which brings about social 
justiceo It deems the allocation of entitlements in a 
manner which does not cause either of the competing 
parties to be worse off than that of their status ante, as 
the efficient way of approaching social justice in a 
situation of conflicting entitlementso47 
For the purpose of determining the most efficient 
rule which is compatible with allocating entitlements 
without causing either of the competing parties to be 
worse off and ultimately, for the purpose of determining 
the rule which is capable of approaching the objective of 
social justice in an efficient manner, the theory of cost 
and benefit analysis has been the subject of variant 
applications .. The most favoured version is that proposed 
by the theory's liberal advocates such as Ackerman,48 
Hirschoff,49 Calabresi50 and Michelman.51 The cost and 
benefit analysis in its liberal version is of the view 
that the allocation of entitlements would not cause either 
of the competing parties to be worse off when -
1) the gains and losses resulting from allocating the 
entitlement in conflict in one way or another were 
examined, 
2) the entitlement in question was allocated to the party, 
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the satisfaction of those interest would result in greater 
gains to the community in which the situation of 
conflicting entitlement arises 9 than the losses that would 
result from establishing liability for causing the said 
situation against the other competing party, and 
3) the party to whose favour the entitlement in conflict 
is established was required to compensate the other 
competing party for the loss caused to him by such an 
application. 52 
The thesis underlying the establishment of liability 
against the other competing party is based on the issue of 
causation. The theory in its liberal version deems the 
physical involvement of the said party or his behavioural 
engagement as the cause of the conflicting entitlement 
situation. It deems the evolving situation as the 
external cost of the competing party_' s physical 
involvement or as the external cost of the said party's 
behavioural engagement. In the light of such an 
interpretation, the theory under consideration is of the 
view that the party against whom it operates must 
internalise the evolving cost and ultimately he ought to 
bear it.53 
(ii) To illustrate the application of the theory of cost 
and benefit analysis in its liberal version as a test for 
allocating entitlements, recall the hypothetical on river 
pollution.- 54 There, the factor which gave rise to a 
situation of conflicting entitlement was the dumping of 
chemical waste in the River Y. On the one hand, it raised 
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John Alex's entitlement to resume his business in the same 
manner as before at no additional coste On the other 
hand, it raised the entitlement of the tenants of the 
residential estate to have their only source of water 
uncontaminatede The determination of whose entitlement 
should prevail, as far as this hypothetical is concerned, 
is closely related to determining to whose favour the 
right to a quiet enjoyment of the River Y should be 
allocated. The party to whose favour the free access to 
the River Y is allocated should, in the last analysis, 
have his respective entitlement preserved. 
The theory of cost and benefit analysis in its 
liberal version resolves the above-mentioned conflict by 
examining the gains and losses evolving from allocating 
the right to a quiet enjoyment of the River Y to either 
John Alex or the tenants of the residential estate. If 
the gains evolving from allocating the said entitlement to 
the latter party were firstly, greater than the evolving 
losses and secondly, they were greater than those evolving 
from allocating it to John Alex, the theory under 
consider.ation would allocate the right to a quiet 
enjoyment of the River Y to the tenants of the residential 
estate. As far as the hypothetical under consideration 
is concerned, it would seem that the theory of cost and 
benefit analysis in its liberal version is more inclined 
to allocate the right to a quiet enjoyment of the River Y 
to the tenants of the residential estate. This is due to 
the fact that had the said entitlement been allocated to 
John Alex, the tenants of the residential estate would, 
~126= 
due to water pollution, experience an increase in the rate 
of diseaseo If, however, they were required to install 
equipment, the purpose of which is to purify the river 
water~ they would experience an increase in their 
expenseso The creation of a situation where either of 
the foregoing consequences would arise, could result in 
social unrest in the residential estate and ultimately it 
could result in public disorder. It is submitted that 
the losses from such an allocation are greater than those 
evolving had the right to a quiet enjoyment of the River Y 
been established in favour of the tenants of the 
residential estate. The losses that could result from 
such an allocation are illustrated in the investment of 
expenses for the purpose of preventing the pollution of 
the River Y. 
By determining the party whose entitlement should 
prevail and ultimately by determining the party to whose 
favour the free access to the River Y should be allocated, 
as far as the hypothetical under consideration is 
concerned, the theory in its liberal version holds the 
party against whom it operates, such as John Alex, liable 
for the factor which gave rise to the situation of 
conflicting entitlements, namely, the dumping of the 
chemical waste. It deems the pollution of the River Y as 
the external cost of John Alex's own behaviour. 
Accordingly, it considers it proper for John Alex to 
internalise such cost and ultimately bear it~ 
Finally, the role of the theory of cost and benefit 
analysis in its liberal version in allocating 
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entitlements, does not terminate by determining the party 
to whose favour the entitlement in conflict should be 
allocatede For the purpose of providing against 
instances whereby the other competing party would be 
placed in a situation worse than that of his status ante, 
the theory under consideration requires the gainers from 
its application, such as the tenants of the residential 
estate, to compensate the losers, such as John Alex.-55 
By such a provision, the said theory purports to preserve 
social justice. 
(iii) The main defects of the theory of cost and benefit 
analysis are three fold. 
and losses which the 
In the first place, the gains 
theory takes into account in 
allocating the entitlements are determined by reference to 
the impact of the allocation of entitlements rule on the 
competing activities. It allocates the entitlement in 
conflict so as to further the activity which the policy 
considerations of the jurisdiction in question intend to 
promote. An example of such an instance is that 
illustrated in the hypothetical relating to river 
pollution. It is submitted that the objective of 
achieving social stability is more significant than the 
objective of marketing a particular product. Since the 
allocation of the right to a quiet enjoyment of the River 
Y in favour of John Alex could result in social unrest, 
every rational legal system in which such a conflict may 
occur would not desire to approach such a rule. Rather 
it would be more inclined to allocate the entitlements in 
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respect of the River Y in favour of the tenants of the 
residential estateo 
To state the obvious» the theory of determining the 
relevant gains and losses which could shape the allocation 
of entitlements rule by reference to the impact of the 
rule in question on the competing activities~ does not 
always operate as a test for allocating entitlements. 
There are instances in which the competing activities are 
of equal significance for the purpose of promoting a 
particular institution. The allocation of the 
entitlement in conflict in favour of the community engaged 
in a particular competing activity could deter the other 
community from engaging in the equally significant 
competing activity. Ultimately, the objective of 
promoting the institution in question would fail. 
An example of the instance in which the competing 
activities are of equal significance for the purpose of 
promoting a common legal institution and where the 
restriction of either competing activity could prevent the 
promotion of such an institution is illustrated in that 
arising from negotiable instrument fraud. In instances 
where a negotiable instrument was stolen and its thief 
fraudulently negotiated it for value to a bona fide third 
party, the title to such a document would be the subject 
of conflicting entitlements. The original true owner 
i.e. the party from whom the negotiable instrument was 
stolen, is interested to have the title of the said 
document and its proceeds restored to him. The third 
party acquirer is interested, by comparison, to have the 
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title to the negotiable instrument and its proceeds 
established in his favour. 
As could be notedp the activities which give rise to 
the foregoing situation are the lawful negotiation of 
negotiable instruments and their acquisition. Had the 
document in question not been issued in the first place, 
its theft and fraudulent misuse would not have occurred~ 
Had it not been acquired, by comparison, its thief would 
not have succeeded in misappropriating its proceeds and 
ultimately his fraudulent practice would not have resulted 
in a loss. 
On the other hand, the act of negotiation, and the 
act of acquisition are of equal significance for the 
purpose of promoting the institution of negotiable 
instruments as a substitute for money and ultimately they 
are of equal significance for the purpose of promoting its 
function as a finance device. 56 Without the act of 
negotiation, negotiable instruments would not come into 
existence. Without the act of acquisition, such 
documents would not function as a substitute for money and 
ultimately they would not function as a finance device.-
The preference of either act would necessarily, in 
instances of conflicting entitlements, restrict the other 
competing act. If the act of negotiation was made 
paramount by restoring the title to the stolen negotiable 
instrument and its proceeds to the original true owner, 
the act of acquisition would be restricted.- The members 
of the commercial community to whom a negotiable 
instrument is offered for a valuable exchange would be 
~130-
deterred from acquiring it. If, however, the act of 
acquisition was made paramount by establishing the title 
to a stolen negotiable instrument and its proceeds in 
favour of the bona fide third party acquirer, the act of 
negotiation would be restrictedo The members of the 
commercial community to whom a negotiable instrument was 
offered as a discharge for the underlying obligation would 
be deterred from taking it up from its issuers. 
Ultimately, the act of negotiation such as issuance would 
be of no practical value. 
In the second place, the theory under consideration 
does not provide a reasonable basis for establishing 
liability against the party to whom it intends to allocate 
the risk arising from the situation of conflicting 
entitlements. The determination that the said party's 
physical presence or his behavioural engagement is the 
cause of creating the situation of conflicting 
entitlements is not quite accurate. It is submitted that 
in situations of conflicting entitlements, the physical 
presence and the behavioural engagements of each of the 
involved competing parties is the cause of creating the 
said situation. 57 For an example, had the residential 
estate not been located on the other side of the River Y 
to the factory, as far as the hypothetical on river 
pollution is concerned,58 the situation of conflicting 
entitlements to a quiet enjoyment of the River Y would not 
have arisen. By the same token, had the factory not been 
located on the River Y, the very same situation would not 
have arisen. In the light of the foregoing, it would be 
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unreasonable in the absence of an existing rule of law to 
determine that a particular competing party» rather than 
the other competing party is liable for causing the 
situation of conflicting entitlementso 
The unreasonable application of the theory of cost 
and benefit analysis becomes more apparent in instances 
where the behavioural engagements of the competing parties 
could, in the general sense, be interpreted as being the 
cause of creating the situation of conflicting 
entitlements. An example of such an instance is that 
arising from negotiable instrument fraud, such as that 
arising from the theft of a negotiable instrument, the 
forgery of its proprietor's indorsement and its fraudulent 
negotiation in favour of a bona fide third party. In 
such an instance, the act of the proprietor in not 
exercising due care in the safe custody and negotiation of 
his document, and the act of the bona fide third party in 
not exercising due care in shopping for information 
relating to the status of the offered instrument, the 
identity of its possessor and the validity of his title, 
are presumed to be the cause for giving rise to the risk 
of loss.59 Had the said parties complied with the above-
mentioned care, they would have prevented the fraudulent 
person i.e. the thief from misusing the negotiable 
instrument, or they would have prevented him from 
misappropriating its proceeds. In such an instance, the 
determination that one of the above-mentioned behaviours 
only is the operative cause of the resulting loss and 
ultimately, the determination that the party responsible 
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for it should be held liable for the said loss does not 
seem~ in the absence of an existing rule of law 9 to be 
reasonableo Its application could result in allocating 
the whole blame to one particular party 9 whilst it could 
result in releasing the equally or more guilty party from 
liabilityo In other words 9 the allocation of loss to one 
competing party, in instances where both competing parties 
are, in general, guilty of causing it, could encourage the 
equally or more guilty party in behaving carelesslyo It 
could result in an increase in the rate of loss occurrence 
and ultimately, it could result in a misallocation of 
weal tho 
In the third place, the theory of cost and benefit 
analysis does not foreclose the issue of allocating 
entitlements by establishing liability against one of the 
competing parties. It requires the other competing party 
i.e. the gainer from the rule of establishing liability 
against his adversary, to compensate the latter in order 
to prevent placing the said party in a situation worse 
than his status ante and in order to approach social 
justicee 60 The theory calculates the amount of the 
compensation that ought to be paid to the loser from the 
allocation of entitlements rule, such as John Alex as far 
as the hypothetical on river pollution is concerned, by 
making reference to the offering or asking price for 
acquiring or giving up a particular entitlement. It 
consults an independent party as to what price he would be 
asking to give up the entitlement in conflict or it 
consults him as to what price he would be offering to 
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purchase the said entitlemento In the light of the 
offered answer, the theory under consideration determines 
the compensation which the gainers would have to pay the 
loserso 61 
To state the obvious» the allocation to the gainers 
of the duty to compensate the losers in in principle 
inconvenient to qualify the general allocation of 
entitlements ruleo Its application could impair the rule 
resulting from the general allocation of entitlements. 
It could render the said rule of no practical value. This 
becomes more apparent in instances where the amount of the 
payable compensation, due to the rate of the offering or 
asking price, is higher than the gains derivable from the 
allocation of the entitlement in conflict in the first 
place to the gainers. In other words, the allocation of 
the duty to compensate the losers could alter the general 
allocation of entitlements rule. It could end up with 
allocating the entitlement in conflict in a manner 
favourable to the party against whom it establishes the 
liability for creating the situation of conflicting 
entitlements. 
On the other hand, the allocation to the gainers of 
the duty to compensate the losers could result in a 
misallocation of wealth. This is due to the fact that 
the payable compensation represents a cost to the gainers~ 
The incurrable cost, by comparison, might not be of an 
enforceable value in favour of such parties. It might 
not generate as benefit to them or it might not be 
absorbed by them. Accordingly, the gainers would have to 
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assume cost without being in the position to derive an 
enforceable value from it or even be in the position to 
spread it among other partieso 
An example of the instances in which the allocation 
to the gainers of the duty to compensate the losers could 
result in a misallocation of wealth is that arising from 
the allocation of the entitlement to the property right to 
a stolen negotiable instrument in favour of its bona fide 
third party axquirer o 62 The bona fide third party 
acquirer, as will be shown below6 3 is not, due to his 
status as such, in the position to derive an enforceable 
value from the assumption of cost. Moreover, he is in no 
position to spread such cost among other parties and 
ultimately he is in no position to recover it, had it been 
allocated to him. Thus, the allocation to the bona fide 
third party of the duty to compensate the original true 
owner i.e. the party from whom the instrument in conflict 
was stolen, would result in a misallocation of wealth to 
him. It would compel him to incur cost despite his 
inability to derive an enforceable value from it or absorb 
it. 
The Theory of Cost and Benefit Analysis Reconstructed 
(i) The notion of social justice in the context of the 
allocation of entitlements is submitted to be valid. On 
the one hand, it incorporates the notion of fairness and 
equity. It takes into account the status of each party in 
relation to the entitlement in conflict. Unlike the 
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other theories, it does not favour one competing party 
over another by reason of his wealth or productivityo On 
the other hand» by examining the status of the involved 
competing parties independent from extraneous elements 9 
the notion of social justice promotes more efficiently the 
objective of value maximisatione It allocates 
entitlement to the party who is in the least position to 
purchase it had it been the subject matter of conflicting 
claims and who would suffer the most hardship had the duty 
to purchase it been allocated to him. 
The notion of examining the gains and losses arising 
from the allocation of entitlements by comparison is 
presumed to be the efficient manner of bringing about 
social justice. It incorporates more effectively the 
theory of examining in abstract the status of the evolving 
competing parties. It determines the party who would 
suffer the most hardship from the allocation of the duty 
to purchase the entitlement in conflict. Ultimately, it 
determines the party to whose favour the entitlement in 
question should be allocated. 
In order for the notion of examining gains and losses 
to operate as an efficient way of achieving social justice 
it should be considered by reference to the cost of 
abating the factor giving rise to the situation of 
conflicting entitlements. That is to say that the gains 
and losses which are to be taken into account in 
determining the allocation of entitlements rule should 
denote those arising from the assumption of the cost of 
abatement. The cost of abatement is presumed to result 
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in a gain when its assumption generates an enforceable 
value in favour of the competing party to whom it is 
allocatedo The said cost is presumed to result in a loss 
by comparison when its assumption does not generate an 
enforceable value in favour of the competing party to whom 
it is allocated or when it cannot be spread among other 
personso From the foregoing, it could be concluded that 
the cost of abatement is presumed to result in a loss when 
it takes the form of a valueless obligation and an 
irreparable damageo 
In the light of the above interpretation, the 
allocation of entitlements rule should be allocated in 
favour of the party who is -
1) in no position to derive an enforceable value from the 
assumption of the cost of abating the factor giving rise 
to the situation of conflicting entitlements, and 
2) who is in no position to absorb such costo 
In such an instance, the entitlement in conflict should be 
established in favour of such a party~ Ultimately, the 
liability giving rise to the situation of conflicting 
entitlem.ents should be established against the party who 
is in the position to derive an enforceable value from the 
assumption of the cost of abatement or who is in the 
position to absorb it. 
Such an application, as could be noted, is in line 
with the notion of social justice. It establishes the 
entitlement in conflict in favour of the party who is in 
no position to provide against the situation of 
conflicting entitlements and who would suffer the most 
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hardship had the cost of abating it been allocated to him~ 
By comparison, the above application enforces the 
allocation of entitlement rule against the party who is 
best situated to provide against the occurrence of the 
situation of conflicting entitlementso It allocates to 
him the duty to assume the cost of abating the factor 
giving rise to the said situation~ Ultimately, in 
instances where the said party fails to comply with such a 
duty, it holds him liable for creating the situation in 
question. 
Finally, by determining the gains and losses which 
underlie the allocation of entitlements rule by reference 
to the cost of abatement, the theory of cost and benefit 
analysis in the advocated sense is presumed to promote in 
an efficient manner the objective of value maximisation. 
This is achieved by restricting the duty to assume the 
cost of abatement i.e. a form of value, to the party who 
derives an enforceable utility from it or to the party who 
is in the position to absorb ito By comparison, it 
releases the party in question from the duty to incur cost 
in instances where he is in no position to derive an 
enforceable value from the assumption of such cost and who 
is in no position to absorb it. By such an application 
the theory under consideration provides against the 
misallocation of wealth. It only operates against the 
party who would suffer the least economic detriment from 
its application. 
From the foregoing it could be concluded that the 
theory of the cost and benefit analysis with reference to 
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the cost of abatement provides an efficient basis in the 
economic sense for allocating entitlements o Its 
application promotesp in an efficient manner P the 
objective of value maximisationo In the light of the 
fo:regoingp and unless a more efficient basis for 
allocating entitlements is forthcoming, the theory under 
consideration is presumed to provide the most efficient 
basis for allocating entitlements. Accordingly it will 
be advanced as the theory for determining the allocation 
of entitlements rule in the context of negotiable 
instrument fraud. 
Theories in Allocating Risk on the Basis of Liability 
The problem of allocating entitlements and ultimately 
the problem of risk allocation is intertwined with the 
question of liability~ This is due to the fact that the 
situation of conflicting entitlements evolves as a result 
of either or both of the competing parties' own conduct~ 
Therefore, many theorists endeavoured to allocate 
entitlements on the basis of liability. They come to 
such an approach by examining the respective conduct of 
the involved competing parties. By determining the 
guilty party whose conduct gives rise to the situation of 
conflicting entitlement, they establish liability against 
him and ultimately they allocate the entitlement in 
conflict to the innocent competing party. The main 
theories advanced in this context are the negligence, 64 
contributory negligence,65 comparative negligence66 and 
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insurance67 theorieso 
The Negligence Theory 
(i) The application of the negligence theory allocates 
risk to the party at fault. The main advantage of the 
said theory is that it conforms with the notion of 
fairness and equity. Nevertheless, its application 
encounters several difficulties and inconveniences. In 
the first place, the negligence theory could be applied as 
a risk allocation mechanism in instances of fault only. 
Where, by comparison, no fault could be attributed to 
either competing parties, or where the involved competing 
parties are at fault, the theory, in its traditional 
version, allocates the risk arbitrarily to the 
plaintiff.68 The terms plaintiff and defendant, in this 
context, denote the injured and the injurer. Thus, in 
instances of no fault and where the competing parties are 
at fault, the risk arising would be allocated to the 
injured party. 
(ii) In the context of negotiable instruments, the terms 
plaintiff and defendant in the sense of injured and 
injurer have no definite application in instances of risk 
arising from fraud. The risk of creating a situation of 
conflicting entitlements is not the direct consequence of 
the parties' conduct. Rather, it is the perpetration of 
a fraudulent practice by an independent party i.-e. the 
fraudulent person. The inapplicability of the term 
injurer to the instance under consideration, becomes more 
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apparent where no fault could be attributed to the 
competing parties in questiono An example of such a 
situation is the dispatch of a negotiable instrument by 
registered mail to a payees Due to postal mis=delivery, 
the instrument comes into the hands of a third person 
bearing a name identical to that of the party to whom the 
instrument is intended to be delivered. The third party 
into whose hands the instrument erroneously comes, 
misappropriates its proceeds by negotiating it with a bona 
fide acquirer. In this example, no fault - in the strict 
sense - could be attributed to either the sender or the 
acquirer. 
reasonably 
The former is presumed to have acted 
once he properly addresses the instrument and 
secures a reasonable means of dispatch. The acquirer is 
presumed to have acted reasonably once he acquires an 
instrument, the face value of which does not arouse 
suspicion as to its genuineness. The fraudulent person 
in the above instances is always deemed to be the actual 
injurer. However, his involvement in the risk allocation 
scene does not normally arise either due to his 
disappearance or insolvency. 
Since the fraudulent practice of the fraudulent 
person takes the form of diverting the normal currency of 
the negotiable instrument, the interest of the party from 
whom the instrument was stolen and whose signature was 
forged, as well as the party into whose hands the 
instrument may bona fide come, could be injured. The 
former's interest would be injured if he was dispossessed 
of the property right to the instrument or its proceeds. 
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The acquirer's interest would be injured if he was 
disentitled to retain the instrument or its proceedso 
The determination of which of the above-mentioned 
competing interests is intended to be directed against by 
the fraudulent practice of the fraudulent person is 
submit ted to be the role of the applicable law o It 
determines which of the competing parties is deemed to be 
the plaintiff in the action in question and ultimately it 
determines the party who should not be entitled to recover 
the loss resulting from negligence~ From the foregoing, 
it could be concluded that the negligence theory allocates 
risk by reference to an applicable rule of law. It does 
not formulate the risk allocation rule in the context of 
negotiable instrument fraud..- This is incompatible with 
the objective of this work. The objective of this work 
is to detemrine a risk allocation rule that could shape 
the rule of law. 
(iii) In the second place, the concept of negligence 
which the theory under consideration employs as a test for 
risk allocation, creates inconvenience to commerce in 
general and in particular to international trade. On the 
one hand, the concept of negligence is not of a uniform 
application.- The Anglo-American and the continental 
Civil legal systems are in disagreement as to the 
essential requirements of negligence.- The former require 
that for a defendant to be held negligent, he must be in 
breach of a specific duty of care owed to the plaintiff.69 
The continental Civil legal systems do not require the 
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existence of a specific duty of careo Every person owes 
to the public a general duty of care not to injure the 
lattero 70 Thus» if the cause upon which the liability 
for damage in an action involving two different legal 
systems is to be basedp was negligence» the plaintiff may 
be frustrated as to his reasonable expectationo The 
proper law may prove to be that of a foreign legal systemo 
It may require the establishment of the defendant's breach 
of a specific duty of care owed to the plaintiffo 
To illustrate, assume that John Alex is the 
proprietor of a business engaged in supplying dairy 
products in the United Kingdom. He employs Willy 
Williams as the financial secretary of his business. In 
his capac! ty as such, Willy Williams is empowered to 
indorse and issue cheques in the business name. Willy 
Williams decides to misappropriate business funds to 
purchase a French Renault caro He fraudulently implies 
to his principal that the firm is indebted to a dairy farm 
a sum of money, purporting to be the purchase value of 
the dairy products. Willy Williams forges invoices to 
that effect and files them to his principal~ John Alex 
signs a blank cheque and instructs Willy Williams to fill 
the spaces as appropriate. The latter fraudulently fills 
in the French dealer's name, the party from whom he 
intends to purchase the Renault, as payee, and fills in 
the value of the car as the sum of money for which the 
cheque is to be payable. Finally, Willy Williams 
misrepresents to the French dealer that the car in 
question is intended to be purchased for business use • 
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As consideration, he posts the fraudulently made cheque to 
the French dealer o The latter ships the car to Willy 
Williams who misappropriates its· Before the cashing of 
the cheque, John Alex learns of the forgeryo He writes 
to the bank and instructs it to countermand the chequeo 
Under the French law, John Alex is liable to the 
French dealer on the cheque. The doctrine of "respondeat 
superior• attributes to him a prima facie presumption of 
fault.71 The liability evolving from the presumptive 
fault runs in favour of every party who might be injured 
by it. Under English law, by comparison, John Alex is 
not liable to the French dealer. The drawer of a 
negotiable instrument in general owes no specific duty of 
care to its holder~72 Thus if the French dealer intends 
to enforce the cheque in an English court, he would be 
frustrated.- Since the drawer's negligence is not 
actionable in England, the English court would not grant a 
liability rule in favour of the plaintiff, i.e. the French 
dealer.73 
, Because the cheque has a significant close-
r fl)fJ'. ,.J\1 , ,· -~ 
lJVl ____________ connecte~:._~/with the English law, the mere actionability 
of negligence in the lex loci delecti i.-e.- French law, 
would not suffice to establish the liability of the drawer 
John Alex.-74 
For the plaintiff to succeed in his action against 
the defendant, he may need to purchase information as to 
the rule of the applicable foreign law and he may need to 
establish under that law the existence of a specific duty 
of care owed to him. The imposition of the duty of 
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enquiry and the imposition of the burden of proof on the 
bona fide acquirer of a negotiable instrument is 
incompatible with the promotion of the institution of 
negotiable instruments as well as the nature of the said 
institution.· 
The shopping for information concerning the rule of 
law in the applicable foreign law may involve cost~ If 
the acquirer, the party upon whom the duty of enquiry is 
imposed~ would not derive enforceable value from the 
incurring of cost, he would refrain from the acquisition 
of negotiable instrumentso Accordingly, the free 
transferability of negotiable instruments would not be 
promoted. 
The allocation of the burden of proof to the bona 
fide acquirer/holder is contrary to the application of the 
general characteristics of negotiable instruments~ 
Negotiable instruments create, in favour of their 
acquirers, a prima facie presumption of regularityo The 
purpose of the said characteristic is to promote the free 
transferability of negotiable instruments. If the 
acquirer/plaintiff was under a duty to establish the 
negligence of the defendant and its actionability under 
the applicable foreign law, he would be divested of the 
advantage afforded to him by the prima facie presumption 
of regularity arising out of the special nature of 
negotiable instruments. Accordingly, the acquisition of 
negotiable instruments in general would be discouragede 
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(iv) On the other hand 9 as a further illustration of the 
inconvenience of the concept of negligence to commerce 9 
the standard of care which ought to be observed is not 
uniform 9 it does not vary as between the different legal 
systems only 9 rather its non-uniformity could be traced 
into the single legal systemo For an example 9 the 
standard of the required care varies according to the size 
of businesso Large businesses are under a duty of care 
to observe more stringent control than small businesses.75 
If loss occurs as a result of lack of supervision of 
employees, large businesses are more likely to be held 
liable than small businesses. 
Here also, in light of the non-uniform! ty of the 
standard of care, the plaintiff may need to shop for 
information concerning the required standard of care and 
he may need to establish the defendant's failure to 
observe the said standard. The allocation of the said 
duties to the plaintiff/acquirer may be incompatible with 
the promotion of negotiable instruments. Their free 
transferability may, 
curtailed. 
due to the above duties, be 
(v) Finally, the theory of negligence employs a factual 
test. Each case which raises the element of negligence 
should be determined on its particular facts. The need 
for court settlement will, accordingly, increase. The 
increase in court settlement will necessarily involve time 
consumption and transaction costs. 
essence to the commercial communi tyo· 
Time is of the 
Merchants utilise 
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time to satisfy their commercial needso If the said time 
was involved in litigation~ merchants would forego the 
opportunity to satisfy their needso Transaction costs~ 
on the other hand are a form of wealth appropriation" If 
the need for litigation was avoidable~ the incurring of 
cost in the course of court settlement would be deemed a 
form of misallocation of wealth .. Lastly, the need for 
court settlement involves uncertainty as to the applicable 
risk allocation rule. Accordingly, merchants would 
either refrain from engaging in other transactions, the 
finance of which is dependent on the court's finding as to 
the transaction in question or they might need to disturb 
the performance of the dependent transaction. Ultimately 
the need for court settlement might damage their financial 
situation. 76 
The Contributory Negligence Theory 
( i) The concept of negligence has undergone a refined 
definition a- Learned Hand J. in United States v Carroll 
Towing77 subjected the concept of negligence to economic 
analysis. The judge considered the standard of care of a 
"rational man" as the proper test for determining the 
liability of parties. The duty to exercise care, in the 
words of the judge, is the function of three variables, 
namely the cost of avoiding accident occurrence, the 
probability of accident occurrence and the gravity of the 
evolving damage.78 
A rational party would be under a duty to avoid 
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accident occurrence if the cost employed for the purpose 
of avoiding accident occurrence was less than the 
probability of accident occurrence and the gravity of 
damage should it occur .. To express the above 
formula in an arithmetical equation, let C signify cost, 
P probability of accident occurrence and G gravity of 
damage.. Learned Hand's formula will thus run: a party 
would be liable for accident occurrence if C<PG.-79 
To illustrate the application of the above mentioned 
liability rule, assume that John Alex, due to his car's 
brake failure, caused Billy Barnes to be injured in an 
accident, the gravity of the injury of which is measured 
at £500. Assume further that John Alex could have 
avoided the accident by remedying the said defect at a 
cost of £100. Because of the high probability that the 
brake failure would cause an accident and because the cost 
of avoiding the accident is less than the evolving injury, 
the contributory negligence theory holds John Alex liable 
for the injury caused to Billy Barnes. 
(ii) Learned Hand's liability rule is further 
supplemented by comparing the cost incurrable by the 
defendant, i.e.- injurer to avoid accident occurrence, with 
that incurrable by the plaintiff i.-e. injured.- The 
liability for the evolving damage is allocated to the 
party who could have avoided the occurrence of an accident 
at the lower or at no cost.-80 Thus, assume that two cars 
were involved in an accident.- The total damage of the 
accident is measured at £1000. Assume further that the 
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accident occurred due to defects 
well as the plaintiff's car. 
in the defendant's as 
Assume» finally» that 
either the defendant or the plaintiff could have avoided 
the accident by remedying the defects in question. The 
defendant's cost of avoidance is measured at £100» whilst 
the plaintiff's cost of avoidance is measured at £50. 
Since the cost of the plaintiff's avoidance is» firstly, 
less than that of the defendant's and, secondly, is less 
than the evolving damage i.e. £1000, the contributory 
negligence theory allocates the risk evolving from the 
accident to the plaintiff. It bars him absolutely from 
raising the liability of the defendant. 
By way of analogy, in instances where the evolving 
damage of an accident was related to the property right of 
a negotiable instrument or its proceeds, the theory under 
consideration allocates the damage in its entirety to the 
party who could have avoided the occurrence of the 
fraudulent practice at the lower or at no cost~ It would 
deny the said party any enforceable interest either to the 
instrument or its proceeds. It would bar him from the 
right of enforcing the instrument, the right of claiming a 
replacement, the right of retaining the instrument or the 
right of claiming and retaining its proceeds. 
To illustrate, assume that John Alex, 
and Willy Williams are solicitors. They 
David Dove 
join in a 
partnership to run a firm of solicitors. As the normal 
business of solicitors requires, the firm opens with the 
Abbey National a trust account, for the purpose of 
managing their clients' account. In order to facilitate 
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the transmission of proceeds in the trust account~ every 
partner individually is empowered to issue cheques in the 
firm's name against the said accounto 
Assume further that Willy Williams is known to the 
other two partners for his gambling activityo On one 
occasion~ and without the knowledge of the other partners~ 
he used the firm's fund to finance his short holidayo· 
Nevertheless» and subsequent to John Alex's and David 
Dove's knowledge of Willy Williams' dishonest 
appropriation of the firm's fund 1 they~ for the purpose of 
maintaining the running of the business, do not restrict 
his authority to issue cheques in the firm's nameo 
Assume also that Willy Williams, due to his 
indebtedness to a gambling club, misappropriates the 
clients' funds.. He issues a cheque in the firm's name 
against the trust fund, in favour of the gambling club .. 
The club, however, takes the cheque in ignorance of the 
special nature of the account against which it is issued.,· 
The club finally presents the cheque for payment.; The 
bank, unaware of the fraud, pays the cheque to the club 
and debits the trust account with the face value of the 
cheque.-81 
Although the issuance of the cheque in the firm's 
name by the authorised agent does not constitute forgery 
in the strict sense, the misappropriation of the clients' 
fund constitutes a breach of trust. The funds in the 
trust account, due to the fraudulent practice, is deemed 
to have been diverted in a manner inconsistent with its 
purpose.. The debited fund is used to finance 
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transactions not related to the clients' interesto The 
competing interests arising from this instance are related 
to the entitlement to the proceeds of the fraudulently 
made chequeo The firm of solicitors is interested to 
claim the surrender of the proceeds from the gambling 
club, on the grounds that the said proceeds are 
misappropriated from the trust account.- The gambling 
club is interested to have itself entitled to retain the 
paid proceeds, on the grounds that it was acquired in 
reliance on a prima facie genuine instrument.-
Assume, finally, that the gambling club and the firm 
of solicitors are in a position to detect the fraudulent 
practice perpetrated by Willy Williams.- The gambling 
club could have avoided the fraud by enquiring with the 
firm of solicitors as to the genuineness of the cheque.-
The cost of the enquiry is estimated at £1, i.-e.- the 
charge of the telephone call. The firm of solicitors 
would have, by comparison, avoided the fraudulent practice 
by entrusting an independent party with the job of 
managing the financial estate of the business, and by 
providing collectively adequate supervision on his job.-
The cost of employing the said party, however, is 
estimated at £250 per week as wages payable to him.-
Since the cost of avoiding the misappropriation is 
less costly to the gambling club, the contributory 
negligence theory allocates the risk in its entirety to 
the gambling club.- It would deny the latter the right of 
retaining the proceeds of the misappropriated cheque•· It 
would bar it from the right of claiming any enforceable 
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interest against the firm of solicitorso' The firm of 
solicitors, by comparison, would be entitled to recover 
the misappropriated proceedso The theory would discharge 
the firm absolutely from liabilityo 
(iii) The advantages of the contributory negligence 
theory are two in number a In the first place P it 
substitutes the ~~ationalw man test for the wreasonablew 
man testo It avoids some of the difficulties concerning 
the application of the traditional negligence theoryo 
The rational man test approaches a uniform applicationo' 
The duty to exercise care and the standard of the required 
care would be interpreted in a substantially similar 
manner o The uncertainty evolving from the non uniform 
nature of the negligence concept would be minimised. The 
need for court settlement would likewise be minimised& 
In the second place, the contributory negligence 
theory in the sense mentioned above, unlike the 
traditional negligence theory, allocates damage in a 
relatively rational manner., In instances where the 
competing parties are at fault, the theory under 
consideration allocates the evolving damage to the party 
who could have avoided the accident at the lower or at no 
cost. It does not allocate the damage arbitrarily to 
either party, e.g. the plaintiff. 
(iv) The disadvantages 
theory are threefold. 
of the contributory negligence 
In the first place, it does not 
reduce the need for court settlement to a minimum.; In 
instances of aevidentiary uncertainty", the need for court 
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settlement remains indispensableo In a jurisdiction 
where information shopping is not available~ the need for 
court settlement would be necessary to determine the party 
who could have avoided accident occurrence at the lower or 
no costo 
In the second place, the contributory negligence 
under consideration, does not theory, in the sense 
provide a rational risk allocation rule in every instance.-
Like its predecessor, it does not provide a rational risk 
allocation rule in instances of "no" or "equal fault" • 
In instances where neither the plaintiff nor the defendant 
could have avoided the occurrence of an accident at any 
cost, or where either party could have avoided it at the 
same cost, the theory allocates the risk arbitrarily to 
the plaintiff .. B2 
In the third place, in instances where the cost of 
avoiding accident occurrence is comparable, the 
contributory negligence theory does not achieve a 
substantially rational rule.- It, on the one hand, 
allocates the risk in its entirety to a party who 
could have avoided it at the •lower" or "no cost".-
The other competing party is absolutely discharged from 
liability.- Thus, in a jurisdiction where information 
could be gathered as to the cost of accident avoidance, 
the party for whom the cost of avoidance is higher, might 
refrain from the exercise of care to avoid accident 
occurrence. For an example, if the firm of solicitors 
in the hypothetical relating to the misappropriation of a 
trust account mentioned above, 83 was aware of the fact 
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that the cost incurrable by third parties in the enquiry 
as to the genuineness of its instruments or the 
circumstances surrounding their issuance, is at any rate~ 
less costly than the cost incurrable in the provision of 
adequate policing of its business, it would refrain from 
taking the necessary precautions to avoid accident 
occurrence~ That is to say, as far as the above 
hypothetical is concerned, the firm of solicitors would 
refrain from employing an independent party for the job of 
managing the financial affairs of the business~ 
Although the contributory negligence theory purports 
to maximise value in the sense that it employs the minimum 
cost for the purpose of avoiding risk, its application 
could facilitate accident occurrence. It encourages the 
party, for whom the cost of avoidance is higher, to act 
carelessly.- If the rate of accident occurrence was 
increased, the probability of damage would likewise 
increase. Damages involve cost assumption; once they 
are increased, the incurrable cost will likewise increase.-
Cost is a form of wealth appropriation. If its 
assumption was increased in instances of avoidable 
accidents, the appropriated wealth would be deemed to be 
misallocated. 
On the other hand, the allocation of accident losses 
to the party who could have avoided it at the lower cost, 
might not be compatible with value maximisation. The 
cost incurrable by the party upon whom the duty to avoid 
risk is imposed might not generate an enforceable value 
in his favour, nor may the said party be in the position 
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to absorb it.- The incurrable cost would then take the 
form of misallocation of wealth. If, however, the duty 
to avoid accident occurrence was allocated to the other 
competing party~ the latter would be in a better position 
to utilise or absorb the incurrable cost~ For an 
example, if the gambling club was under a duty to shop for 
information concerning the genuineness of the cheque and 
the surrounding circumstances of its issuance, the cost 
incurrable for the said purpose would not generate 
enforceable value to the gambling club. The cost 
incurred in the course of information shopping would not 
be recovered. If the firm of solicitors was, by 
comparison, under a duty to provide adequate policing for 
its business, the incurring of cost in the employment of a 
qualified party for the purpose of managing the financial 
affairs of the business would increase the firm's 
reliability. 
would grow. 
would then be 
clients. 
Ultimately, the estate of the business 
The cost of employing the independent party( 11,. 
absorbed by distributing it among the firm's 
Finally, the allocation of accident losses to the 
party whose cost of avoidance is less, might overlap with 
other significant considerations, such as the interest of 
the legal institution in question and the interest of the 
particular community. If the gambling club was under a 
duty to shop for information concerning the genuineness of 
the cheque and the circumstances surrounding its issuance, 
the cheque would fail to perform its intended function. 
It would not be capable of being transmitted into money 
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immediatelyo Ultimately it would not operate as a payment 
devicea And since information shopping might involve cost 
assumption» the bona fide third party might» due to the 
failure to derive an enforceable utility or to absorb the 
incurrable cost» refrain from the acquisition of 
negotiable instruments. Accordingly, the free 
transferability of negotiable instruments would be 
severely curtailed. 
The Comparative Negligence Theory 
(i) The basis of the comparative negligence theory is to 
allocate loss resulting from a negligent act, to the 
negligent parties, in •proportion• to their fault. For 
an example, assume that John Alex drives his car in excess 
of the speed limit in a busy road, hits Billy Barnes, a 
pedestrian, who recklessly jumped out to cross the road.-
Assume further that Billy Barnes, as a result of 
the accident, lost one of his legs and, finally, that 
the bodily harm caused to him was estimated in monetary 
terms at £1000. The comparative negligence theory does 
not afford the injured Billy Barnes a full recovery of the 
£1000. The loss is apportioned upon the defendant/injurer 
and the plaintiff/victim, in accordance with the gravity 
of their respective fault. Thus, if John Alex was found 
to be 75% at fault and Billy Barnes 25% at fault, the 
latter is entitled to £750 only.- If, however, neither 
the defendant nor the plaintiff were guilty of negligence, 
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the theory allocates the loss resulting from the accident 
arbitrarily to the lattero 
(ii) The advantages of the comparative negligence theory 
are three in numbero In the first place, it achieves the 
main advantage of the traditional negligence theory, 
namely that it determines the risk allocation problem on 
an equitable basiso It allocates the loss evolving from 
an accident proportionately to the negligent parties., 
In the second place, the comparative negligence theory 
avoids some of the difficulties of the traditional 
negligence theory. It resolves the problem of multiple 
negligent parties by allocating the risk to the negligent 
parties in proportion to their gravity of fault. In the 
third place, more importantly, the theory under discussion 
provides incentives for accident loss avoidance. Each of 
the parties involved will take safety measures in order to 
avoid risks. This is approached by increasing their 
standard of care to the "optimum level". In other words, 
and in terms of economic analysis, the apportionment of 
damages between negligent defendant and plaintiff, i.-e.-
injurer and injured, achieves economic efficiency. The 
apportionment rule, on the one hand, allocates accident 
loss to the parties whose conduct contributes to the 
accident occurrence.- The rule, on the other hand, 
motivates parties interested to avoid liability, to 
optimise their standard of care.. The standard of care, 
in instances of evidentiary uncertainty, would exceed the 
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legal standard, consequently accident occurrence will be 
minimised a 
(iii) As far as the law of negotiable instruments is 
concerned~ the application of the comparative negligence 
theory would suggest that the loss resulting from the 
acquisition of instruments vitiated by forged 
indorsements, would be apportioned between the acquirer, 
i.e. the taker from the forger and the true owner, e.g.-
the drawer, in instances where both parties are negligent.-
An illustration of the instance in which both true owner 
and acquirer are negligent, could be noted from the 
assumption where a company entrusts a dishonest employee, 
Willy Williams, with its seal and the remittance of 
company cheques to its bank account. The dishonest 
employee steals one of the company's cheques, indorses it 
in the company's name to his own order and reindorses it 
to a third person, e.g. Billy Barnes, who takes it up in 
good faith but without adequately identifying his 
transferor, i.e. the forger, Willy Williams. The 
negligence attributable to the company is illustrated in 
their employment of a dishonest person in a delicate 
office, namely that related to the safekeeping of the 
corporate seal and the payment of accounts. The 
negligence attributable to Billy Barnes, i.-e •' the bona 
fide third party acquirer, by comparison is illustrated in 
his failure to identify his prior transferor and 
investigate the validity of his title.- The loss 
resulting from the acquisition of the stolen cheque would, 
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under the comparative negligence theory be apportioned 
between the company and Billy Barnes according to the 
gravity of their negligenceo Thus, if Billy Barnes was 
found to be 30% negligent, the theory under consideration 
would entitle him to enforce in his favour the face value 
of the acquired cheque less 30% i.e. the gravity of his 
negligenceo 
(iv) The main defects of the comparative negligence 
theory are threefold. In the first place, it fails to 
stipulate a rational rule for every risk instance. In 
instances where no fault could be attributed to either 
competing party, the comparative negligence theory 
allocates the evolving risk arbitrarily to the 
plaintiff .-84 In the second place, the theory under 
consideration does not minimise the need for court 
settlement.- On the contrary, it renders court settlement 
indispensable, in almost every instance of comparative 
negligence.- The need for court settlement would be 
essential for the purpose of measuring the gravity of the 
fault of the particular party and the manner of 
determining the apportionment of damage.- Since the 
gravity of fault is factual, the manner of loss 
apportionment would be determined by a court finding only.-
Court settlement involves time consumption, transaction 
cost and increases uncertainty. As has been illustrated 
above,85 they are hindrances to general commerce as well 
as the commercial community.-
In the third place, the apportionment of losses 
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between the competing parties is inconsistent with the 
special nature of negotiable instrumentso Negotiable 
instruments are writings of dual natureo They» on the 
one hand» create rights and obligations o The maker of 
the negotiable instrument in question, or its indorser, 
promises or undertakes to pay the holder of the instrument 
its face value, provided that certain requirements are 
mete 86 These writings, on the other hand, possess the 
characteristic of chattels. Their property is freely 
transferable from one hand to another. The relationship 
between the contractual obligation incorporated in the 
writing in question, and the latter's transferability, is 
that the liability of the promisor is created in favour of 
whoever qualifies as the "owner" of the writing. Thus, 
the liability of a drawer of a cheque, for an example, is 
dependent on the fact whether the claimant of the cheque 
satisfies the true owner/holder's status. If this 
question is answered in the affirmative, the claimant will 
be entitled to the full face value of the instrument • 
If, by comparison, the above question is answered in the 
negative, the claimant will not be entitled to any 
payment. 
The comparative negligence theory does not allocate 
entitlements to negotiable instruments in a manner 
consistent with the special nature of the said 
institution.- It apportions the loss between the 
competing parties.- The apportionment of the loss between 
the taker from the forger and the true owner, seems to 
suggest that the entitlement to the instrument in question 
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is divided between the two partieso As far as the above 
illustration is concerned,87 two thirds of the cheque 
would be owned by the company and the last third would be 
owned by Billy Barnes a This is unacceptable in the 
context of negotiable instrumentso The taker from the 
forger cannot qualify as a holder of a part of the 
instrument in question, whilst he fails to qualify as such 
as far as the remaining part, in instances where the 
I 
acquisition of the instrument occurred under a single set 
of facts.-88 
A further illustration of the inconsistency of the 
comparative negligence theory with allocation of risk in 
the context of negotiable instruments, is that it applies 
in settings inapplicable to the risk of negotiable 
instrument fraud. As has been shown above, 89 the damage 
evolving from the negotiable instrument fraud is not 
normally the direct cause of the conduct of either 
competing party. The terms defendant and plaintiff in 
the sense of injured and injurer have no defined 
counterparts in the context of negotiable instrument 
fraud. 
The Insurance Theory 
( i) The insurance theory allocates the evolving loss 
from an accident to the party best able to provide for 
insurance. In determining the party best able to provide 
for insurance, the theory under consideration takes 
account of the party's appreciation of the gravity of the 
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evolving risk in the particular activity, his capacity to 
provide against it 9 and his capability to absorb the cost 
incurrable in the course of providing against the said 
risko The party's capability to provide against risk 
necessarily requires that the said party should be in a 
position to control the activity giving rise to the risk 
in question, or he should be in a position to control the 
party whose activity gives rise to the riske By virtue 
of the available controlling power, the party in question 
would be able to provide against risko 
(ii) In the context of negotiable instruments, banks are 
presumed to be in the best position to provide against 
negotiable instrument fraude90 Due to the special nature 
of its business, the bank would be more able to determine, 
in light of the rate of fraud, the gravity of the risk. 
Due to its involvement in the collection and payment of 
negotiable instruments, the bank is presumed to have a 
controlling power over its depositor or customer. And, 
finally, due to its involvement in the banking business, 
the bank is presumed to be in the best position to absorb 
the cost incurrable in the course of provision against 
negotiable instrument fraud. The cost incurrable by way 
of insurance or by way of employing the available 
expertise and technology is, on the one hand essential for 
promoting the banking business and, on the other hand, is 
recoverable from the beneficiaries of the banking 
services. By way of periodic and service charges, the 
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bank may distribute the incurrable cost among its 
depositors and customers. 
(iii) The main advantage of the insurance theory is that 
its strict application stipulates a rational risk 
allocation rule in instances where no clear case of 
"'fault .. could be attributed to either competing party. 
It initially allocates the evolving risk to the party best 
able to provide against it. By way of distributing the 
incurrable cost, the insurance theory re-allocates the 
risk to almost every beneficiary of the activity which 
gives rise to the risk in question. In the context of 
negotiable instrument fraud, the theory re-allocates the 
risk of fraud to the drawers and holders of negotiable 
instruments. The insurance theory finally determines 
with certainty, as far as negotiable instruments are 
concerned, the party to whom risk is normally allocated 
i.e. the bank. Accordingly, the need for court 
settlement would be minimised, transaction costs would 
then be eliminated and time would be saved. 
(iv) The 
fourfold. 
main defects of the insurance theory · are 
In the first place, by allocating accident 
losses to the party best able to provide for insurance, 
other parties may be encouraged to behave carelessly. 91 
The risk would then be initially allocated inefficiently. 
The negligent party might escape the loss caused by his 
careless behaviour, especially in instances where the loss 
is comparatively trivial and where the negligent party is 
not connected with the party against whom risk is normally 
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allocated. The latter, accordingly, might not be able to 
charge to him the loss, or he might not, due to the 
trivial amount of the loss, desire to file a cause of 
action against the negligent party. 
To illustratep assume that John Alex purchases from 
a neighbouring food store two pints of milk, one pack of 
eggs, one loaf of bread and some fruit e In 
consideration, John Alex issues a cheque to David Dove, 
the proprietor of the store, for the amount of five pounds 
and seventy five pence, the face value of the purchased 
food. David Dove opens the till, puts in the cheque and 
leaves the till open to serve another customer. Willy 
Williams enters the shop, notices the cheque and steals 
it. Later David Dove realises the theft, he contacts 
Alex and advises him to stop the cheque. The latter 
stops the stolen cheque and issues a replacement to Dove. 
Willy Williams then forges Dove's signature and makes the 
cheque endorsable to his, i.e. Williams favour. Willy 
Williams then misrepresents to Billy Barnes that the 
cheque in his possession was taken in discharge of a debt 
owed to him. Accordingly, Barnes accepts to cash the 
cheque for Williams. The former deposits the cheque with 
his bank for collection. With reference to a special 
arrangement, Barnes draws the proceeds of the cheque 
before its clearance. By the time the collecting bank 
presents the cheque for payment, the drawee bank receives 
a stop payment order from its customer, John Alex. In 
compliance with the stop payment order, the drawee bank 
dishonours the chequee 
~164-
If the risk of forgery was to be allocated initially 
to the collecting bank» David Dove might escape the loss 
evolving from his negligent behaviouro Since Dove is not 
a customer of the collecting bankp the latter would not be 
able to charge to the former the face value of the cheque 
and since the amount of the cheque is trivial» the 
collecting bank might not desire to bring an action 
against the negligent party. The amount recoverable does 
not make it worth the cost incurrable in the law suit. 
In the second place, as far as the risk of negotiable 
instrument fraud is concerned, the allocation of the risk 
to the bank does not cover every instance of negotiable 
instrument fraud. On the one hand, negotiable 
instruments might not pass in a chain of collection. The 
holder may present his instrument directly to the drawee 
bank for payment. An example of such instrument is the 
uncrossed cheque. The holder need not, in this instance, 
secure the payment of the cheque through a collecting 
bank. On the other hand, negotiable instruments might 
not be paid by the drawee bank. The latterp due to its 
receipt of a stop payment order, may dishonour the 
presented instrument. 
In the instances where banks are not involved in the 
negotiable instrument risk of fraud, such as the case in 
the above instances, the insurance theory would have no 
application as a mechanism of risk allocation. Neither 
the drawer, nor the original true owner, nor the bona fide 
third party acquirer may be in the position to provide for 
insurance. The risk in this instance would then need to 
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be allocated on a basis other than insuranceo 
In the third place 9 the allocation of risk to a bank 
might not approach an efficient risk allocation ruleo 
The bank might not be in a position to control the 
activity of issuing or negotiating negotiable instruments 9 
or it might not be in the position to control the party 
engaged in such activity. The bank does not, once it 
issues cheque books to its customers, control the activity 
of cheque issuance and negotiationo The cheque book 
becomes the property of the customer and issued cheques 
become the property of the intended payee or indorsee. 
The bank, prior to the issuance of cheque books to its 
customer, does not normally stipulate unilaterally in the 
blank cheque, terms, the effect of which could restrict 
the cheques utility. Each cheque is intended to 
incorporate contractual obligations. The unilaterally 
incorporated terms might affect the customer's or the 
subsequent indorsor 's capac! ty to utilise the cheque in 
question in the desired mannero Third parties might not 
be willing to take the instrument, the utility of which 
is restricted. Accordingly, the cheque would fail to 
perform its intended function. It would not be freely 
transferable as a payment device. 
The bank's incapacity in controlling the party who 
engages in the activity of issuing and negotiating 
negotiable instruments, is illustrated by the non-
existence of an effective connection between the bank and 
the said party. The drawee bank does not normally 
establish a connection with the indorsor or presenter of a 
negotiable instrument. 
is with its customer~ 
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The drawee bank's only connection 
i.e. the issuer of a negotiable 
instrument. The collecting bank~ by comparison~ does not 
establish any connection with the issuer or the indorsor. 
Its connection with the presenter i.e. depositor could~ 
however~ be incidental. It could be based on a single 
transaction~ whereby the collecting bank engages to 
collect a single deposit item. The relationship 
terminates as soon as the collection arrangement is 
completed. 
If, however, the bank was required to accept 
negotiable instruments from parties with whom it 
establishes an effective connection only, such as that it 
establishes with its customer, in its strict sense, 
negotiable instruments would fail to fulfil their desired 
function. They would not be readily transferable into 
money immediately. Non-bank customers would not be able 
to cash their instruments. Ultimately, the objective of 
promoting the institution of negotiable instruments would 
not be fully achieved. 
Finally, collecting and drawee banks are not 
necessarily the party best able to provide for insurance. 
Drawers and indorsors may be better able to provide for 
insurance. Large companies which have been in business 
for long periods may be in a better position to provide 
for insurance, either by purchasing private insurance or 
by forming with other businesses a portfolio insurance. 
The cost of insurance could however be absorbed by 
distributing it among their employees or customers. 
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The Theory of Value Maximisation with Reference 
to Cost and Benefit Analysis re-visited 
J 
,_ .. ~lv-t vi \.l 
The value maximisation theory in the advocated sense, 
--------.. -· " 
the one hand achieves the advantages of the above 
mentioned theories collectively and it, on the other hand, 
avoids the defects of the said theories. By associating 
the duty to provide against risk with the party's ability 
to utilise the cost involved in the provision against risk 
and his ability to absorb it, the theory firstly 
approaches a fair and equitable rule. It allocates the 
risk of accident occurrence in a manner compatible with 
the status of the competing parties. It operates in 
favour of the party who is neither in the position to 
derive an enforceable value from the cost incurrable in 
the course of the provision against risk, nor is he in the 
position to absorb it. It allocates the risk of accident 
occurrence to the party who suffers the least hardship 
from it. 
Secondly, the theory under examination fixes the 
standard of the required care in a manner compatible with 
the competing parties' ability to provide against risk in 
the sense mentioned above. It distinguishes between the 
required standard of care of the party best able to 
provide against risk and that of the party least able to 
provide against it. It raises the standard of care of 
the former to that of the rational man, while it fixes the 
standard of care of the other competing party with that of 
the reasonable man, in the loose sense. 
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Thirdly, the theory, by allocating to each party the 
required standard of care, imposes a deterrent rule o It 
motivates each party to observe the fixed standard of 
care o Where the failure to exercise the fixed standard 
of care results in the occurrence of an accident, the 
theory would allocate the evolving loss entirely or 
proportionately to the negligent partyo 
Fourthly, by associating the duty to exercise care 
with the duty to provide against risk with reference to 
the cost and benefit analysis, the value maximisation 
theory could be employed to regulate almost every risk 
instance. As far as the risk of negotiable instrument 
fraud is concerned, the theory under consideration 
provides a risk allocation rule in instances of fault, 
no fault, payment, as well as non-payment instances. 
In instances of fault, the theory deems the party at 
fault as the party best able to provide against 
risk. It accordingly allocates the risk entirely to 
him. If, however, each of the competing parties was at 
fault, that is to say that each of the competing parties 
breached the fixed standard of care, the theory deems each 
party as the best party to provide against risk. It, 
accordingly, apportions the evolving damage according to 
the gravity of the fault of each party. Where no fault 
is involved in instances of payment or non-payment, the 
theory defines the party best able to provide against risk 
so as to denote the party who is in the best position to 
utilise and absorb the cost, the assumption of which is 
necessary to avoid the occurrence of accidents. On the 
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other hand, by allocating risk to the party at fault or 
the party best able to provide against risk, the theory 
dispenses with terms and concepts inconvenient to the risk 
of negotiable instrument fraud. The terms plaintiff and 
defendant in the sense of injured and injurer have no 
significance in the allocation of risk under the value 
maximisation theory. 
Finally, the cost and benefit analysis could be 
utilised to fix a general risk allocation rule. By 
reference to the general average of the particular risk 
instances, the theory could determine the party best able 
to provide against risk in a particular setting. Thus, 
if the party best able to provide against risk was 
predictable with reference to the setting in question, the 
competing parties involved in the said setting would be 
able to determine with certainty the manner of allocating 
the evolving risk. The need for court settlement would 
be minimised, transaction cost would then be eliminated 
and time would be saved. Ultimately, the interest of 
general commerce and the commercial community would be 
satisfied. 
The Approximation Theory 
(i) The negligence theory, it is argued, could be 
modified to meet the interest of commerce and the 
commercial community and ultimately, it could be advanced 
as a mechanism for risk allocation, in instances 
of negotiable instrument fraud. The essence of this 
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argument is to draw from the general average of negotiable 
instrument fraud a general rule as to the party most at 
fault in facilitating the occurrence of fraudo The 
allocation of the risk of fraud to the said party would 
then bring about a uniform 9 predictable and certain risk 
allocation rulee The need for court settlement would be 
minimised, 
would be 
transaction costs would be eliminated, time 
saved 
commerce and 
satisfied.92 
and 
the 
ultimately the 
commercial 
interest of general 
community would be 
(ii) In reply, it could be observed that the 
approximation theory does not suggest a test, the 
application of which could determine the party most at 
fault. It does not, on its own, indicate the criterion 
according to which the fault of the competing parties 
could be determined. 
The value maximisation theory and its cost and 
benefit analysis, by comparison, suggests a test based on 
economic analysis, the application of which could 
determine the party most at fault. It applies the cost 
and benefit analysis as criteria for determining the 
existence of fault. The party under the value 
maximisation theory is deemed at fault if he fails to take 
measures, the cost of which could be utilised or absorbed 
by him and the observance of which could avoid the 
accident i.e. fraud occurrence. However, the value 
maximisation theory does not contradict the approximation 
theory, rather it operates as a supplement to it. It 
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devises a proper test, according to which the party most 
at fault could be determined. 
The Manner of Approaching the Considerations 
Relevant to Risk Allocation in the 
Context of Negotiable Instrument Fraud 
I. The Promotion of the Institution of 
Negotiable Instruments 
The promotion of negotiable instruments will be 
achieved by the facilitation of their free 
transferability. To facilitate the free transferability 
of negotiable instruments they should possess some of the 
attributes of money, the very thing which they are 
intended to substitute. In particular, their possession 
should suffice to create a prima facie ownership in favour 
of the possessor. If such an attribute is conferred, 
negotiable instruments would fulfil their economic 
function. Acquirers would be able to cash their 
instruments with speed and confidence. Their possession 
would presume in their favour a prima facie ownership. 
In the second place, the establishment of a prima 
facie title to a negotiable inst~ument by the mere 
reference to its apparent possession, renders the 
instrument freely marketable. Such a document would 
then circulate in isolation of the independent transaction 
or transact ions giving rise to it. Its validity would 
not be affected by the invalidity of the said transaction 
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or transactionse Third parties, in the course of their 
dealing, would not need to enquire beyond the regularity 
of the form of the instrumente Such application would, 
firstly, assure the third parties as to the validity of 
their title to the instrument, regardless of the 
invalidity of their transferor's title and secondly, it 
would exempt them from the financial burden of enquiring 
as to the validity of the independent transaction. In 
the light of the above mentioned attribute, the 
acquisition of negotiable instruments would be encouraged 
and ultimately the free transferability of negotiable 
instruments would be promoted. 
II. The Interest of the Commercial Community 
The interest of the commercial community involved in 
the negotiable instrument transaction will be protected, 
if, on the one hand, the members of the said community 
i.e. traders are afforded adequate assurance that their 
reasonable expectation will be satisfied and, on the other 
hand, they will be afforded a predictable and speedily 
enforceable rule. In instances where the reasonable 
expectations of the parties in question compete, the 
commercial community is interested to have its members 
afforded measures, the function of which is to provide 
against the occurrence of incidents detrimental to their 
favour. 
The creation of a predictable and speedily 
enforceable rule satisfies the interest of the commercial 
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community because 9 firstly, it would minimise the need for 
court settlement and, secondly, time would be saved. If 
the parties to a negotiable instrument were able to 
determine with certainty the party to whom risk would be 
allocated 9 as far as this work is concerned, they would 
not need to have recourse to the courts. A direct right 
of recourse against the party to whom risk is allocated 
would settle the conflict in question. The party to whom 
risk is allocated, however, would not normally refuse to 
abide _by the ultimate consequence if its application was 
determinative and certain. Such refusal would only cost 
him added expenses, namely, that illustrated by the 
trans?~t~on costs. 
\·)";o::: 1. 1 \, Timi, in commercial transactions, is of the essence • 
. ~· /~·.· '·'' '-.._/ 
~ ~ It is deemed a significant factor in promoting the 
objective of value maximisation. Within a specified 
period of time, traders plan to engage in an X number of 
transactions. Each of these transactions is presumed to 
satisfy the trader's interests. Each of these interests 
possess a value to the trader. If, in the specified 
period of time, a Y number of transactions, less than X 
were concluded, the trader in question is presumed to have 
forgone an opportunity to engage in other transactions 
originally planned. Such would fo~ to his disadvantage 
opportunities whereby value would be maximised. 
The increase in court settlement is an illustration 
of time consumption. Its involvement would for~o an 
opportunity to maximise value by, firstly, engaging in 
other transactions and, secondly, by utilising the 
-174-
monetary claim incorporated in the instrument, in funding 
the said transactions. By contrast, the minimisation of 
court settlement is compatible with value maximisation. 
The time saved in the enforcement of the risk allocation 
rule would enable traders to satisfy other interests. 
A predictable and speedily enforceable rule would be 
achieved by implementing an automatic uniform rule. A 
uniform application would necessarily suggest, as far as 
risk arising from negotiable instrument transactions is 
concerned,· that the evolving risk is almost always 
allocated to a particular party. Naming the party to 
whom risk is allocated would render the determination of 
liability predictable and certain. Accordingly, the 
enforcement of the rule would be speedy. Finally, the 
need for court settlement would be minimised and time 
would be saved 
III. The Interest of the Public at Large 
The interest of the public at large would be 
protected if the occurrence of fraud was avoided. To 
avoid the occurrence of fraud, the parties involved in the 
negotiable instrument transactions should be deterred from 
not providing adequate precaution, the observance of which 
could render the perpetration of fraud on the part of the 
fraudulent person impossible or more onerous. 
The deterrence of fraud could be achieved by imposing 
upon the parties involved a duty to provide against its 
occurrence. The failure to observe the said care could 
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raise their liabilityo Accordingly, the loss resulting 
from the occurrence of fraud would be allocated entirely 
or proportionately to the negligent party. 
IVo Economic Efficiency as a Mechanism for Risk 
Allocation and the Theory of Value Maximisation 
Risk would be allocated in a manner compatible with 
economic efficiency, if it was allocated to the party best 
able to provide against it. To determine the party best 
able to provide against fraud, account should be taken of 
the ability of the party to prevent the occurrence of 
fraud in the first place, his ability to detect it should 
it occur, his ability to provide for insurance and spread 
the cost of insurance and, in the instance where insurance 
costs are not recoverable, his ability to derive benefit 
from the cost assumption. The determination of the party 
best able to provide against fraud in this manner would 
result in value maximisation. The cost incurrable in 
providing against risk would be borne by the party who 
derives benefit from such costs9 The allocation of loss 
in a manner compatible with value maximisation satisfies 
the interest of the commercial community. 
V. The Notion of Fairness and Justice 
Finally, the notion of fairness and equity would be 
satisfied if, firstly, parties to negotiable instruments 
were held liable for their misbehaviour and, secondly, the 
=176-
duty to incur costs was allocated to the party who derives 
value from its assumptiono Raising the liability of 
negligent parties would operate as a deterrent against him 
to observe the necessary precaution to prevent the 
occurrence of fraud~ whilst the allocation of the duty 
to incur cost to the party who derives benefit from 
it would allocate risk to the party best able to provide 
against it • 
. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
BACK NOTES 
1. Mistakes may give rise to contract disturbance, in 
the sense that and as far as the enforcement of monetary 
claims is concerned, payment could be made to a person not 
entitled to it~ either because the mistaken party has not 
intended payment to be made to the said person as such or 
because the mistaken party, due to the intervention of an 
independent third party, was induced to make payment to 
the wrong person. In many instances mistake as to the 
identity of the payee raises the negligence of the 
mistaken party i.e. payor. An example of such an 
instance is payment to the impostor. To illustrate, 
assume that Willy Williams purports to be the sales 
manager of a firm engaged in retailing electrical goods, 
operating under the name of Williams Household Electrics. 
In his capacity as such he contacts John Alex and 
persuades him to purchase the advertised bargain at a low 
price. The advertised bargain comprises a fridge, 
washing machine, cooker and vacuum cleaner. John Alex 
induced by the bargain decides to purchase the said goods 
through the sales manager Willy Williams. By way of 
payment John Alex issues a cheque payable to Williams 
Household Electrics and delivers it to the purported sales 
manager~ Williams then promises Alex that delivery of 
the purchased goods (due to heavy work imposed upon the 
van drivers) will take place three days later. Three 
days later when delivery fails to take place as promised 
Alex contacts Williams Household Electrics. Upon enquiry 
the sales manager of Williams Household Electrics informs 
Alex that the firm has no recollection of employing Willy 
Williams or of engaging with Alex. Alex realises that 
the arrangement with Williams was a fraud and contacts his 
bank to countermand the cheque. To his surprise the bank 
replies that the cheque has been met and payment made to 
David Dove, the holder, to whom the cheque was indorsed in 
the name of Williams Household Electrics. 
The mistake of identity in this example is 
illustrated in the erroneous impression that Alex was 
dealing with the sales manager of Williams Household 
Electrics and ultimately he was engaging with the latter~ 
Due to this mistake Alex mandated to his bank to make 
payment equal to the face value of the cheque in favour of 
Williams Household Electrics to which no indebtedness was 
created. As a result of the said mistake the negotiable 
instrument transaction, i.e. cheque, is deemed to be 
disturbed in two respects. In the first place the 
property of the cheque is transferred to a person not 
originally intended to possess an interest, i.e. David 
Dove. In the second place the proceeds of the cheque are 
delivered in favour of other than the intended holder. 
Ultimately the proceeds of the cheque were misdirected. 
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The mistake illustrated above is, as could be noted, a 
consequence of negligencee The negligence of the issuer 
of the cheque, i.e. Alex in not making necessary enquiries 
as to the true identity of Willy Williams is presumed to 
have facilitated the disturbance of the contract. Willy 
Williams due to Alex's negligence was able to practise his 
fraud, negotiate the cheque to a bona fide third party and 
induce the bank to honour the cheque without raising any 
suspicion as to the regularity of the cheque~ Had the 
issuer Alex exercised care he would have prevented the 
occurrence of the fraude 
2. The perpetration of fraud might not always be the 
commission of an independent party. Parties to 
negotiable instruments may also engage in fraudulent 
practice. An example of such an instance is the payee's 
unauthorised alteration of the face value of the 
negotiable instrument. Such act disturbs the negotiable 
instrument transaction in the sense that it alters the 
original contract of innocent parties. For example the 
alteration of the face value of the cheque from £1000, to 
£21000 makes the instrument as if it were drawn for 
£21000. Thus if the instrument comes into the hands of a 
bona fide third party it purports to confer upon him the 
right to enforce the instrument in its altered form. If 
the bona fide third party holder was allowed to enforce 
the instrument to the extent of the altered form, the 
innocent party against whom enforcement is sought to be 
made would be frustrated. He would be forced to enforce 
a contract different in terms from that to which he had 
consented. If the holder was denied enforcing the 
instrument in its altered form his reasonable expectation 
would be frustrated. He would be giving in consideration 
to its possessor a value higher than that which he would 
be deriving from it. 
3. The only distinction between the present and the 
preceding hypothetical is that the occurrence of fraud in 
the preceding hypothetical was facilitated by the issuer's 
negligence. Its negligence is illustrated by its failure 
to employ a strict test of selection of employees, strict 
supervision of their job and a periodic examination of 
accounts, statements and invoices prepared by them. In 
the present hypothetical by comparison the occurrence of 
fraud is presumed to be the sole perpetration . of the 
fraudulent person, i.e~ Willy Williams the cashier of the 
take-away restaurant. No negligence as such could be 
attributed to David Dove the proprietor of the restaurant. 
The standard of care which ought to be observed by him is 
not identical to that which ought to be observed by Alex 
Euro-Construction. The required standard of care varies 
according to the size of the business. cf. n.4~ 
4. It is submitted that the standard of care required to 
be observed is not uniform. Certain considerations e~g. 
the size of the business, underlie the formulation of the 
standard of care. Small businesses are not under a duty 
to apply strict supervision of their employees or to 
/ (4.1 
, __ 
~179-
engage in a thorough review of invoices and accounts 
prepared by them. The failure to apply strict 
supervision or to engage in thorough review need not 
always raise negligence of the business in question. 
cf o White and Summers, The Uniform Commercial Code, 
2nd Edition, (1984) pe630e 
Since as far as the example in the text is concerned, 
the take-away restaurant is a small business and Willy 
Williams demonstrated honesty during twenty years of 
service, David Dove, the proprietor, is not presumed to be 
negligent in not verifying the restaurant's accounts 
during his absence; nor is he negligent in not applying 
strict supervision of Willy Williams' job. His failure 
to observe both conducts would still place him in the 
shoes of the reasonable man. 
5. For more detail concerning the creation of negotiable 
instruments see pp.40-44 supra. 
6. For more details concerning the interests competing 
in negotiable instruments see pp. 205-223 infra. 
7. However the original true owner may demand payment 
from the drawee in instances where the instrument comes 
into the hands of a bona fide third party, satisfying the 
lawful holder status so far as the true owner provides an 
indemnity to the drawee. The purpose of the indemnity is 
to compensate the drawee against claims of payment made by 
the lawful holder. In effect the indemnity operates as a 
means of protecting the drawee from incurring double 
liability where no blame could be attributed to him as to 
the disturbance of the normal currency of the instrument. 
8. cf. Section 3(1) B.E.A~, Article 3-104 u.c.c. 
and Articles 1 G.u.L~(Bills) and 1 G.U~L~(Cheques). 
9. Although the law functions as the means of 
formulating the particular risk allocation rule, it 
enables the parties in question to shape the risk 
allocation rule in a manner suitable to their particular 
transaction. In the case of the contract of sale the law 
enables the parties to reshape the risk allocation rule 
underlying their transaction. They may, as far as it is 
fair and reasonable, stipulate that the risk arising from 
the delivery of a defective product shall always be 
allocated to the seller in instances where the said defect 
is patent. 
In the context of negotiable instruments the parties 
in question may also be allowed to formulate the risk 
allocation rule for their particular transaction as far as 
the said rule is fair and reasonable. In the United 
States, by virtue of Article 4-103 banks are allowed by a 
special arrangement to derogate from the provisions of the 
said article. Bankers in the United States in light of 
the delegated discretionary power utilise Article 4-103 to 
stipulate in their contracts with their customers, clauses 
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the effect of which is to shift the risk of wrongful 
payment to the customero An example of such clauses are 
those which shorten the period of time within which the 
customer should report improper payment and ultimately 
avoid the risk arising from the forgery of signatures, or 
the clauses the effect of which is to exempt the bank from 
the duty to give a timely notice of dishonouro 
On the Continent, banks are also allowed to shape the 
risk allocation rule as between themselves and their 
customers. 
cf. the remark of the German delegate to the Geneva 
Conference on the Unification of the Laws Relating to 
Bills of Exchange, Promissory Notes and Cheques, 2nd 
session, L.N. Document No. C628 M249 1931 11, p~309. 
In France banks utilise the said power to shift the risk 
of payment upon a forged instrument to the customer. By 
way of a special clause they enable themselves to charge 
erroneous payments, made upon a forged instrument to their 
customers. 
cf. Farnsworth, Cheques in France and the United States, a 
Comparative Study, (1962), 36 Tulane L. Rev. 
For the parties in question to shape the applicable 
risk allocation rule, they should confine the impact of 
the said rule to their personal relationship. If the 
proposed risk allocation rule was meant to have an overall 
impact, they should bring it home to the remote third 
party whose involvement in the negotiable instrument 
transaction is foreseeable. The manner in which the 
proposed risk allocation rule could be brought home to the 
third party is to negative or restrict the negotiability 
attribute of the negotiable instrument in question. Such 
step alerts the third party to safeguard his interest. 
It warns him of the risk inherent in the acquisition of 
such document. 
In instances where the proposed risk allocation rule 
is meant to have a general impact and where the said rule 
is not brought home in the above mentioned manne~ to the 
bona fide third party, the application of the doctrine of 
party autonomy might be inconsistent with the nature of 
negotiable instruments. Negotiable instruments are meant 
to possess some of the attributes of money. In 
particular they are meant to be freely marketable. 
Accordingly their possession might come into many hands 
before their final payment. 
Because of the special nature of negotiable 
instruments the establishment of the immediate parties' 
autonomy to choose the applicable risk allocation rule to 
the negotiable instrument transaction might restrict the 
free transferability of such instruments. It might divest 
the instrument in question of its practical value. The 
bona fide third party to whom the instrument is offered 
for a valuable exchange, might need, in instances where 
the drawer and the initial payee stipulate that the holder 
shall bear the risk arising from the forgery of a 
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signature, or the risk arising from the interposition of 
personal defences, to shop for information concerning the 
status of the instrument and the status of its possessor, 
i.e. the party from whom the third party intends to 
acquire the instrument. 
Because of the involvement of time and cost in 
information shopping, third parties might be deterred from 
the acquisition of negotiable instruments. The objective 
of promoting the free transferability of negotiable 
instruments would ultimately fail. 
If the third party was made to shop for information 
concerning the status of the offered instrument and the 
status of its possessor, he might need to enquire beyond 
the four corners of the instrument. He might need to 
enquire as to the circumstances which led to the issuance 
of the initial acquisition of the instrument. Such 
enquiry on the one hand restricts the free transferability 
of negotiable instruments and on the other hand it 
restricts the instrument's fulfilment of its economic 
function. 
For a negotiable instrument to be freely transferable 
it should flow in the stream of commerce independent of 
any extraneous elements. In other words, it should pass 
from hand to hand as a "courier without luggage• and in 
order to facilitate the negotiable instrument's fulfilment 
of its economic function, iee. as a payment device, it 
should be capable of being liquidated into money 
immediately. The making of enquiry beyond the four 
corners of the instrument restricts the instrument's 
fulfilment of its economic function because it involves 
time. The instrument's liquidation into money would not 
occur unless and until the enquiry is completed.-
10. The determination of the paramount interest becomes 
difficult in instances where the competing parties were 
innocent. The interest of each competing party qualifies 
for protection. In instances where the two interests 
conflict, the prote~tion conferred upon either interest 
would necessarily impair the other interest. In such an 
instance, it would be appropriate to subscribe to the 
comparative impairment approach to determine the paramount 
interest, the protection of which is favoured and 
ultimately determine the party to whom risk would be 
allocated. 
The gist of the comparative impairment approach is to 
compare the gravity of hardship created to the competing 
interests by the risk allocation rule. It determines the 
interest to which the most hardship is created as 
paramount.. It accordingly allocates the risk evolving 
from the activity in question to the party whose interest 
suffers the least hardship from the risk allocation rule. 
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11 o Merchants in the early ages recognised the risk 
involved in the transmission of cash moneyo Because the 
theft of money created a windfall against the original 
true owner~ merchants were in favour of creating an 
instrument that could satisfy the function of money as 
well as the interest of the original true ownero 
12o cfo Section 29 BoEoAop Article 3-305~ 3-306 UoCoCo 
and Article 17 Go U o Lo (Bills) and Article 22 
GoUoLo(Cheques)o 
13. See ppo256-259 and 330-361 infra. 
14. cf. po616 infra. 
15. cfo Section 29 and 60 B~EoA., Articles 16, 17 and 40 
G.U.L.(Bills). 
16. The American Law Institute, (A.Loi.) and the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 
(N.c.c.u.s.L.), are currently working on a special article 
on wire transfers. The proposed Article 4A of the u~c.c~ 
intends to regulate the rules relating to wire transfers. 
The proposed article is intended to be considered for 
final approval in the second half of 1990. The official 
text of the said article is not available; however, an 
outline of the proposed Article 4A could be obtained from 
the A.L.L 
17. cf. Walden and Savage, Legal Problems of Paperless 
Transactions, (1982), Jo Bus. L. 102~ 
18. Rosenthal, Negotiability, Who Needs It?, (1971), 71 
Col. L. Rev. 375. 
19. per Vaughan Williams L.J. in Smith v Prosser [1907] 2 
KB 741, 
and per Warrington J. in Vinden v Hughes [1905] 1 KB 799. 
20. cf. Sections 54, 55 B.E.A. and Articles 9, 15 
and 32, G.U.L.(Bills). 
21. In Mead v Young (1790) 4 TR 33, Buller and Grase J.J. 
expressed the necessity to punish the wrongdoer i.e. the 
forger. Grase J. was of the opinion that punishing the 
wrongdoer is more significant than putting an insuperable 
clog on the negotiability of negotiable instruments. 
He observed that ••• 
"If this decision will prove a clog on the circulation of 
bills of exchange, I think it will be less detrimental to 
the public, than permitting persons to recover through the 
medium of a forgery." 
Furthermore, in Buller's and his view the bringing 
about of the forger's punishment would be facilitated, 
once the risk of forged signatures is allocated to the 
immediate taker from the forger. Because of his direct 
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engagement with the forger» the acquirer » i.e. taker is 
presumed to be in the best position to trace the forgero 
Grase J. observed ooo 
"I agree also with my brother Buller, that this decision 
will be more convenient to the publicp because then the 
plaintiff will prosecute the person» who indorsed to him» 
for the forgeryo" 
Buller J. held ooo 
"Independently of these reasons, I think that convenience 
requires that a determination should be in favour of the 
defendant. I have no difficulty in saying that this H~ 
Davis, knowing that the bill was not intended for him, was 
guilty of a forgery; for the circumstance of his bearing 
the same name with the payee cannot vary this case, since 
he was not the same person. Then if the plaintiff cannot 
recover on this bill, he will be induced to prosecute the 
forger; and that would be the case even if it had passed 
through several hands, because each indorser would trace 
it up to the person from whom he received it, and at last 
it would come to him who had been guilty of the forgery: 
whereas if the plaintiff succeed in this action, he will 
have no inducement to prosecute for the forgery; the 
drawer, on whom the loss would in that case fall, might 
have no means of discovering the person who committed the 
forgery, and thus he would probably escape punishment." 
However, there are other theories in legal 
philosophy, the gist of which is to determine the function 
of the criminal law. Some are of the view that the 
function of the criminal law is to deter the wrongdoer. 
Others are of the view that the function of the criminal 
law is to rehabilitate the wrongdoer and finally, others 
in light of the rise of the economic analysis approach are 
of the view that the function of the criminal law is to 
allocate to the wrongdoer the cost arising from his wrong 
doing. 
cf. Klevorick, Legal Theory & the Economic Analysis of 
Torts & Crimes, (1985), 85 Cole L. Rev~ 905. 
22. Under the English common law, due to the rigid! ty 
and inconvenience of the remedies provided by the Kings 
courts, litigants petitioned the King to decide their 
disputes according to his conscience~ The King, in the 
early stages clothed his Chancellor with . judicial 
author! ty. He was empowered to resolve the disputes 
filed to the King's office. Since the Chancellor's basic 
education was that of the canon law, he based his 
decisions on the said law. The rules of the canon law 
were in accord with the principles of fairness and equity. 
Because of the increase of petitions to the King, a 
special court was set up to decide the filed disputes. 
The name applied to it was derivable from the man whom the 
King authorised in the early stages to decide the 
petitioned disputes i.e. the chancellor. Since the court 
of chancery was recognised as independent from the King's 
courts, it was not bound by the decisions of the latter. 
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The court ultimately had to develop its own rules. As 
there were no judicial precedents, the court of chancery 
resorted to the canon law and the principles of equity 
i.e. fairness and justice. Every decision then became a 
binding precedent for similarly circumstanced cases. Due 
to the presence of the King's courts and the courts of 
chancery, two conflicting and independent rules of law 
were in application, namely, the rules of the common law 
and the rules of the law of equity. Gradually, and in 
order to attract litigation in its courts, the King's 
court i.e. the courts of the common law relaxed their 
procedures and remedies. In the 16th century, the lex 
mercatoria was admitted as part of the common law and 
later the common law judges took account of the principles 
of equity. The principles of equity then became binding 
on the common law courts. It was not before the 19th 
century, when the two systems of courts were abolished, 
that the courts of common law were elected to serve as the 
only court of law in England• Nevertheless, equity was 
incorporated as part of the common law. At present, 
judges must take into account the rules of equity in 
deciding the cases before them. 
The doctrine of fairness and equity however has been 
incorporated in various principles such as good faith 
unconscionability and reasonableness. The various legal 
systems, due to the ambiguity of the doctrine under 
consideration might not incorporate it in their laws. 
Nevertheless, they approach its application through the 
principles of good faith unconscionability and 
reasonableness. The U.C.·C. is an example of such law. 
Throughout its various articles it sanctions the above-
mentioned principles. 
In France, the doctrine of fairness and justice has 
been utilised to fill the gaps left by the legislator. 
The rules of unjustified enrichment are an example of such 
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denies him any defence the application of which could 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE PROBLEM OF RISK ALLOCATION 
IN INSTANCES OF FORGED SIGNATURES 
(i) The forgery of a signature is a ~ ~aud 
perpetrated by an independent party. It is an example of 
a situation in which risk may arise. The forgery of a 
signature, on the one hand, involves the attributing of a 
promise or an undertaking to an innocent party. Such act 
would raise the liability of the innocent party, in 
particular when the forged signature purports to confer 
benefit in favour of a bona fide third party. An example 
of such an instance is the forgery of the payee's 
indorsement in favour of the fraudulent person and the 
negotiation of the instrument to a bona fide third party 
unaware of the forgery.-1 
The fixing of a signature on a negotiable instrument 
constitutes a contract .-2 The signatory or purported 
signatory, be he the drawer, indorsor or acceptor, 
promises or undertakes to pay the holder of the instrument 
its face value. Where the drawee does not pay the 
instrument, the holder, on the basis of the contractual 
promise or undertaking created by the signature may, by 
way of recourse, raise the liability of the signatory or 
purported signatory in question.3 Thus, the bona fide 
third party, into whose favour the instrument is 
fraudulently indorsed, may, as far as the above example is 
-196-
concerned, in his capacity as the holder and on the basis 
of the payee's purported indorsementp raise the liability 
of the lattero 
(ii) The forgery of a signaturep on the other handp may 
involve the diversion of the normal currency of the 
instrumento4 The issuing or indorsing of an instrument 
signifies the transfer of the property of the instrument. 
It is presumed to confer upon the payee or indorsee a 
property right to the instrument, whereby the latter may 
satisfy the holder status. In his capacity as such he 
may confer a good title in favour of subsequent acquirers~ 
The latter may, accordingly, satisfy the holder status. 
The satisfaction of the holder status confers upon the 
acquirer, i.e. the party, to whose favour the said status 
is established, the rights inherent in "the negotiability 
doctrine". He may accordingly enforce the instrument 
against any or all prior parties and he may retain its 
proceeds in instances of payment. 
The forgery of the drawer's issuance or the payee's 
indorsement affects the normal currency of the instrument, 
in the sense that, it purports to attribute to the prima 
facie drawer or payee, the intention to transfer the 
property of the instrument to a subsequent party. It, 
accordingly, purports to confer upon the latter, the 
holder status. It finally purports to enable the 
subsequent party, i.e. the party to whose favour the 
instrument is prima facie issued or indorsed, to procure a 
valid transfer in favour of another. The transfer of the 
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instrument in favour of the ultimate bona fide third 
party, purports to confer upon the latter~ the holder 
status o Accordingly it purports to establish in his 
favour, the right to enforce the instrument and the right 
to retain its proceeds in instances of payment. Such 
transfer affects the normal currency of the instrument, in 
the sense that it purports to dispossess the original true 
owner, i.ea the party from whom the instrument was 
originally stolen or the party whose signature was forged, 
of his property right to it, and it purports to establish 
the said right in favour of a bona fide third party. 
(iii) Finally, the risk evolving from the forgery of a 
signature is not confined as between the party against 
whom the forgery is immediately directed, i.e the party 
whose signature is forged, and the party to whose favour 
the fraudulent person negotiates the instrument. Rather 
its effect runs to parties remote to the forgery~ 
Examples of such parties are, the drawer, in instances 
where the indorsement of the payee is forged, and the 
subsequent acquirer, i.e. the party to whose favour the 
initial bona fide acquirer negotiates the instrument .. 
The risk evolving from the forgery in this instance is of 
a contractual and proprietary nature. On the one hand, 
the forgery raises the liability of the remote signatory 
e.g. the drawer, in favour of the subsequent acquirer as 
the holder, on the basis of the undertaking incurred by 
the issuance of the instrument. 
raises the acquirer's entitlement 
On the other hand, it 
as the holder, to 
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enforce the rights incorporated in the instrument, 
exclusively in his favour, and his entitlement to retain 
the proceeds of the instrument in instances of payrnento 
Definition and Scope of Application ::-<J.W ILA·o,.,eJV.._ t. .ch -~ .. <Z 
-0·.?--c:.-f 
The term "forgery" is nowhere defined in the 
respective 
negotiable 
regulated 
question. 
general, 
fraudulent 
codes regulating the laws relating to 
instruments. Presumably it is left to be 
by the penal law of the jurisdiction in 
By reference to the penal codification in 
forgery could broadly be defined as the 
destruction of the genuineness of an 
instrument, with the intention that it shall be used to 
induce another person to accept it as genuine.5 
The destruction of the genuineness of an instrument 
could be perpetrated by signing in the name of another 
without securing the latter's authority. Such act would 
fraudulently attribute to the purported signatory the 
intention to incur liability and the intention to transfer 
the property right to the instrument. 
Signatures appearing on negotiable instruments are of 
two types as to their order of incorporation; namely, 
those incorporated at the time of making, such as the 
signature of the drawer, and those incorporated subsequent 
to the making e.g. the signature of the payee or indorsee 
and the signature of the drawee. Normally signatures 
..e. 
superceding the making occur subsequent to the issua~ of 
the instrument. Issuance occurs when the maker of the 
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instrument places his signature on the instrument and 
delivers it to the intended payee" 6 Thus, the forgery 
vitiates the maki:_ng_ of the instrument if it occurs prior 
to the issuance, whilst it vitiates the negotiation or 
acceptance if it occurs subsequent to the issuance. 
(i) The most obvious form of the forgery in the making 
is the instance where a person attributes the making of a 
negotiable instrument to another. This occurs by the 
former's use of the latter's name in signing the 
instrument as maker or drawer. An example of such 
instance is the signature by Willy Williams in the name of 
John Alex as the drawer. The fraudulent attribute of 
such form of forgery is illustrated by the intention of 
the fraudulent person, Willy Williams, to use the 
instrument as if it had been drawn by John Alex. Similar 
to this example is the instance where the fraudulent 
person signs in a representative capacity without 
authority, such as the signature per pro John Alex made by 
Willy Williams. The fraudulent attribute of such 
signature is illustrated by the intention of Willy 
Williams to clothe himself with a representative capacity. 
The making of an instrument in the name of a 
fictitious person and the making of an instrument by an 
agent in misuse of his authority are not, by comparison, 
illustrations of forgery in the making. An example of the 
former is the making of a negotiable instrument by Willy 
Williams in the name of Gullible Grocer, a non-existent 
person. Such form of making is not deemed to be a form 
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of forgery because the maker does not intend to create 
anxiety by virtue of his making, to another party.7 The 
party in whose name the making is made is a non-
existent person. Accordingly, no anxiety could be 
suffered by him. 
As far as the agent's misuse of authority is 
concerned, it is submitted, in the u.c.c. as well as the 
G.U.L., that the agent's misuse of authority in the making 
is not a form of forgery. A signature is presumed to be 
a forgery, if it was made without actual, implied or 
apparent authority. 8 To illustrate, assume that Willy 
Williams is appointed as the President of Alex Euro-
Construction. In his capacity as such he is authorised 
to settle the firm's account by issuing and indorsing 
cheques in its own name. Thus if Williams misuses his 
authority, and issues, in the name of the firm, cheques 
for his own interest, he would not be deemed to be 
involved in the fraudulent making of cheques. His 
issuance of cheques in the firm's name is well within his 
actual authority. His misuse of the firm's proceeds in 
satisfying his own interest, does not raise the validity 
of the act of issuance. It, by comparison, raises his 
entitlement to use the proceeds for his own interest. 
By virtue of Section 24 of the 1861 English Forgery 
Act,9 the agent's signature in the company's name and in 
misuse of his authority, did not invalidate the instrument 
signed in the said capacity. The instrument remained 
valid if it came into the hands of a bona fide acquirer. 
~~ 
In Morison v London County & Westminster Bank Ltd.,lo the 
\ .. __./ 
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court applied Section 24 of the 1861 Act .. The case 
involved an agent authorised to sign cheques in the name 
of his principal i.e o the company. In fraud of his 
principal, the agent signed the cheques in his 
representative capacity» for his own purposeo The bank 
on which the cheques were drawn, paid the proceeds of the 
cheques to a bona fide third party. The company sought 
to recover the proceeds from the third party recipient.-
The court held, that an instrument cannot be validated for 
one purpose and invalidated for another.- It cannot be 
genuine in one hand and a forgery in another .11 Since 
the cheques were valid, as far as the payor bank was 
concerned, they would be valid in the hands of the third 
party acquirer. 
In Kreditbank Cassel v Schenkers Ltd.,1 2 the court of =~ 
first instance followed the decision in the Morison case.Jc~· 
Kreditbank, Cassel v Schenkers involved an agent's misuse 
of author! ty. The Articles of the company (Schenkers) 
authorised the local managers of the company to indorse 
and issue bills of exchange in the company's name. 
Clarke, a local manager of the company, was however, 
delegated the power of issuing and indorsing cheques only. 
Nevertheless he, in misuse of his authority, drew bills of 
exchange in the company's name for his own purpose. The 
bank, accordingly, paid the bills and charged the 
company's account with the face value of the bills. The 
court found that the bills were valid and gave judgfment 
in favour of the bank.13 
The Court of Appeal overruled the decision of the 
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lower court. They interpreted the bills of exchange 
drawn in the name of the company and for the purpose of 
the local manager, as a forgery. They defined forgery as 
it was then applicable in the 1913 Forgery Act. 14 An 
instrument is presumed to be a forgery when it tells a lie 
about itself.15 Since the bills of exchange involved in 
the case under consideration purport, contrary to the 
fact, to be drawn in favour of the company, they are 
deemed to be a forgery. The court then subjected the 
concept of forgery as incorporated in the B.E~A., to the 
definition found in the 1913 Forgery Act.16 By reference 
to Section 24 B.E.A., the court held that the signature in 
a representative capacity in the name of the company and 
in fraud of the latter is inoperative for the purpose of 
discharging the payor.17 Finally, the court gave 
judgement in favour of the company. 
The significance of determining the status of a 
signature of a representative in the name of his principal 
and in fraud of the latter, lies in the construction 
attributable to the instrument in which such signature is 
incorporated. The construction of the instrument in the 
light of the fraudulent practice, in one way or another, 
determines the entitlements evolving from it. The manner 
in which the said entitlements are determined raises, due 
to the occurrence of fraud, the problem of risk 
allocation. 
(ii) The forgery of an indorsement occurs when the 
fraudulent person signs the instrument in the name of the 
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payee or indorseeo An example of such an instance is the 
signature in the name of David Doves the payee of an 
instrument 9 by Willy Williamso Of courses such an 
instance would not occur unless the fraudulent person, 
Willy Williams 9 intercepts the normal currency of the 
instrument, or misappropriates it in fraud of his 
principalo The theft of the instrument, from the post 
box of the payee, illustrates the interception of the 
instrument, whilst the indorsement in the name of the 
payee by his trustee, for the latter's own purpose, 
illustrates the misappropriation of the instrumento The 
forgery in both instances is illustrated by attributing 
the indorsement to the payee, David Dove. 
(iii) The forgery of an acceptance occurs when the 
fraudulent person signs in the name of the drawee. An 
example of such an instance is the signature by Willy 
Wiliams in the name of Jimmy Johnbow, the party upon whom 
the instrument is drawn. The forgery in this instance is 
illustrated by attributing the acceptance to Jimmy 
Johnbow. Although the acceptance is not related to the 
transferability of the instrument, the purpose of forging 
the drawee's acceptance is to give rise to a direct 
relationship between the acceptor and the holder. It 
attributes to the former the promise to pay the instrument 
on its day of maturity.18 In other words, such a 
signature establishes a contractual liability against its 
purported maker and in favour of the holder, of the 
instrument in which it is incorporated. 
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Forms of Instrument Vulnerable to Forgery 
Negotiable instruments could~ as to their form of 
drawing» be 
instrumentso 
divided into bearer~ i~c~~ and 
Bearer instruments ar~oefined as 
order 
those 
drawn originally to bearer or those the last indorsement 
on which is an indorsement to bearer or in blank.l9 
Inchoate instruments are defined as those instruments 
signed in blank with the intention that they shall 
circulate as negotiable instruments.20 Order instruments 
are defined as those instruments which are originally 
drawn payable to a specified person or to his order, or 
the last indorsement on which is a special indorsement 
i.e. which stipulates a specified person to whom or to 
whose order it shall be payable. 21 Examples of such 
instruments are, the instrument which on the face of it 
stipulates, pay David Dove, or, pay David Dove or order, 
and the instrument, the last indorsement on which 
stipulates pay Billy Barnes, or, pay Billy Barnes or 
order. The special indorsement may appear on either an 
instrument drawn originally to order, or it could appear 
on an instrument drawn originally to bearer. In both 
situations, with one exception,22 the special indorsement 
renders the instrument bearing it, an order instrument. 
An order instrument is the most vulnerable form of 
negotiable instruments to the risk of the forgery of 
signatures. It may be vitiated as to its making, as well 
as to its negotiation. Indorsements are essential for 
the transferability of order instruments. For a 
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fraudulent person to facilitate his fraud, he must forge 
the indorsement of the payee or indorseeo 
Bearer instruments, by comparison» are transferable 
by mere deliveryo They do not stipulate the payee or 
indorsee to whose favour they shall be payable. Any 
possessor» be he a thief or a finder, could qualify as the 
purported holder. Thus, the fraudulent person need not 
forge the signature of the party from whom he intercepts 
the instrument, to facilitate his fraud. He may 
negotiate the stolen instrument to a bona fide third party 
by the mere delivering of it. 
Inchoate instruments, due to their incompleteness, do 
not stipulate to whose order they shall be payable. The 
space allotted for the name of the payee is left unfilled. 
Thus, if an inchoate instrument in its status as such, 
comes into the hands of a fraudulent person, be he the 
trustee, or a thief, there would not be a payee or 
indorsee whose signature is required to be forged, for the 
purpose of negotiating, i.e. transferring the instrument. 
The fraudulent person need only fill in his name or the 
word bearer in the space de signa ted, to facilitate his 
fraud 
Competing Interests 
The competing interests arising from instances of the 
forgery of signatures vary. Generally speaking, the 
number of competing interests is dependent on the parties 
involved in the negotiable instrument transaction. The 
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more hands the instrument comes into, the more interests 
will compete. The examination of the validity of all 
relevant interests is essential for the purpose of 
determining the risk allocation rule. In order to make 
concrete the significance of the relevant interests~ three 
hypotheticals are provided. They all involve situations 
in which negotiable instruments are negotiated to a bona 
fide third party for value. 
Hypothetical 1 
Willy Williams breaks into John Alex's office. He 
forces open a locked drawer P steals a cheque from the 
latter's cheque book, forges Alex's signature and issues 
the cheque in his, i.e. Williams', favour. Willy 
Williams then negotiates the cheque for value to Billy 
Barnes, by indorsing it in his own name to the latter~ 
Hypothetical 2 
John Alex draws up a cheque, making it payable to the 
order of Dove and Co., a Mail order business, as 
consideration for ordered goods~ Due to postal 
miscarriage, the cheque comes into the hands of Willy 
Williams, the manager of a grocery shop operating under 
the name of Dove and Co., and situated in the same postal 
locality as the mail order business. Willy Williams, 
aware of the misdelivery, decides to misappropriate the 
cheque. He purports to act as the intended payee, signs 
the cheque in the shop's name and indorses it for value to 
Billy Barnes~ 
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Hypothetical 3 
John Alex issues a cheque to the order of David Doveo 
David Dove delivers the cheque to his servant, Willy 
Williams, for deposito Willy Williams, in twenty years 
of service, has shown devotion and honesty; 
nevertheless, due to his financial difficulty, he decides 
to misappropriate the chequeo He forges his principal's 
signature and makes the cheque indorsable in his own 
favour. Willy Williams then negotiates the cheque to 
Billy Barnes for valuable consideration. 
The interests involved in the first hypothetical are 
two in number, the interest of the purported drawer, John 
Alex, and the interest of the bona fide third party 
acquirer, Billy Barnes. The interest of the acquirer, 
Barnes, is related to the negotiable instrument 
transaction, i.e. cheque, whilst the interest of the 
purported drawer, Alex, is related to the contractual 
undertaking incorporated in the instrument, cheque. The 
purported drawer does not possess an interest in the 
instrument. The cheque, as far as the hypothetical under 
consideration is concerned, does not possess an 
enforceable right in relation to Alex~ It is considered 
to be a mere sham. 
piece of paper~23 
It operates as a piece of paper, qua 
The interests involved in the second hypothetical 
are, by comparison, three in number; the interest of the 
drawer, John Alex, the interest of the purported indorsor, 
Dove and Co., and the interest of the bona fide third 
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party acquirer 9 Billy Barnes o Unlike the first 
hypothetical, the interest of the drawer, Alex, and the 
interest of the acquirer, Barnes, are both related to the 
instrument ioeo chequeo Since the instrument 9 cheque, in 
the hypothetical under consideration does not come into 
the possession of the payee, Dove and Co., the property 
right to the cheque does not pass to it. Dove and Co.-
accordingly, does not possess an enforceable right on the 
chequeo Its interest, by comparison, is related to the 
contractual undertaking purported to be assumed on the 
cheque, in its own name. 
The interests involved in the third hypothetical 
are, also, three in number; the interest of the drawer, 
John Alex, the interest of the purported indorsor, David 
Dove, and the interest of the bona fide third party 
acquirer, Billy Barnes. Unlike the second hypothetical, 
the property right to the instrument, cheque, passes to 
the intended payee. The forgery, in the hypothetical 
under consideration, materialises whilst the cheque is in 
the possession of its payee. 
involved are all related to 
transaction, i.e. cheque. 
Thus, the three interests 
the negotiable instrument 
The competing interests may increase if the 
instrument in question is accepted or paid by the drawee. 
The interest of the acceptor/payor in this instance, would 
be involved. His interest is always related to the 
negotiable instrument transaction. 
-209~ 
Other Parties 
(i) A negotiable instrument, for the purpose of securing 
payments, may pass in the chain of collectiono· It may 
need to pass through more than one pair of hands before it 
can be presented for payment e The instrument may pass 
through the hands of a depository agent and an 
intermediary agent, in order to facilitate the presentment 
of the instrument for payment. The reason for having 
more than one agent involved in the collection of 
negotiable instruments could be explained on two grounds. 
The acquired instrument could be deposited with an agent 
for collection, the jurisdictional operation of which 
does not cover the jurisdiction where the instrument is 
intended to be payable, or it could be deposited with an 
agent not recognised in the jurisdiction where the 
instrument is payable as a member of the Clearing House 
Association. 
In the first instance, the agent with which the 
acquired instrument is deposited for payment, should, for 
the purpose of collecting the proceeds of the deposited 
instrument, arrange with another agent, the jurisdictional 
operation of which covers the jurisdiction where the 
instrument is payable, to present the said instrument to 
the drawee for payment. This instance normally arises in 
the interstate instruments where the acquisition and the 
deposit of a negotiable instrument occurs in one 
jurisdiction, whilst its payment is intended to be made in 
another. An example of such an instance is the 
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instrument, the acquisition and deposit of which occurs 
in Louisiana, whilst its payment is intended to be made in 
Chicagoo If the jurisdictional operation of the bank 
with which the instrument was deposited for collection was 
confined to the state of Louisiana, such as the National 
First State Bank of Louisiana, it, for the purpose of 
collecting the proceeds of the deposited instrument, would 
have to arrange with another bank, the jurisdictional 
operation of which covers the state of Chicago, such as 
the Federal Reserve Bank, to present the deposited 
instrument for payment. For this purpose, the former 
should transfer to the latter the deposited instrument so 
as to enable the intermediary agent, the Federal Reserve 
Bank, to present the said instrument for payment, through 
its counterpart in the jurisdiction where the instrument 
is payable, e.g. Chicagoe 
In the instances where the acquired instrument is 
deposited with an agent not recognised in the jurisdiction 
where the instrument is payable, as a member of the 
Clearing House Association, the said agent would have to 
arrange with a member of the Clearing House Association to 
present the deposited instrument for payment. Unlike the 
first instance, the acquired instrument need not be an 
inter state instrument so as to justify its involvement in 
a chain of collection. Inland instruments may need to 
·pass through more than one agent for the purpose of 
collection. An example of such an instance is the 
deposit of a cheque, issued ·acquired and payable in 
England with a post office. The Post Office, in the 
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English legal system, is not a member of the Bankers 
Clearing House Association. It cannot directly procure 
the collection of the deposited instrument. Thus, in 
order to facilitate the collection of the deposited 
cheque, it must arrange with a member of the Bankers 
Clearing House Association such as Barclay's or the 
National Westminster Bank to collect the proceeds of the 
cheque. To facilitate the said purpose, it should 
transfer the deposited cheque to the bank in question~ 
(ii) The involvement of the interest of the depositary 
as well as the intermediary agent in the competing 
interest situation depends on the status of the said 
agent. If the depositary or the intermediary agent acts 
in its capacity as a collecting agent, that is to say 
it holds the credit of the deposited instrument until 
final payment, the interest of the collecting agent in 
question would not be impaired. In instances of 
dishonour, it may return the dishonoured instrument 
upstream until it reaches the ultimate acquirer/depositor. 
If the depositary or intermediary agent provisionally 
credits the proceeds of the deposited instrument to the 
account of the immediate transferor, i.e. the depositor of 
the depository agent, the crediting agent may in instances 
of dishonour, reverse the provisional credit~ 
If, however, the depositary or intermediary agent 
allows its immediate transferor to withdraw the proceeds 
of the deposited instrument before final payment, the 
agent in question would not be acting in its capacity as a 
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collecting agente By conferring upon the transferor the 
right to withdraw the proceeds of the deposited instrument 
before final payment, the depositary or the intermediary 
agent would be deemed to have acquired the deposited 
instrument from the immediate transferor. The cashing 
agent will then stand in the shoes of the bona fide 
acquirero Its interest would be identical to that of the 
bona fide acquirer. It would be related to the property 
right to the deposited instrument. 
The status of the depositary and the intermediary agent 
is also the decisive factor in determining the involvement 
of the interest of the said agent in the competing 
interest situation, in instances of payment. If the 
depositary or the intermediary agent receives payment in 
its capacity as a collecting agent, from the drawee, its 
interest as such would not be impaired. If the 
depositary or intermediary agent was compelled to account 
for the paid proceeds which it holds for its immediate 
transferor, the reverted proceeds would be charged to the 
transferor. If, however, the paid proceeds were credited 
to the transferor there would be nothing which the 
depositary or the intermediary agent would have to account 
to the payor.24 
If, by comparison, the depositary or intermediary 
agent holds the paid proceeds for its own use, it would be 
deemed to stand in the shoes of the bona fide recipient. 
As will be shown below25 the interest of the bona fide 
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recipient in instances of payment is related to the 
property right to the paid proceedso 
(iii) Finally~ the forger may be involved as a party to 
the negotiable instrument transactiono In instances 
where he misrepresents himself to another as the purported 
signatory and negotiates the forged instrument in his 
capacity as such to the third party, the u.c.c.26 and the 
G.U.Lo27 expressly provide that the forger occupies the 
status of the party whom he purports to represent.-
Accordingly, the bona fide acquirer, the party to whom the 
instrument was fraudulently negotiated, may enforce the 
acquired instrument against the forger by way of recourse.-
Under the English legal system, the forger does not 
occupy the status of the signatory, the party whom he 
purports to represent. Nevertheless, the law imposes on 
every transferor a chain of warranties. The transferor 
warrants to his immediate transferee, amongst other 
things, that he is deemed to be the party whom he purports 
to represent. 28 Since the forger is presumed to be the 
immediate transferor of the bona fide acquirer, he is 
deemed to warrant to the latter that he is the purported 
signatory. If the forger was found guilty of 
misrepresenting his actual status to his immediate 
transferee, the latter may raise the former's breach of 
warranty liability. Ultimately he may enforce the face 
value of the acquired instrument against him. 
The involvement of the forger as a party to the 
forged instrument becomes more apparent in instances where 
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he purports to negotiate the forged instrument in his own 
nameo Examples of such an instance could be gathered 
from the hypotheticals mentioned aboveo29 In the first 
hypothetical the forger~ Willy Williams~ fraudulently 
issued the cheque in his favour~ whilst in the second and 
third hypotheticals he fraudulently indorsed the cheque in 
question to his order o In his capacity as payee and 
indorsee he perpetrated his fraudulent practice. By way 
of indorsing or re-indorsing the intercepted cheque, he 
facilitated the transfer of the cheque to a bona fide 
third party e.g o Billy Barnes o As indorsor, the forger 
engages on the instrument. He undertakes to pay its face 
value, should the drawee fail to honour it on its day of 
maturity. 30 In instances of dishonour, the bona fide 
acquirer may then enforce the instrument against the 
forger by way of recourse. 
Although the forger may be a party to the negotiable 
instrument transaction, the liability created by his 
engagement on the instrument is not of a practical value. 
Its enforcement is almost always unavailing, either due to 
his insolvency or to his unavailability. 
Since the involvement of interests in the competing 
interest situation may vary according to the dishonour or 
payment instance, the following discussion will examine in 
detail the interest of the competing parties in the said 
settings separately. 
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Competing Interests in Instances of Dishonour 
The interests involved in the event of dishonouring 
an instrument vitiated by a forged signature vary 
according to the legal status of the competing parties. 
The competing parties could generally be divided into two 
categories, namely those involved "prior• to the forgery 
and those involved "subsequent" to it. The first 
category encompasses the drawer of the instrument in 
question, e.g. John Alex in the second and third 
hypotheticals and in many cases the payee, such as David 
Dove in the third hypothetical. The second category of 
parties by comparison, encompasses the bona fide acquirer 
for value and without notice of the forgery e.g. Billy 
Barnes, in the first, second and third hypothetical. The 
person upon whom the instrument is drawn, may of course be 
a party to the instrument, but his interest as an acceptor 
does not compete with the remaining interests i.e. the 
interest of the drawer, payee, and the bona fide acquirer. 
The acceptor may dishonour the instrument when presented 
to him for payment. 
( i) The interest of the first category of parties 
depends on the remoteness of the party in question from 
the act of forgery. The payee, i.e. David Dove, in the 
third hypothetical illustrates the immediate party to the 
forgery. In that hypothetical, the cheque was stolen 
from the payee soon after it came into his possession. 
The same hypothetical illustrates the remoteness of the 
drawer i.e. John Alex, from the forgery. The forgery of 
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Dove's signature occurred when the bill intentionally left 
the drawer's hand and reached its intended payeeo The 
second hypothetical is a border-line situationo The 
drawer in this hypothetical is neither as immediate as the 
payee in the third hypothetical, nor is he as remote as 
the drawer in that case a' The forgery in the second 
hypothetical occurred subsequent to the intentional 
transfer of the cheque, but before it reached its intended 
payee. The forger, Willy Williams, intercepted the bill 
before it came into the possession of the intended payee 
i.e. Dove and Coo, the mail order business. 
The interest of the immediate party is submitted to be 
two-fold. It is associated with the special nature of 
negotiable instruments as a •chose in action•. In the 
first place, the immediate party, e.g. David Dove, in the 
third hypothetical is interested to have his property to 
the instrument in question protected. In the second 
place he is interested to have himself unaccountable for 
the contractual undertaking fraudulently attributed to 
him. That is to say that, the stolen cheque should not 
be enforced against him, even if it comes into the hands 
of a bona fide third party. 
(ii) The interest of the remote party, e.g. John Alex, 
in the third hypothetical, is to have himself protected 
against double liability. He would be subject to double 
liability if he was made liable on the instrument to the 
bona fide acquirer, i.e. Billy Barnes as well as on the 
underlying obligation in favour of the original payee i.e. 
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David Doveo On the one hand and as a general rule~ the 
appearance of a negotiable instrument in the hands of a 
bona fide third party~ raises the significance of the 
contractual obligation incorporated in the instrumente 
The signatory~ by engaging on the instrument in question, 
promises or undertakes to pay the holder of the instrument 
when dishonoured a 31 The person who satisfies the status 
of a holder avails himself of the right of enforcing the 
instrument by way of recourse. On the other hand the 
engagement on a negotiable instrument presupposes the 
existence of an independent transaction giving rise to a 
creditor/debtor relationship. The latter undertakes to 
discharge the evolving obligation by way of issuing or 
negotiating a negotiable instrument. Nevertheless, the 
act of issuance or negotiation and indorsement does not 
discharge the underlying obligation absolutely. It 
suspends the operativeness of the said obligation until 
the day of maturity of the instrument.- If the instrument 
was paid to the creditor or to the party to whose favour 
the payment is directed to be made, the discharge of the 
instrument would retroactively discharge the underlying 
obligation.- If, however, the instrument was dishonoured, 
the underlying obligation revives. 32 The theft of the 
instrument from the payee/creditor would necessarily 
prevent him from demanding payment from the drawee. His 
status would be tantamount to that of the creditor of a 
dishonoured instrument. His right of action on the 
underlying obligation would then revive. 
In order to protect John Alex against double 
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liability~ his liability should be confined to that 
arising from the negotiable instrument transactiono That 
is to say that his liability should run in favour of the 
holder of the instrument ioeo chequeo Thus~ the interest 
of the drawer to be accountable for a single payment would 
be achieved by determining the party who qualifies as the 
holder of the instrument i o e. the party to whose favour 
the property right to the stolen instrument is 
establishedo If the holder status was established in 
favour of Billy Barnes, David Dove should forfeit his 
right of recourse on the underlying obligation against 
John Alexe If, however, the holder status was 
established in favour of David Dove, Billy Barnes should 
forfeit his right of action on the negotiable instrument 
against John Alex. 
(iii) The interest of the party in the borderline 
situation, e.g. John Alex in the second hypothetical, is 
illustrated in establishing in his favour the property 
right to the stolen instrument. Since the instrument in 
question does not reach its intended payee, the drawer 
transferor is interested to have the property right to the 
instrument restored to him. The transferor in question 
accepts to transfer the property in the instrument 
provided that it reaches the intended transferee. When 
the instrument comes into the hands of a party other than 
the intended transferee, the intention of the transferor 
would fail once the property in the instrument is 
established in favour of the said party. If, however, 
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the said property was established in favour of the third 
the 
liabilityo 
transferor would be subject to double 
The first would be related to his undertaking 
incorporated in the instrument~ whilst the second cause of 
liability would be related to the underlying obligation 
vis-~-vis himself and the intended transfereeo33 
(iv) The interest of the second category of parties, 
namely the bona fide acquirer is illustrated in the right 
to have his reliance protected. The bona fide acquirer 
should be assured that the transactions in which he 
engages, in reliance on their prima facie genuineness, 
are valid. The failure to uphold the valid! ty of the 
transactions in question, will disturb the whole of the 
market's dealings. Thus, if the bona fide acquirer 
obtains through his dealings, a negotiable instrument, in 
reliance on its prima facie regularity he should be 
reasonably protected against defences and claims of which 
he could not reasonably be expected to know~ 
The main application of the reliance protection, as 
it will be noted, is the upholding of the bona fide 
acquirer's right of property to the purchased instrument. 
The bona fide acquirer would obtain no practical 
value from the negotiable instrument had his right to the 
property been denied. No payment could be obtained 
through it and, more importantly, no right could be 
enforced upon it~ The instrument in this state would be 
a worthless piece of paper. 
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Competing Interests in Instances of Payment 
The interests involved in the payment of an 
instrument vitiated by a form of forgery also vary 
according to the status of the competing parties~ The 
categorisation of parties adopted in the course of 
discussing the dishonour instance is applicable~34 The 
category of prior parties encompasses, as is the case in 
the dishonour, the drawer and the payee, whilst the 
category of subsequent parties encompasses the bona fide 
acquirer and the drawee, payor~ The latter, however, may 
engage in the instrument prior to the occurrence of the 
act of forgery. This could be illustrated by the 
assumption whereby the party on whom the instrument is 
drawn places his acceptance before the forger intercepts 
the instrument. 3 5 Nevertheless, the interest of the 
drawee-acceptor does not materialise until the instrument 
is paid or when he is denied the right of refusing 
payment.- This obviously occurs subsequent to the forgery 
only, i.e. when the instrument in question comes into the 
hands of a bona fide acquirer to whom payment is made or 
in whose favour the right of payment is established. 
(i) The interest of the first category of parties is 
also dependent on the remoteness of the involved party. 
The drawer, John Alex, in the first hypothetical, 
illustrates the immediate party to the forgery. The 
blank cheque in that hypothetical was stolen from the 
purported drawer. The purported drawer is interested to 
have the cheque invalidated as a negotiable instrument and 
~221-
ultimately have his credit with the drawee-payor restored 
to its original estate., In other words, the purported 
drawer is interested not to have himself charged for the 
paymento 
Like the drawer in the first hypothetical, the payee 
ioeo David Dove, in the third also illustrates the 
immediate party to the forgeryo Nevertheless, the 
payee's relevant interest is that related to the property 
right to the instrument. He is interested to establish 
his holder status to the stolen instrument. Once this is 
satisfied, the payment is deemed to be improperly paid if 
it was made in favour of a party other than the payee or 
the party to whose favour the payment is directed. 
Ultimately, the drawee would not be discharged as between 
himself and his customer i.e the drawer. The payee may 
then demand proper payment to his favour in his capacity 
as the holder of the instrument. 
(ii) The interest of the remote party, e.g. the drawer 
John Alex in the second and third hypotheticals, is 
identical to that mentioned in the course of discussing 
the competing interests in the event of dishonour. The 
drawer is interested to have himself protected against 
double liability. This is achieved by establishing the 
holder status to either the original payee, i.e. David 
Dove, or the bona fide acquirer, i.e. Billy Barnes, as far 
as the third hypothetical is concerned. If the holder 
status was established in favour of the payee, the 
protection against double liability would be maintained by 
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challenging the payment made to the bona fide acquirer o 
If the holder status was established in favour of the bona 
fide acquirer~ the protection against double liability 
would be maintained by denying to the payee his right of 
recourse against the drawero 
By comparison» the protection against double 
liability» as far as the second hypothetical is concerned, 
could be maintained by denying the holder status to the 
bona fide acquirer o Ultimately, the payment to the 
latter would be deemed improper; accordingly, the drawee 
payor may not charge the drawer with the improper payment. 
(iii) As to the second category of parties, the interest 
of the bona fide acquirer is illustrated in establishing 
in his favour a good title to the paid proceeds. His 
interest in the paid proceeds arises firstly, from his 
reasonable expectation that the acquired instrument shall 
establish in his favour the holder status and secondly, 
from his reliance on the finality of payment. If the 
drawee was allowed to recover the erroneously paid 
proceeds from the bona fide acquirer recipient, the latter 
would be placed in a state of uncertainty as to his 
financial situation. The said uncertainty would either 
prevent him from carrying on his business or it would 
impair his status as to subsequent engagements~ 
(iv) The interest of the drawee payor is manifested in 
his right of protection against double payment. This is 
achieved either by validating his act of payment, or by 
allowing him the right of recovering the proceeds of the 
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improper payment from the recipiento In both instances, 
his interest is related to the status of the bona fide 
recipient ieee the party to whose favour payment was 
erroneously madeo If the holder status was established 
in favour of the recipient, the drawee would be protected 
against double payment by validating his act of payment • 
His customer or the party from whom the instrument was 
stolen would be denied the right to challenge the drawee's 
payment. If, however, the recipient was denied the 
holder status, the protection against double payment would 
be achieved by establishing in favour of the drawee/payor 
the right of recovering the erroneous payment from the 
recipient.-
~ / .... :....tJ8? ow If" 
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The Attitude of the Anglo-American and the Continental 
Geneva Legal Systems in Allocating Risk 
arising from the Forgery of Signatures 
(i) Traditionally, the Anglo-American and the 
Continental Civil legal systems adhered to a substantially 
similar risk allocation rule, in instances of forgery of 
signatures. They were of the opinion that negotiable 
instruments are transferable by, or on behalf of, the 
designated payee or indorsee only. Any transfer 
purporting to be made by a person lacking the necessary 
authority, was deemed inoperative. The property right to 
the vitiated instrument remained with the party from whom 
the instrument was stolen or misappropriated. The bona 
fide transferee for value could not qualify as the lawful 
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holder a Accordinglyp he could not derive enforceable 
rights on the instrument o Finally~ payment to him did 
not discharge the payor from his obligation to the maker 
of the instrument .. The former could not charge the 
latter with the paymento 
In a 1752 French case» 36 a payee entrusted another to 
arrange for the drawee's acceptance on a bill of exchange .. 
After the acceptance was secured, the entrusted agent 
forged the payee's indorsement. He made the bill payable 
to his accomplice, a stockbroker.. The latter indorsed 
the bill for value to a bona fide third party~ The court 
held, that, the forgery of the payee's indorsement did not 
transfer the property of the bill of exchange~ It 
remained vested in the latter. In a similar case,37 the 
French court extended the inoperativeness attribute of 
forged signatures, to the drawee payor. It denied him 
the right of charging the maker of a negotiable instrument 
with its payment, in instances where the instrument in 
question was vitiated by forgery of a signature. 
In England, the courts approached an identical 
! ~-----------~-~~ 
t'-·:: application. In Mead v Young, 38 the court held, that for 
I , ,__.,...-=--· .... 
~ an indorsement to be effective for the purpose of 
procuring a valid transfer, it must be made in the hand of 
the intended payee or indorsee. This case involved a 
bill of exchange issued in favour of Henry Davies. Due 
to postal misdelivery, the bill came into the hands of 
another Henry Davies. The latter fraudulently indorsed 
the bill for value to a bona fide third party. The bona 
fide acquirer then sought to enforce the bill against the 
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acceptoro The latter, due to the forgery, refused 
paymento The majority of the court held that 9 since the 
indorsement by which the third party acquired the bil1 9 
was not made in the hand of the intended Henry Davies, it 
was a forgeryo Accordingly, the acquirer could not 
qualify as the holder of the bill of exchange.-39 
In Smith v Sheppard,40 Lord Mansfield, before whom 
the case was heard, determined the effect of forgery on 
the drawee/payor. His Lordship observed ·•• 
"··• He that takes a forged bill must abide 
by the consequences, for the man whose name 
is forged knows nothing of it." 
Smith v Sheppard involved a bill of exchange drawn on a 
buyer, as consideration for sold goods. The bill was 
made payable to a third party. The buyer accepted the 
bill and paid its proceeds to an indorsee. The bill then 
turned out to have been stolen from its payee.- The 
indorsement in the name of the latter was proved to be a 
forgery. The payee then sought to demand the proceeds 
of the stolen instrument from the drawee. The latter 
refused on the grounds that payment was made in favour of 
a bona fide acquirer. Lord Mansfield defeated the 
drawee's argument. He was of the opinion that the 
indorsement, to be valid, must be made in the hand of the 
payee. The drawee was under a duty to enquire whether 
the indorsement was made in the hand of the intended 
payee.41 Since the purported indorsement was a forgery, 
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it could not procure a valid transfero Payment to the 
transferee did not ultimately discharge the payoro 
(ii) The similarity between the Anglo-American and the 
Continental Civil legal systems~ in allocating the risk 
evolving from the forgery of signatures~ was due to the 
uniform origin of the rules relating to negotiable 
instrumentso In the 14th century 9 and probably in the 
second half of the 13th century~ the institution of 
negotiable instruments, as illustrated in its ancient 
form, i.e. bill of exchange, functioned in the "Italian 
community" onlyo 42 With the aid of the Roman 
wcambium",43 the Lombards utilised the bill of exchange to 
facilitate the transmission of money, as well as foreign 
exchange transactionso When a London merchant bought on 
credit goods from a Venetian merchant, the former wrote an 
acknowledgement of the debt, and promised to pay it on its 
day of maturity. The London merchant then arranged with 
a bona fide banker travelling to a fair in Europe and 
authorised him to pay the former's debts~ The Venetian 
merchant likewise arranged with a Venetian banker 
travelling to the same fair and authorised him to receive 
due payments • At the fair, bankers met to settle their 
accounts. When the debts of two bankers could not be 
extinguished by set off, the banker with the adverse 
balance drew upon another banker with whom the former 
possessed a favourable balance, an order directing the 
latter to pay the banker in credit the balance. When 
business in Europe expanded, bankers appointed permanent 
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agents at the major fairs and citieso Thus the banker did 
not have to travel himselfo If the London merchant, as 
far as the above example is concerned, intended to pay the 
Venetian merchant the face value of the purchased goods, 
he arranged with a London banker to effect payment in 
favour of the Venetian merchant. The London banker then 
advised his correspondent, a Venetian banker, to make 
payment in favour of the Venetian merchant.-44 
By the same token, when a London merchant intended to 
travel to a European fair or city for business, he, for 
the purpose of remitting money, arranged with a London 
exchanger to provide the former with money in the currency 
of the locality to which the merchant intended to travel.-
On receipt of the money intended to be exchanged, the 
exchanger wrote an acknowledgement of the debt and 
promised to pay it on its_.day of maturity. The exchanger 
then arranged with a merchant travelling to the same fair 
or city to which the first merchant intended to travel, to 
pay the latter a sum of money equal to that deposited with 
the exchanger. On arrival, the London merchant could, by 
presenting the drafted letter, enforce the face value of 
the draft in the required currency.45 When business 
expanded, exchangers appointed permanent agents in the 
major fairs and cities. Thus, the exchanger did not have 
to arrange with a merchant travelling to a particular fair 
or city to make payment in favour of a third party. The 
remitting exchanger advised his correspondent, based at 
the fair or city to which the depositor intended to 
travel, to pay the latter a sum of money equal to the 
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money deposited with him for the purpose of remittanceo 
From these orders and letters of advice, the form of 
the bill of exchange developedo And from the fairs where 
merchants met to do business~ the bill of exchange 
was introduced to Europeo Due to the uniform practice 
featured at the fairs, the rules relating to negotiable 
instruments, when first introduced to Europe, were 
similar a Due to the involvement of negotiable 
instruments in international trade, the practice relating 
to such instruments witnessed a parallel evolution. For 
an example, when indorsements to order first appeared on 
the Continent in the beginning of the 17th century, 46 
Marius wrote his advices acknowledging the existence 
of similar practice in England.47 Malynes in his 
nLex Mercatoria" in 1622, did not, by comparison, mention 
the existence of such practice. 4B In the beginning 
of the 18th century, when, on the Continent, the 
applied,49 Lord Mansfield, concept of "abstract" 
in Miller v Race, 50 
as to English Law. 
was 
firmly established its application 
As a fur.ther illustration of the uniform attribute of 
the practice relating to negotiable instruments, courts 
frequently cite juristic interpretations for jurists of 
other legal systems, so far as the said interpretations 
have a bearing on the subject matter in question, and so 
far as they do not violate the established general 
principles of the forum. 
For an example, in Young v Grote51 Best J. cited 
Pothier's proposition as to the effect of the drawer's 
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negligence in drawing up his instrument, on his right 
against the defrauded payoro Young v Grote involved a 
bill of exchange signed in blank o The drawer, Young, 
left the blank signed bill with his wife for the purpose 
of enabling her to settle the business's account as 
appropriate~ The wife, due to her inexperience, caused 
the bill to be drawn in a manner that the amount to which 
it was payable could be raised without exciting suspicion~ 
She delivered the bill to a clerk of Young, instructing 
him to fill in the bill for the amount of fifty pounds, 
two shillings and threepenceo The clerk returned the 
bill to Mrs. Young. It was established that, the amount 
for which the bill was drawn was written in the middle of 
the space designated for the amount payable in words.-
The letter f in fifty pounds was written as a small 
letter. The figure 5 was removed from the £ sign. 
Mrs. Young instructed the clerk to cash the bill to pay 
wages due to two of Young's employees. The clerk 
fraudulently inserted the words three hundred before the 
word fifty, in the space designated for the amount in 
words~ He next inserted the figure 3 before the figure 
5 and after the pound sign. He presented the bill to 
Grote for payment. The latter, unaware of the fraud, 
paid the bill in its altered form.-
Best J., in finding against the drawer, Young, cited 
Pothier's proposition as authority. He found that since 
Young was negligent in drawing up his instrument, he could 
not recover against the defrauded drawee payor, who was, 
due to the drawer's negligence, made to pay the bill in 
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its fraudulent statuso52 Pothier's proposition read as 
follows: 
"Cependant si c'~tait par la faute du tireur 
que le banquer eut ete induit en erreur, le 
tireur n'ayant pas eu le soin d'ecrire sa 
lettre de maniere a prevenir les falsifications; 
puta s 9 il avait ~crit en chiffres la somme 
tir~e par la lettre, et qu'on eut a joute 
zero, le tireur serait en ce cas tenu 
d'indemniser le banquier de ce qu'il a 
souffert de la falsification de la lettre, 
a laquelle le tireur par sa faute a donne 
lieu; et c'est a ce cas qu'on doit 
restreindre la decision de Scacchia."~53 
(iii) The similarity between the Anglo-American and the 
Continental civil legal systems did not last long~ From 
the 19th century, the dispute as to the effect of the 
forgery of signatures started to materialise.54 The 
attitude of the legal system in question as to the manner 
of risk allocation in instances of forged signatures was 
incorporated in the codifications as well as the courts' 
findings, relating to negotiable instruments. As has 
been shown above,55 the competing interests involved may 
vary according to the particular setting. Accordingly, 
the determination of the interest less favourable for the 
purpose of allocating risk and ultimately, the 
determination of the party to whom risk is to be 
allocated, may also vary. The following discussion will 
outline the attitude of the legal systems under 
consideration as to allocating risk in instances of the 
forgery of signatures in two separate settings, namely, 
that of dishonour and payment. 
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The Attitude of the Anglo-American and the 
Continental Geneva Legal Systems in Alloca~ing Risk 
of Forged Signatures in Instances of Dishonour 
In determining the effect of forged signatures, the 
legal systems under consideration distinguish between two 
categories of parties, viz. parties "immediate• to the 
forgery and parties "remoten from the forgery. The first 
category of parties encompasses the party whose signature 
was forged. He could be the purported drawer, the payee, 
the indorsee or the drawee. The second category of 
parties, i.e. those remote from the forgery, encompasses 
parties whose signature was not forged. Nevertheless 
their involvement in the negotiable instrument transaction 
either precedes or supercedes a forged signature. 
Examples of such parties are, the drawer, in instances 
where the payee's indorsement was forged, the indorsor 
subsequent to the forgery and the bona fide acquirer. 
The Effect of Forgery on the 
party whose s:f.gnature was forged 
The Anglo-American and the Continental Geneva legal 
systems are in agreement, that the forgery of a signature 
does not bind the party whose signature was forged. The 
acquirer of the instrument vitiated by a forged signature 
may not enforce his instrument against the party whose 
signature was forged. 
Article 7 G.U~L.(Bills) reads: 
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"If a bill of exchange bears signatures 
of persons incapable of binding themselves 
by a bill of exchange or forged signature~ 
or signatures of fictitious persons or 
signatures which for any other reason 
cannot bind the persons who signed the bill 
of exchange or on whose behalf it was signed~ 
the obligations of the other persons 
who signed it are none the less valide"56 
Section 24 B.E.A. reads: 
"Subject to the provisions of this Act, 
where a signature on a bill is forged, 
or placed thereon without the authority 
of the person whose signature it purports 
to be, the forged or unauthorised 
signature is wholly inoperative, and no 
right to retain the bill or give a 
discharge therefor, or to enforce payment 
thereof against any party thereto, can be 
acquired through or under that signature."57 
Thus, as far as the hypotheticals mentioned earlier 
are concerned, 58 Billy Barnes, the bona fide third party 
acquirer, may not enforce the cheque in the first 
hypothetical against the purported drawer, John Alex. 
The signature of the latter is forged: it could not 
establish any liability against him. As to the second 
and third hypotheticals, Billy Barnes may not enforce the 
cheque in question against the payee Dove and Co. the mail 
order business or David Dove. His indorsement is forged; 
ultimately no liability could be established against him~ 
As could be noted, the •non binding• attribute of a 
forged signature rendered by Article 7 G. U. L. (Bills) and 
the "inoperative• attribute rendered by Section 24 B.E~A.-
are not synonymous. The effect of inoperative signatures 
has a wider impact than the non binding signature.- Every 
inoperative signature is not binding but the reverse is 
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not trueo 
belowo 
This is discussed in the section immediately 
The Effect of Forgery on Remote Parties 
( i) As to the effect of forged signatures on remote 
parties, the legal systems under consideration are in 
disagreement whether the forged signature should be given 
a apersonal" or ngeneral" impacta That is to say that 
the Anglo-American and the Continental Geneva legal 
systems disagree on whether the non binding attribute of 
forged signatures should be confined to the party whose 
signature was forged or should it run to remote parties. 
If the non binding attribute of a forged signature 
was to be given a wide application signatures prior to the 
forgery would forfeit their significance. Parties 
engaged prior to the forgery would be discharged as 
against the bona fide third party into whose hands the 
vitiated instrument may come. The latter would be left 
with a worthless piece of paper which conveys no 
enforceable rights. 
If, however, the non-binding nature was to be given a 
limited application, i.e. confined to the party whose 
signature was forged, the liability incurred by parties 
prior to the forgery would remain valid in favour of the 
bona fide third party acquirer. Despite the forgery, the 
acquirer would be able to enforce his instrument against 
parties prior to the forgery. 
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(ii) The signature, the forgery of which may have an 
impact on remote parties, is the signature which, firstly, 
is essential for the transferability of a negotiable 
instrument and secondly, it supercedes a valid signature. 
The forgery of a signature essential for the 
transferability of an instrument causes the acquisition of 
the instrument by a bona fide third party. Accordingly, 
the problem of competing interests and ultimately the 
problem of allocating risk would then arise. The forgery 
of a signature not related to the transferability of the 
instrument, such as the forgery of the drawee's 
acceptance, would not, by comparison, involve a competing 
interests situation as between parties remote from the 
forgery, unless the forgery of the drawee's acceptance 
accompanies the forgery of a signature essential for the 
transferability of the instrument. The competing 
interest situation evolving from such an instance would be 
attributed to the forgery of the latter's signature. The 
liability of the remaining signatories on the instrument 
remains, despite the forgery of the drawee's acceptance, 
operative in favour of the bona fide acquirer, provided 
that no essential signature is forged. The acquirer may, 
on the basis of the instrument, enforce the liability of 
the signatory in question. 
On the other hand and in order to examine the impact 
of the forgery of a signature it is essential for the 
forged signature to supercede a valid signature or 
signatures. If the forged signature was the first 
signature as to its order of incorporation, there would be 
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no signature or signatures preceding the forged signaturep 
the examination of the operativeness of which is required. 
Thusp if the forged signature was that of the purported 
drawerp such as the case in the first hypothetical, 59 
there would not be other signatures the operativeness of 
which is required to be established. The signature of 
the drawer is normally presumed to be the first as to the 
order of signatures appearing on negotiable instruments. 
From the foregoing it appears that the signature, the 
forgery of which could create a competing interest problem 
is that of the payee or indorsee, as is the case in the 
second and third hypotheticals.6° Its involvement raises 
the operativeness of prior signatures and ultimately the 
liability of parties prior to the forgery, in favour of 
the bona fide third party acquirer into whose hands the 
instrument may come. In other words, the forgery of the 
payee's or indorsee's signature, i.e indorsement, raises 
the problem of risk allocation. The determination of the 
party to whom risk would be allocated would necessarily 
indicate the interest, the protection of which is less 
favourable in allocating risk. 
The Attitude of the Legal Systems under consideration 
as to the Effect of Forgery on Remote Parties 
(i) The Anglo-American legal systems, in determining the 
effect of the forgery of signatures (indorsements) on 
prior parties, adhere to the pre-codification traditional 
attitude. The decision in Meade v Young61 has been 
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incorporated in the BoEoAo as well as the UoCoCo 
both deny the operativeness of the forged signatureo 
Section 24 BaEoAo reads: 
"Subject to the provisions of this Act where a 
signature on a bill is forged or placed thereon 
without the authority of the person whose 
signature it purports to be» the forged or 
unauthorised signature is wholly inoperative 
and no right to retain the bill or give a 
discharge therefor or to enforce payment 
thereof against any party thereto, can be 
acquired through or under that signatureo" 
Article 3 - 404 UoC c~ reads: 
"1) Any unauthorised signature is wholly 
inoperative as that of the person whose name 
is signed unless he ratifies it or is precluded 
from denying it; but it operates as the 
signature of the unauthorised signer in favour 
of any person who in good faith pays the 
instrument or takes it for value." 
They 
Since forged signatures are not operative, they would 
not effect a valuable transfer of the negotiable 
instrument in questiono If a bona fide third party 
acquires an instrument through a forged signature, he 
would not be deemed to have established his right to the 
instrument through a valid transfer. The property right 
to the instrument would not, accordingly, be established 
in his favour. He would not, due to the forgery, qualify 
as the holder of the instrument. In the last analysis he 
would not be able to enforce his instrument against 
parties prior to the forgery. The instrument which comes 
into his possession through a forged signature, forfeits 
its significance as na negotiable instrumentn, it operates 
in his hands as a piece of paper qua piece of paper. 
Since forged signatures do not effect a valid 
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transfer, the property of the piece of paper as a 
negotiable instrument remains with the party from whom it 
was stoleno He remains the holder of the instrumento 
The rights incorporated in it run to his favour. The 
loss of the instrument does not dispossess him of the 
enforceable rights incorporated in it. He may claim the 
surrender of the instrument or its proceeds from its bona 
fide acquirer /recipient. He may, as a general rule, 62 
compel the drawee to make payment to him, notwithstanding 
the fact that the latter had paid a bona fide third party. 
(ii) The Continental Civil legal systems, by comparison, 
shifted from the traditional attitude. By the end of the 
18th century,63 Germany took the initiative in limiting 
the impact of forged indorsements.64 With the aid of the 
"abstract doctrine", the Germans were able to confine the 
non-binding attribute of forged signatures, to the party 
whose signature was forged. They, in the first place, 
divorced the validity of each signature from that of the 
other. The~held that the invalidity of one signature did 
not affect the validity of other signatures. In the 
second place, the Germans differentiated between the 
property of the instrument and the transactions 
incorporated in it. They held that the property of an 
instrument could prima facie be established in favour of 
another, even if he established his property to the 
instrument through a void transaction. As the prima 
facie owner of the instrument, he could convey the 
property of the instrument to a third party. The latter 
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couldg if he acts bona fideg establish a perfect title 
to the instrument o The invalidity of the underlying 
transactiong according to which his transferor established 
his property to the instrumentg did not affect the 
property of the acquirero Even when the bona fide 
acquirer established his property right to the instrument 
through or from a forgerg he could establish a perfect and 
unimpeachable title.65 
The German abstract theory was favoured throughout 
the Continent e In the 1930-1931 Geneva Conferences on 
the Unification of the Laws relating to Bills of Exchange, 
Promissory Notes and Cheques, the Continental Civil legal 
systems expressed their approval of the German rule. 66 
The doctrine of abstract has been incorporated in the 
Conventions on the Uniform Laws The separation between 
the various signatures has been incorporated in Article 7 
Gc>U.L.(Bills).67 
Article 7 reads: 
"If a bill of exchange bears signatures of 
persons incapable of binding themselves by 
a bill of exchange or forged signatures, 
or signatures of fictitious persons or 
signatures which for any other reason cannot 
bind the persons who signed the bill of 
exchange or on whose behalf it was signed, 
the obligations of the other persons who 
signed it are none the less valid." 
/; . 
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The underlined phrase clearly illustrates the independent 
status of the various signatures. It reinstates the 
validity of signatures appearing on negotiable 
instruments, despite the existence of a superceding forged 
signature. 
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The separation between the signatures on the one hand 
and the property of the instrument on the other has been, 
however, incorporated in Article 16 G.U.L.(Bills)o68 
Article 16 reads: 
"The possessor of a bill of exchange is deemed to 
be the lawful holder if he establishes his title 
to the bill through an uninterrupted series 
of indorsements even if the last indorsement 
is in blank. In this connection, cancelled 
indorsements are deemed not to be written 
(non ecrits). When an indorsement in blank 
is followed by another indorsement, the person 
who signed the last indorsement is deemed to 
have acquired the bill by the indorsement in 
blank. Where a person has been dispossessed 
of a bill of exchange in any manner whatsoever 
the holder who establishes his right thereto in 
the manner mentioned in the preceding paragraph 
is not bound to give up the bill unless he has 
acquired it in bad faith or unless in acquiring 
it he has been guilty of gross neg1igence~"69 
The second paragraph of Article 16 illustrates the 
independent nature of the property of negotiable 
instruments.70 Despite the fact that the instrument was 
dispossessed from its owner, the latter may not compel the 
surrender of the instrument or its proceeds from the bona 
fide third party who acquired the instrument through a 
regular chain of endorsements and in good faith. The 
forgery of the payee's indorsement does not disentitle the 
acquirer to the property right of the instrument. 
The Continental Geneva legal systems, unlike the 
Anglo-American, import a valid transfer into the forged 
indorsement. The third party who acquires the instrument 
through a forged indorsement may qualify as the lawful 
holder of the instrument. Accordingly, he possesses an 
unimpeachable property right to the instrument, he may 
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enforce the instrument against all liable parties~ he may 
enforce the face value of the instrument against the 
drawee and he may retain the proceeds of the instrument in 
instances of paymento 
(iii) From the foregoing, it could be concluded that, 
the manner in which the legal systems under consideration 
allocate the risk arising from the forgery of signatures 
varies according to the form of the forgery involved. In 
instances where the forgery takes the form of the forgery 
in the making, the Anglo-American and the Continental 
Geneva legal systems are in agreement. Since the forgery 
of the making does not bind the purported maker I drawer, 
the evolving risk would be allocated to the acquirer from 
the forger, e.g. Billy Barnes, as in the first 
hypothetical. If, however, the forgery takes the form of 
the forgery in the negotiation, such as the cases in the 
second and third hypotheticals, the Anglo-American legal 
systems determine that the evolving risk would be 
allocated to the acquirer, i.e. Bil.ly Barnes. The 
Continental Geneva legal systems, by comparison, determine 
that the evolving risk would be allocated to the original 
true owner i.e. the drawer, 
hypothetical and the payee 
hypothetical. 
John Alex, 
David Dove 
in the second 
in the third 
In the light of the above attitude, it is submitted 
that the Anglo-American legal systems adhere to a narrow 
application of the •negotiability doctrine", whilst the 
Continental Geneva legal systems adhere to a wide 
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application o The negotiability doctrine is the most 
significant concept in the context of negotiable 
instrumentso Its characteristics differentiate negotiable 
instruments from other chases in actiono The application 
of the negotiability doctrine comes to the rule that the 
bona fide acquirer of a negotiable instrument possesses a 
perfect and unimpeachable titleo His title to the 
instrument may not be defeated by raising defences and 
claims of which he was not awareQ Parties to a 
negotiable instrument may not disclaim their liability by 
subjecting the bona fide acquirer to personal defences 
which they possess against parties from or through whom 
the acquirer establishes his title to the instrument.71 
The Anglo-American legal systems approach the narrow 
application of the negotiability doctrine by narrowing the 
concept of "holder". 
The concept of holder in the context of negotiable 
instruments, is equivalent to the concept of owner in the 
law of property. The satisfaction of the holder status 
avails the bona fide acquirer of the advantages of the 
negotiability doctrine~ The status of a holder in the 
Anglo-American legal system applies to every party who 
establishes his acquisition of the instrument through a 
genuine chain of indorsements. For an indorsement to be 
genuine it must be made by or on behalf of the intended 
payee or indorsee i.-e.- the party to whose favour the 
instrument was initially issued and indorsed and to whose 
favour it was delivered for the purpose of transferring 
the property of it.72 The thief of a negotiable 
-242~ 
instrument and the trustee or agent such as Willy 
Williams, in the second and third hypotheticals above» are 
not the intended payee or indorsee~ They cannot by way 
of indorsement transfer the property of the instrument o 
The bona fide third party who takes the instrument from 
the said thief 9 trustee or agent does not qualify as the 
holder. 
The Continental Geneva legal systems approach the 
wide application of the negotiability doctrine by 
broadening the concept of "holder". The holder status in 
the said legal systems applies to every possessor who 
establishes his title to the instrument through a regular 
chain of indorsements.73 The forgery of an indorsement, 
contrary to the Anglo-American legal system does not 
interrupt the chain of signatures. Thus the possessor 
may qualify as the lawful holder of the instrument, even 
if a forgery vitiates the said instrument~ 
The Impact of Forged Signatures Under the UNCITRAL 
Convention Relating to International Bills of Exchange and 
International Promissory Notes on the Rights and 
Liabilities of Parties to Vitiated Negotiable Instruments 
in Instances of Dishonour74 
Like the Anglo-American and the Continental Geneva 
legal systems,75 the UNCITRAL Convention on International 
Bills of Exchange and International Promissory Notes, in 
determining the effect of forged signatures on the rights 
and liabilities of parties to a negotiable instrument 
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which such signatures vitiate, distinguishes between 
parties who are immediate to the forgery i.e. the persons 
whose signatures were forged and those who are remote from 
the forgery. As far as the issue is related to 
determining the effect of the forged signature on the 
liability of the party immediate to the forgery and its 
effect on the rights of the party claiming an interest in 
the negotiable instrument, the Convention incorporates the 
well established rule in the Anglo-American as well as the 
Continental Geneva legal systems~ As a general rule, it 
provides that a person is not liable on a bill of exchange 
or a promissory note unless he signs it.76 The forgery 
of his signature does not render him liable on such a 
document. Article 33 of the Convention reads in this 
context: 
"1) Subject to the provisions of articles 
34 and 36, a person is not liable on 
an instrument unless he signs it." 
Like the Anglo-American and the Continental Geneva 
legal systems, the Convention does not render a forged 
signature binding on the person whose signature it 
purports to be. It divests such a signature of any legal 
significance, as between the person whose signature it 
purports to be and the party who intends to establish in 
his favour the entitlements incorporated in the negotiable 
instrument which it vitiates. On the one hand, it holds 
the former unaccountable for the promise or undertaking 
attributed to him by the forged signature. On the other 
hand, it denies to the party who intends to establish in 
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his favour the entitlements incorporated in the vitiated 
instrument, the right of enforcing the promise or 
undertaking arising from the forged signature against the 
person whose signature was forgede Ultimately, it denies 
him the right of enforcing the face value of the vitiated 
instrument against the latter. 
In the light of the foregoing, it could be noted that 
the convention does not render the indorsement by Willy 
Williams in the name of Dove and Co., the mail order 
business, i~e~ the payee, binding upon the latter.77 It 
does not establish liability on the bill of exchange or 
the promissory note against the payee. Furthermore, it 
denies to Billy Barnes, i.e. the party who intends to 
establish in his favour the entitlements incorporated in 
the bill or note, the right of enforcing the undertaking 
arising from the forged indorsement against the payee i.e~ 
Dove and Co. the mail order business. Ultimately, it 
denies to Billy Barnes the right of claiming the face 
value of the bill or note from the latter. 
As to the determination of the effect of forged 
signatures on the rights and liabilities of remote 
parties, the Convention incorporates a unique rule. On 
the one hand, it states that the holder status and 
ultfuately the protected holder status may be satisfied 
even if the bill or note in question was vitiated by a 
forged indorsement, provided that the person claiming the 
satisfaction of such status establishes his title to the 
bill or note through a regular chain of indorsements. 
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Article 15 in this context reads: 
1) A person is a holder if he is: 
a) The payee in possession of the instrument; or 
b) In possession of an instrument which has been endorsed 
to him, or on which the last endorsement is in blank, and 
on which there appears an uninterrupted series of 
endorsements, even if any endorsement was forged or was 
signed by an agent without authority. . 1 
s e~-tW~A.. vt. · 
From the foregoing, it cou~ concluded that the 
taker from the forger, in instances where the latter 
purports to behave as an indorsee and purports to transfer 
the bill of exchange or promissory note in his capacity as 
such in favour of the former, would satisfy the holder 
status. In his status as such, he may claim in his 
favour all the rights conferred upon the holder of a bill 
or note. In particular, he may enforce all promises and 
undertakings incorporated in the bill or note against any 
or all signatories. The signatory against whom the bill 
or note is intended to be enforced may not challenge the 
holder's right of action by reason that the said party 
took the bill or note in question from the forger. 
On the other hand, the Convention states that 
the person whose signature was forged and any prior party 
who would suffer a loss as a result of the forgery may 
claim from the forger, or from the party immediately 
following him, a compensation equal to the loss 
suffered by such a person or party. Article 25 reads in 
part: 
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1) If an endorsement is forged, the person whose 
endorsement is forged, or a party who signed the 
instrument before the forgery, has the right to 
recover compensation for any damage that he may 
have suffered because of the forgery against: 
a) The forger; 
b) The person to whom the instrument was 
directly transferred by the forger; 
c) A party or the drawee who paid the 
instrument to the forger directly or 
through one or more endorsees for 
collection. ~~.~~. 
4) Except as against the forger, the damages 
recoverable under paragraph 1) of this 
article may not exceed the amount referred 
to in article 70 or 71. 
The foregoing article seems to suggest that the 
satisfaction of the holder status and even the 
satisfaction of the protected holder status does not 
necessarily confer upon the person satisfying such a 
status the entitlements inherent in the acquisition of a 
negotiable instrument. In instances where such a person 
establishes his title to the bill of exchange or 
promissory note in question directly from the forger, he 
would be liable to the person whose signature was forged 
i.e. the person from whom the bill or note was stolen or 
misappropriated and to any prior party for the loss 
suffered as a result of the forgery by such a person or 
party. He would have to compensate the said person or 
party for the resulting loss. His liability in this 
context is strict. It may not be discharged by 
establishing his bona fides, his unawareness of the 
invalidity of his transferor's title or that his behaviour 
in acquiring the bill or note conformed with that of the 
reasonable man. 
Apparently, the liability established against the 
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taker from the forger in favour of the original true owner 
or any prior party is off the instrument~78 in instances 
where he behaves bona fide and without being aware of the 
invalidity of his transferor's titleo In his status as 
the holder~ he may enforce the promise or undertaking 
incorporated in the bill or note. Accordingly, he may 
satisfy the face value of the bill or note from the person 
making such a promise or undertaking~79 The latter party 
may not refuse the payment of the bill or note in favour 
of its holder by reason that he established his title to 
it directly from the forger. By virtue of Articles 28 
and 30 of the Convention, the party against whom the bill 
or note is intended to be enforced may not set up against 
the holder defences of which he had no knowledge, nor can 
he set up against the holder defences in instances where 
the latter did not obtain the bill or note in question by 
fraud or theft and he did not participate in a fraud or 
theft concerning it.BO 
Furthermore, the Convention applies the foregoing 
rule in instances where the party against whom the bill or 
note is intended to be enforced intends to defeat the 
holder's right of action by setting up counter claims 
against him., By virtue of the above mentioned Articles, 
the party in question may not set up counter claims 
against the holder unless the latter had knowledge of 
their existence when he obtained the bill, or note or 
participated in a fraud or theft concerning it.Bl Thus 
if the party against whom the bill or note was intended to 
be enforced sets up against the bona fide holder his right 
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to obtain compensation for the loss that he would suffer 
had he been forced to pay the face value of the document 
in question, his action as such would fail. It would be 
successful if it was brought in a separate action only. 
In the light of the foregoing, it could be noted that 
the Convention allocates the loss resulting from Willy 
Williams' fraudulent practice, as far as the second and 
third hypotheticals are concerned,82 to Billy Barnes i~e. 
the immediate taker from the forger. It does not 
approach such a rule directly through the negotiable 
instrument's right of action, rather it approaches the 
said rule on the basis of a separate action. This is due 
to the fact that it establishes the holder status in 
favour of the taker from the forger such as Billy Barnes~ 
Accordingly, it entitles him to enforce the face value of 
the bill or note against prior signatories such as John 
Alex. The latter party may not, by reason that Billy 
Barnes obtained the bill or note in question from Willy 
Williams, discharge his liability on the instrument to him 
i.e~ Barnes~ Furthermore he may not defeat the latter's 
right of action unless he can establish that the said 
party knew of the invalidity of Willy Williams' title or 
that he obtained the document in question by fraud or 
theft or that he participated in such a practice. 
However, Billy Barnes' satisfaction of the holder 
status does not establish in his favour the entitlements 
inherent in the negotiable instrument • Despite his 
ability to enforce the face value of his bill or note 
against John Alex, he remains liable to him as well as to 
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the original true owner, such as David Dove in the third 
hypothetical, for the loss resulting from the payment of 
the bill or note to him. Either John Alex or David Dove 
can recover from Billy Barnes in a separate action the 
loss suffered by them. 
The above solution was adopted as a compromise 
between the solution found in the Anglo-American legal 
systems and that found in the Continental Geneva legal 
systems. 83 It was contended that the determination of 
the effect of forged signatures on the rights and 
liabilities of remote parties in the said manner would 
accommodate the advantages inherent in the risk allocation 
rule as enforced in the Anglo-American as well as the 
Continental Geneva legal systems.84 By establishing the 
holder status in favour of every person who derives his 
title to the bill or note through an uninterrupted chain 
of indorsements, even if any of the relevant indorsements 
was forged, the proposed solution, like that found in the 
Continental Geneva legal systems, purports to encourage 
the acquisition of bills and notes and ultimately it 
purports to further the function of the institution of 
negotiable instruments as a finance device. This is due 
to the fact that the establishment of the holder status in 
favour of every person who derives his title to the bill 
or note in question through an uninterrupted chain of 
indorsements, prima facie confers upon such a person the 
entitlements inherent in the negotiable instrument. In 
particular, it enables him to enforce the face value of 
his document against any or all signatories without being 
' J 
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subject to defences and claims of which he had no 
knowledgeo 
On the other hand 9 by establishing that the immediate 
taker from the forger is liable to the person whose 
signature was forged and any prior party for the loss 
resulting from the forgery, the Convention purports to 
incorporate the rule enforced in the Anglo-American legal 
systemso In effect, it purports to suggest that forged 
signatures are of no practical value in favour of the 
immediate transferee. They do not establish in favour of 
the said party a conclusive and final property right to 
the proceeds of the acquired instrument. He would have 
to account to the person whose signature was forged and 
any prior party for the obtained proceeds in order to 
repair the damage caused to the latter by the forgery of 
the signature.85 
To state the obvious, the solution adopted in the 
convention does not achieve, in an efficient manner, the 
result arising from the risk allocation rule enforced in 
the Anglo-American legal systems or that arising from the 
risk allocation rule enforced in the Continental Geneva 
legal systems. By establishing liability for the loss 
resulting from the forgery of a signature against the 
immediate taker from the forger, th~~~---~~---­
submitted to have failed to afford a potential competing 
J""' ~--~- .. .r--' .. - ... ..--~ .......... -~-• ..,._~---- ·- -·-· ~ ... .,...c:.----......-. .._.._..="'- ~- ... , •. --=~-..,'h1;"-__,~_,-=>!l',__ .. -~ --· . ____ .,.,...........,.,.._..._..,.,-~~---- ·-... . .. .._ __ 
party a reasonable protection. In most instances the 
,_....--.--~~----- ·~.--- ~ <o. -~--
immediate taker from the forger is not in a better 
situation than that of his successors to detect the 
forgery and ultimately provide against its occurrence. 
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The four corners of the offered bill or note and the 
circumstances surrounding its acquisition do not normally 
reveal to the immediate taker from the forger the 
existence of any irregularity in the document in question 
or the existence of any irregularity in the title of its 
possessoro If he was made to shop for information 
concerning the issues in question, he would incur expenses 
in a detrimental manner. That is to say that he would be 
made to incur cost without being in the position to derive 
an enforceable value from it or even absorb it. His 
satisfaction of the holder status moreover, would not 
afford him a practical value. Due to his liability for 
the loss resulting from the forgery in favour of the 
person whose signature was forged and any prior party, he 
would not be able to retain the face value of his 
document. He would have to repay it to the said party as 
compensation for the resulting loss. 
From the foregoing, it could be concluded that the 
establishment of liability against the taker from the 
forger could deter the commercial community from engaging 
with strangers. Accordingly, it could deter the said 
community from acquiring negotiable instruments from such 
persons. In the last analysis, the solution proposed in 
the Convention could restrict the function of the 
institution of negotiable instruments as a finance 
device. 86 
Finally, by establishing the holder status in favour 
of the immediate taker from the forger, the Convention is 
submitted to have failed to allocate the ultimate loss in 
=252-
an efficient mannero It allocates the loss arising from 
the forgery of an indorsement to the immediate taker from 
the forger in a circuitous way. In the first place, it 
entitles the said party to enforce the face value of his 
document against a prior signatoryo It prevents the 
latter from defeating the holder's right of action by 
setting up personal defences and claims. In the second 
place, it entitles the signatory against whom the bill or 
note is enforced to claim in a separate action the loss 
sustained by him as a result of the forgery and the 
subsequent payment of the face value of the document in 
question in favour of the immediate taker from the forger. 
As could be noted, the establishment of the holder 
status in favour of the immediate taker from the forger on 
the one hand and the establishment in favour of the 
signatory against whom a negotiable instrument is enforced 
of the right to claim in a separate action from the former 
on the other hand, involves multiple law suits in 
allocating the loss arising from the forgery of 
indorsements to the taker from the forger. Firstly, it 
gives rise to the right of action on the bill or note in 
favour of the immediate taker from the forger against the 
signatory. Secondly, it gives rise to a separate right 
of action in favour of the signatory in question against 
the immediate taker from the forger. The involvement of 
law suits is both costly and time consuming. The 
increase in their rate is inconvenient in commerce. The 
cost and time arising from their involvement could prevent 
the enforcement of value in an economically efficient 
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manner G 87 Such an inconvenience becomes more apparent 
when the need for law suits could be avoided or minimisedo 
In such an instance» the cost and time that would be 
involved in an unnecessary law suit would be utilised to 
satisfy other urgent interestso 
A situation where law suits could be avoided or 
minimised is that demonstrated by the allocation of the 
loss resulting from the forgery of indorsements to the 
immediate taker from the forger. By entitling the 
signatory against whom the bill or note is enforced to 
defeat the immediate taker from the forger's right of 
action on the document in question, the need for a 
separate right of action would have been avoided. 
Accordingly, unnecessary cost and time would be saved 
whereas the resulting loss would be allocated to the party 
to whom the Convention indicates as the risk bearer, 
namely the immediate taker from the forger. 
The Impact of Forged Signatures Under the UNCITRAL Draft 
Convention Relating to International Chegues on the Rights 
and Liabilities of Parties to Vitiated Negotiable 
Instruments in Instances of Dishonour88 
The draft Convention on International Cheques 
incorporates a rule substantially similar to that enforced 
in the Convention. Like the latter, in determining the 
effect of forged signatures on the rights and liabilities 
of parties to a cheque which such a signature vitiates, it 
distinguishes between parties immediate to the forgery and 
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parties remote from ito As far as the issue is related 
to determining the effect of forged signatures on the 
liability of the person whose signature was forged~ the 
draft Convention incorporates the well-established ruleo· 
It expressly provides that any person is not liable on a 
cheque unless he signs ito 89 By necessary implication 
the foregoing rule suggests that a forged signature does 
not bind the person in whose name it is fraudulently made. 
It does not attribute to him any promise or undertaking~ 
Ultimately, it does not establish in favour of the person 
to whom the cheque in question is transferred by the 
forged indorsement, the right of enforcing its face value 
against the person whose signature was forged. 
As far as the above hypotheticals are concerned, it 
could be noted that the Draft Convention does not 
establish liability against Dove and Co. or David Dove, 
the payees in the second and third hypotheticals 
respectively,9° for the undertaking fraudulently 
attributed to them by the forged indorsements. Such 
indorsements do not bind the payees and ultimately, the 
taker from the forger such as Billy Barnes or any 
subsequent transferee may not rely on them to exercise his 
right of recourse against the purported signatories i~e~ 
Dove and Co. and David Dove. 
As far as the issue is related to determining the 
effect of forged signatures on the rights and liabilities 
of remote parties, the Draft Convention approaches a 
result substantially similar to that found in the 
Convention. It allocates the loss arising from the 
forged signature 
from the forger. 
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signatory 
enfo'rced 
i.e. indorsement, to the immediate taker 
Unlike the Convention, it enables the 
whom the cheque is intended to be 
the holder's right of action, by 
against 
to defeat 
setting up all defences and claims even if the latter had 
no knowledge of their existence or had acted free from 
negligence in his acquisition.91 Thus, if the immediate 
taker from the forger intended to enforce his cheque 
against a prior party i.e. signatory, the latter may raise 
in the same action as a counter claim his entitlement to 
recover from him compensation equal to the loss that he 
would sustain as a result of the forgery had he been made 
to pay the face value of the cheque in question.92 Such 
a rule avoids the situation of multiplicity of actions in 
allocating the risk arising from the forgery of an 
indorsement to the immediate taker from the forger. 
Despite his satisfaction of the holder status, it renders 
him subject on the cheque to the prior party's claim for 
compensation. Accordingly, it dispenses with the need 
for a separate action whereby the right for compensation 
could be claimed. 
As far as the above hypotheticals are concerned, 93 
the Draft Convention allocates the loss resulting from 
Willy Williams' fraudulent practice to Billy Barnes. It 
renders him liable to John Alex and David Dove 
respectively for the loss suffered by them as a result of 
the forged indorsement. It entitles either of them to 
set up against Billy Barnes i.e. the immediate taker from 
the forger as a counter claim, the right to recover from 
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him the loss that would result to them from the forgery 
and their payment of the cheque in his favour o 
Ultimately, it entitles the said parties to defeat Billy 
Barnes' right of action on the cheque against themo 
The Attitude of the Anglo-American and the Continental 
Geneva legal systems in Allocating the 
Risk of Forgery in Instances of Payment 
The payment of a negotiable instrument involves the 
interest of the draweeG Its involvement gives rise to a 
competing interest situation. On the one hand, it 
competes with the interest of the party whose signature 
was forged, as well as the interest of parties prior to 
the forgery. On the other hand, it competes with the 
interest of the party to whose favour the proceeds of the 
forged instrument were paid. In order to determine the 
attitude of the legal systems under consideration, in 
relation to the manner of allocating. the risk of forged 
signatures, it is essential to compare the interest of the 
drawee/payor with the interest of the party whose 
signature was forged as well as the interest of prior 
parties, on the one hand, and to compare it with the 
interest of the bona fide recipient on the other. 
The Right of the Drawee Payor to Charge to his 
Customer Payments made upon a Forged Instrument 
The Anglo-American and the majority of the 
Continental Geneva legal systems are in agreement that the 
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drawee who pays a fraudulently made instrument is not 
entitled to charge the purported maker or drawer with the 
paymento If the drawee erroneously debits the purported 
maker's or drawer's account with the face value of the 
forged instrument, he must recredit the said account with 
the debited amounto The relevant provision from which 
the above rule could be inferred is Section 24 B.E.A.,94 
as far as the Anglo-American legal systems are concerned. 
The said section denies the operativeness of forged 
signatures. It expressly provides that payment upon a 
forged signature does not avail the payor a valid 
discharge a 
Section 24 reads in part: 
"Subject to the provisions of this Act, where 
a signature on a bill is forged or placed 
thereon without the authority of the person 
whose signature it purports to be, the forged 
or unauthorised signature is wholly inoperative 
and no right to retain the bill or to give a 
discharge therefor or to enforce payment thereof 
against any party thereto can be acquired through 
or under that signature •• ,." 
Thus, the drawee who erroneously pays a forged instrument 
may not charge the purported maker or drawer with the 
erroneous payment. Such act would be tantamount to a 
discharge of his obligation as between himself and the 
purported maker or drawer. 
At the Geneva Conference on the Unification of the 
Laws relating to Cheques, the delegates of the represented 
states agreed to leave issues relating to risk allocation 
outside the concerns of the Convention.95 They were not 
able to propose a common and uniform rule in this context. 
-258-
Nevertheless, the minutes of the Conference illustrate, as 
far as the drawee payor's right to charge the erroneous 
payemt to the purported maker or drawer in instances of 
forged instruments is concerned, that the majority of 
the Continental Geneva legal systems were in agreement 
that the drawee payor may not charge to the purported 
maker or drawer, erroneous payments.96 In 
determining the above rule, reference was made to the 
general principles of the civil law. There it was 
accepted that debtors may not be discharged from their 
obligation as to their creditors unless the former comply 
with the latter's mandate. Since no mandate could be 
attributed to the creditor, the debtor may not debit the 
latter's account.97 
Some of the Continental Geneva legal systems such as 
France and Belgium allow the drawee payor, in instances of 
paying a forged instrument to charge to the purported 
maker or drawer, the proceeds of the erroneous payment. 
This is achieved not as a matter of principle but by way 
of special arrangements between the drawee and his 
customer, i.e. the purported maker or drawer whose 
signature was forged. The drawee, at the time of opening 
an account, stipulates against the customer that, in the 
absence of the former's negligence in detecting forgery, 
the customer shall bear the risk evolving from the forgery 
of his signature. If the forgery passes undetected, the 
drawee may charge to the customer the erroneous payment.98 
Nevertheless, as a matter of principle and in the absence 
of a like stipulation, it is submitted that the drawee may 
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not charge against his customer payment made in reliance 
on forged instrumentso99 
Finally the rule that drawee payors may not charge to 
the purported maker or drawer erroneous payments made in 
reliance on forged instruments~ could be inferred from an 
elaborate reading of Article 7 G.U .. L.(Bills).lOO 
The saod article denies any binding attribute of forged 
signatures .. Since the forgery of the purported maker's 
or drawer's signature does not bind the purported maker or 
drawer, the unauthorised use of his name should not 
prejudice him. No liability should, in light of the 
forgery, be established against the purported maker or 
drawer.. As a direct application of the non binding 
attribute of the maker's or drawer's forged signature, the 
drawee should not be allowed to charge the maker or drawer 
with the payment. Any application to the contrary would 
indicate that the purported maker or drawer is held liable 
for the unauthorised use of his name. 
The Right of the Drawee Payor to Recover Payments made 
upon a Forged Instrument from the Acguirer/Recipient 
As to the drawee payor's right of recovery against 
the bona fide acquirer /recipient, the Anglo-American and 
the Continental Geneva legal systems are in agreement that 
the drawee payor is not entitled to recover from the bona 
fide acquirer/recipient erroneous payments made in favour 
of the latter. The legal systems under consideration, 
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however~ impose to variant degrees limits upon the said 
ruleo 
(i) As a general rule, in the Anglo=American legal 
systems~ the mistaken payor may recover from the recipient 
money paid under the mistaken impression that the latter 
was entitled to it, where in fact and in conscience he 
is not entitled to retain it. The leading case 
applying the said rule is Kelly v SolariolOl It involved 
the erroneous payment of a life insurance policy o 
Mr. Solari before his death purchased a life insurance 
policy from Argus Life Assurance Co e His wife Mrs. 
Solari was appointed as executrix. She, after her 
husband's death sought to enforce the policy. Due to the 
failure to pay the due premium, the actuary informed a 
director of the insurance company that according to the 
terms of the insurance contract, the policy was deemed to 
have lapsed. The director wrote the word lapsed in 
pencil on the policy. Mrs. Solari later demanded amongst 
other due payments the face value of the insurance policy. 
The directors at the relevant time failed to notice the 
pencilled word on the policy. They, accordingly, paid 
Mrs. Solari the due payment. Parke B. gave a ruling in 
favour of Kelly, one of the directors who brought the case 
on behalf of the insurance company. Since Mrs. Solari 
was aware of the lapse of the policy and she did not 
suffer a detriment because of the erroneous payment, it 
was not against conscience to compel her to return the 
erroneously paid proceeds to the company~102 
As an exception to the general rule, it is submitted 
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that payors are not allowed to recover erroneous payments 
from bona fide recipientso 
to be the celebrated case in which the said exception was 
firmly establishedo P~!c~ w N~al® involved two bills of 
exchange 9 purported to be drawn by Sutton on John Price 
for £40 eacho The two bills bore several indorsements, 
the last of which was an indorsement to Neale.; The 
payment of the first bill was offered by Price, the 
drawee 9 to Neale, the indorsee, without prior acceptance. 
The drawee sent his servant to the indorsee and procured 
payment upon receipt of the bill. The second bill was 
paid by Price after he had accepted it. Price shortly 
after had learned that the two bills were forgeries e A 
forger named Lee had forged the drawer's signature on the 
two bills. The drawee brought an action on the case, 
claiming that Neale was indebted to him for a sum of money 
had and received for the plaintiff's, Price's, use. Lord 
Mansfield, before whom the case was heard, stated the rule 
that, 
"It is an action for money had and received 
for the plaintiff's use, in which action the 
plaintiff cannot recover the money unless it 
be against conscience in the defendant to 
retain it; and great liberality is always 
allowed in this sort of action. But it 
can never be thought unconscientious in the 
defendant to retain this money when he has 
once received it, upon a bill of exchange 
indorsed to him for fair and valuable 
consideration, which he had bona fide 
paid without the least privity 
or suspicion of any forgery."l04 
The rule in Price v Neale was subject to judicial 
scrutiny. Courts attempted to infer a general 
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proposition from the above rule. They attempted to 
determine the ratio upon which JPlrrli.c~ w Weml® was based~ 
"tvhereby the mistaken payor would be denied the right of 
recovery against the bona fide recipient. 
C©dlt® w Naa~\l:errm.al!l\105 is the next relevant case. 
It involved a bill of exchange drawn by T. Dutton on a 
firm operating under the name of Sewell and Cross. The 
bill of exchange purported to be accepted by the said 
firm~ payable at the plaintiff's Cocks~ bankers in 
London with whom Sewell and Cross opened an account. The 
said bill of exchange bore several indorsements, the last 
of which was to the order of Sanderson and Co. who had an 
account with Masterman, another banker. The former 
deposited the bill with the latter for collection. The 
latter presented the bill to Cocks who paid accordingly. 
On the next day, Cocks learned that the bill was a forgery 
and the drawer had forged their customer 1 s acceptance. 
Upon this fact, they demanded the return of the paid 
proceeds from the defendant bankers. 
Bayley J. observed that it would be against 
conscience to claim the erroneously paid proceeds from the 
bona fide recipient if the latter, due to the payor 1 s 
right of recovery against him, would suffer an alteration 
in position to his detriment. The recipient is deemed to 
suffer an alteration in position to his detriment once the 
drawee fails to inform him on the day when the instrument 
falls due that it shall be paid or dishonoured. In such 
an instance the drawee would be preventing the recipient 
~263-
from claiming the enforcement of the instrument on its day 
of maturityo 
Bayley Jo in this connection observed that~ 
~the holder of a bill is entitled to know on 
the day when it becomes due whether it is an 
honoured or dishonoured bill and that if he 
receives the money and is suffered to retain 
it during the whole of that day~ the 
parties who paid it cannot recover it backo"l06 
Lofidcn and River Plate Bank v Bank of Liverpooi107 
involved a bill of exchange purchase in Monte Video from 
the plaintiff's branch making it payable to a company in 
Havana a This bill of exchange came into the hands of a 
thief who forged two indorsements, that of the payee and 
that of the purchasero The latter indorsement was made 
in favour of the thief who offered it for a discount •. 
The discounting company accepted to discount the bill 
subject to its acceptance. The bill was dispatched to 
the correspondent of the said company requesting the 
former to obtain acceptanceo Having done that, the 
company discounted the bill. Later, the London 
correspondent credited the bill into their account with 
the Bank of Liverpool. The latter through its agent 
presented the bill for payment to London and River Plate 
Bank who paid accordingly. When the forgery was 
discovered, the plaintiff sought to recover the proceeds 
from the defendants, i.e. the Bank of Liverpool. 
Mathew J. in delivering the decision of the court 
applied the principle laid down by Bayley J. in Cocks v 
Masterman. He observed that the failure to give notice 
of dishonour on the day when the instrument fell due was 
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the ratio for denying the right of recovering erroneous 
payments made in favour of the holder. The Judge held 
that: 
~the simple rule laid down in clear language 
for the first time that when a bill becomes 
due and it is presented for payment 9 the 
holder ought to know at once whether the 
bill is going to be paid or not. If the 
mistake is discovered at once 9 it may be 
that the money can be recovered back. But 
if it be not and the money is paid in good 
faith and is received in good faith and 
there is an interval of time in which the 
position of the holder may be altered 
the principle seems to apply that money 
once paid cannot be recovered back."108 
By way of dictum it is said that Mathew J. in 
considering the ratio of Pric® w N~ale held that: 
"It seems to me the principle underlying the 
decision is this! that if the plaintiff in 
that case so conducted himself as to lead 
the holder of the bill to believe that he 
considered the signature genuine 9 he could 
not afterwards withdraw from that positiona"109 
The above dictum gave rise to an uncertainty among legal 
writers and judges alikellO as to the payor's right of 
recovery against the recipienta It prima facie suggests 
that thG payor \-muld be denied :recovery against the 
recipient, even if the latter establishes his title to the 
instrument in question through forged signatures. 
The Privy Council in The Imperial Bank of Canada v 
the Bank of Hamiltonlll refuted the broad interpretation 
of Mathew J.'s dictum. The Imperial Bank of Canada case 
involved a cheque. Although validly drawn, the amount 
for which it was payable was fraudulently raised by 
another. The cheque bore the plaintiff's certification. 
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The fraudulent person deposited the cheque with the 
defendant for collectiono The depository bank i o eo the 
Bank of Hamilton, allowed the fraudulent person to 
withdraw the proceeds of the cheque in its altered form 
before final payment e The Privy Council held that the 
plaintiff drawee I acceptor was not bound by the altered 
cheque. The defendant was not allowed to rely on the 
plaintiff's certification and enforce the chequee Since 
the cheque did not bear a valid indorsement, in favour of 
the defendant bank, it was a forgery in toto. It, 
accordingly, could confer no entitlements in favour of the 
bank acquirer.ll2 
The court in National Westminster Bank Ltd.- v 
Barclays Bank International Ltd.- and Anotherl13 settled 
the uncertainty. It held that in instances where the 
paid instrument was a forgery from beginning to end the 
drawee payor may recover the erroneously paid proceeds 
from the recipient~ The case under consideration 
involved the forgery of a customer's signature on a 
cheque. Robert Bill, a retired Navy Commander had a 
current account with the Natj_onal Westminster Bank in 
London. The bank issued to him successive cheque books 
and a spare cheque book. Commander Bill used to leave 
his spare cheque book in Nigeria, where he spent most of 
his time after retirement. One day, Commander Bill 
received from his bank, a statement showing that a 
substantial amount had been debited from his account. He 
had no recollection of the said debt. Upon inquiry, it 
was established that a cheque was missing from his spare 
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cheque book. His signature was forged and the cheque was 
made payable to Mr. Mo Ismail. The cheque was presented 
for special collection through Barclays Bank 
Internationalo National Westminster then paid the cheque 
proceedso National Westminster acknowledged that 
Commander Bill's account had been erroneously debitedo 
It agreed to recredit his account with the debited amount. 
National Westminster sought to recover the erroneous 
payment from the first defendant Barclays Bank 
International and the second defendant~ Mro Mo Ismail. 
Mro M. Ismail was a member of the Lebanese 
community living in Nigeriao He owned a large fleet of 
tankers and lorries. Shortly after the war with a 
neighbouring country~ Nigeria~ due to the financial 
crisis~ introduced strict currency control regulationso 
It required that foreign companies operating in Nigeria 
must be 40% 01vned by Nigerian nationals. Mr. Ismail and 
the rest of the Lebanese community thought that the new 
regulations were discriminatory. They took every 
opportunity to transfer money out or Nigeria. Mr. Ismail 
had an account with the first defendant. He, from time 
to time, remitted sterling to his account in London. He 
exchanged on the black market Nigerian pounds for pounds 
sterling. Due to the boom in the currency black market, 
the rate of cheque forgery increased o Mr. Ismail was 
once himself a victim of forgery. Nevertheless, his bank 
recredited his account. 
One day, Ismail needed spare parts for his fleet 
which were of English manufacture. Mr o Haider~ the 
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general manager of Ismail's business assured Mr. Ismail 
that his brother R o Haider could secure for him pounds 
sterling. Laterp Ro Haider presented a cheque 9 the 
amount of which was written in figures only. It bore the 
signature of Commander Bill as drawer, nevertheless it did 
not stipulate the name of the payee. R. Haider falsely 
told Mr. Ismail that he took the cheque from its purported 
drawer whom he met at the club. Mr. Ismail accepted to 
exchange the cheque with Nigerian pounds if the cheque was 
paid. Ismail deposited the cheque with the first 
defendant for collection. The latter collected the 
proceeds of the cheque and deposited it with its customers 
account. Mr. Ismail then paid R. Haider the equivalent 
in Nigerian currency. The cheque afterwards proved to be 
a forgery. 
Kerr L.J. distinguished the case of London and River 
Plate Bank v the Bank of Liverpool.114 The decision of 
Mathew J., in the opinion of his Lordship was concerned 
with determining the ratio of Price v Neale, as to the 
position of the drawee acceptor. His finding that the 
drawe~ guara-ntees the genuineness of the drawer's 
signature was a mere application of Section 54 B.E.A.-
Section 54 reads: 
"The acceptor of a bill by accepting it 
1) Engages that he will pay it according 
to the tenour of his acceptance. 
2) Is precluded from denying to a holder 
in due course: 
(a) The existence of the drawer, the 
genuineness of his signature and his 
capacity and authority to draw the bill -- »115 • • • 
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His Lordship observed that the reason according to 
which the above quoted ratio was extended to the drawee 
payor as to the first bill of exchange which involved the 
payment of the drawee, onlyg is that it could not be taken 
in isolation from the second bill of exchange which 
involved the drawee's acceptance and paymentel16 His 
Lordship distinguished the rule of Price v Neale because 
of its particular facts and reinforced the rule that 
drawees in general do not by the mere payment of the 
instrument represent to the payees recipients the 
genuineness of the instrument or the genuineness of the 
purported drawer's signature.117 
Nevertheless, Kerr L.J. observed that if the party 
upon whom the instrument was drawn erroneously pays a 
forged instrument in favour of a bona fide acquirer who 
establishes his title to the instrument through a genuine 
signature, he may not recover the erroneously paid 
proceeds from the latter. His Lordship, in making his 
findings, cited with approval the rule laid doWn by 
Bailey J. in Cocks v Mastermano The basis for denying 
the drawee payor's right of recovery against the bona fide 
acquirer recipient is to prevent the change in position to 
the acquirer recipients detriment. The drawee payors 
right of recovery would be detrimental to the acquirer 
recipient because it might disable the latter from the 
exercise of the right of recourse against his transferor 
from whom he acquired the instrument on the day when the 
instrument falls due. 
Finally, Kerr L.J. made the rule that for the 
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acquirer recipient to retain the erroneously paid 
proceeds p he must establish his title to the instrument 
through a genuine signature i.e. indorsement. If the 
only signature or all incorporated signatures through 
which the acqutrer establishes his title to the instrument 
were forgeries» the piece of paper to which the acquirer 
establishes his title would not be interpreted as a 
negotiable instrument. No interests could then be 
claimed under it.118 Since no genuine signature through 
which the acquirer recipient establishes his title could 
be established~ there would not be a party against whom 
the acquirer recipient can enforce his instrument. Thus~ 
in instances where the drawee payor was allowed to recover 
erroneous payments~ the acquirer recipient would not 
suffer a change in position to his detriment.l19 There 
would not be a right of recourse that could be forfeited. 
Goff J. , in BaEclays Bank w Siiillils Son and Cooke!> 
(Southe~n) L~do and Sovman!J,120 reinforced the ratio laid 
He considered the change 
of position in a detrimental manner as a relevant basis 
for dis~ntitling the mistaken drawee payor of the right of 
recovery of erroneous payments from the bona fide acquirer 
recipient. 122 In the absence of such change, it would 
not be against conscience to compel the acquirer recipient 
to revert the proceeds of the erroneous payment to the 
mistaken drawee payor. 
The head notes of the case provide: 
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"Where a person paid money to another under 
a mistake of fact which caused him to make the 
payment, he was prima facie entitled to 
recover it as money paid under a mistake of 
fact. His claim might however fail if 
3) the payee had changed his position in good 
faith or was deemed in law to have done so."l23 
(ii) As far as the u.c.c. is concerned, the provision of 
Article 3-418 denies to the drawee/payor acceptor the 
right of recovering erroneous payments made in favour of a 
bona fide acquirer and the right of refusing payment to 
him in instances of acceptance. 
Article 3-418 u.c.c. reads: 
"Except for recovery of bank payments as 
provided in the Article on Bank Deposits and 
Collections (Article 4) and except for the 
liability for breach of warranty on presentment 
under the preceding section, payment or 
acceptance of any instrument is final in 
favour of a holder in due course or a person 
who has in good faith changed his position in 
reliance on the payment." 
Unlike the rule in the English legal system, the 
u.c.c. does not require that the acquirer recipient should 
establish his title to the instrument through a genuine 
signature, in order for him to retain the erroneously paid 
proceeds. The acquirer recipient may satisfy the holder 
in due course status, even if he was the first transferee 
on the instrument. By virtue of Article 3-302, the payee 
of a negotiable instrument may qualify as the holder in 
due course.124 Thus, if the only signature appearing on 
the instrument through which the acquirer establishes his 
title was a forgery, he may qualify as the holder in 
due course as between himself and the drawee payor.-
=271= 
Accordingly? the latter may not compel the former to 
revert the proceeds of the erroneously paid instrument 
to himo 
(iii) At the Geneva Conference on the Unification of the 
Laws relating to Cheques~ although it was agreed to 
exclude questions as to risk allocation from the concerns 
of the conventions~ it is submitted that in the major 
Continental Civil legal systems, the bona fide third party 
who establishes his title to the instrument through a 
"regular" chain of indorsements and who receives payment 
from the drawee, shall not be compelled to revert the 
erroneously paid proceeds to the drawee payor e 125 The 
above rule goes back to the days when the drawing of a 
bill of exchange was accompanied by a letter from the 
drawer to the drawee advising the latter of the drawing. 
If the drawee accepted or paid without having received 
this confirmatory letter~ there would be some grounds 
for treating him like a drawee who accepted without having 
sufficient funds of the drawer.126 
Like the English legal system, the Continental Geneva 
legal systems establish a good title in favour of the bona 
fide acquirer recipient as to erroneous payments, if and 
only if he establishes his title to the instrument through 
a chain of indorsements. Apparently, if the acquirer 
recipient was the first transferee and the only signature 
appearing on the instrument through which he establishes 
his title was a forgery, such as in the case of National 
Westminster v Barclays Bank International and Another,127 
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the acquirer recipient would not be entitled to retain the 
erroneous payment. He would not be deemed to have his 
title to the instrument established through a chain of 
indorsement so The drawee would then be entitled to 
recover the said payment from the recipiento 
Nevertheless, unlike the English legal system, the 
Continental Geneva legal systems do not require the 
indorsement, through which the acquirer/recipient 
establishes his title, to be genuine. The regularity of 
the chain of indorsements is submitted to be the essence 
of the acquirer's establishment of the lawful holder 
status. 128 The regularity of the chain of indorsements 
requirement is deemed to be satisfied when the signatures 
incorporated in the negotiable instrument purport to be 
made in the name of the intended payee or indorsees. 
Thus, if the fraudulent person who forges the purported 
drawer's signature makes the instrument payable in favour 
of another and impersonates the said party and indorses 
the instrument in the latter's name in favour of a bona 
fide third party, the third party acquirer would be 
purported to have established his ti~le to the instrument 
through a regular chain of indorsements. If the drawee 
pays the acquirer in his status as such, he would be 
denied the right of recovering the erroneous payment from 
him. 
The Effect of Payment upon a Forged Indorsement 
(i) As to the payment of an instrument vitiated by a 
forged indorsementp the legal systems under consideration 
determine the effect of such forgery by reference to the 
status they establish to the acquirer to whose favour the 
payment is made. Since the Anglo~American legal systems 
deny the holder status to the acquirer who establishes his 
title to the instrument through a forged indorsement,l29 
they deny to the drawee payor the right of charging to the 
drawer the proceeds of the erroneous payment. Such 
payment to the said acquirer would not discharge .the payor 
from his obligation. The drawer may compel the drawee to 
re-credi t his account as if payment had not occurred. 
The payee or indorsee, the party from whom the instrument 
was stolen and whose indorsement was forged, may force the 
drawee to make fresh payment in his favour. 
The traditional precodification rule as laid down in 
Smith v Shepperd1 30 has been incorporated in the B.E.A. as 
well as the U.C.C. Section 59 B.E.A. sets out the 
requirements necessary to discharge the drawee in 
instances of payment. In order for the drawee payor to 
be discharged, he must pay "the holder~ of the instrument. 
Section 59 reads: 
"A bill is discharged by payment in due course 
by or on behalf of the drawee or acceptor. 
'Payment in due course' means payment made at 
or after the maturity of the bill to the holder 
thereof in good faith and without notice that 
his title to the bill is defective." 
It is submitted that the term holder appearing in the 
above quoted section is interpreted narrowly. It denotes 
the party who acquires the instrument through a genuine 
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chain of indorsements. 131 If a forgery vitiates the 
instrument~ the acquirer would not qualify as the holder. 
Accordingly~ payment to him would not discharge the payor. 
The U. C. C. approaches the above application in an 
identical manner. The drawee would not be discharged 
unless payment is made to the holdero The term holder is 
defined narro1;vlyo It applies to the party who 
establishes his title to the instrument through a genuine 
chain of signatures.l32 If the chain of signatures was 
interrupted by a forgery, the acquirer would not qualify 
as the holder. Payment to him would not discharge the 
payor. By virtue of Article 3-419 U.-C.C. ~ the drawee 
payor is deemed to have converted the proceeds of the 
instrument .133 The original true owner may accordingly 
compel him to make fresh payment to the former in his 
favour. 
(ii) The B.E.-A. and the 1957 Cheques Act make an 
exception to the above stated rule. By virtue of Section 
60 of the B.E.A. and Section 1 of the 1957 Cheques Act, 
the drawee banker, in instances of cheques and other 
analogous demand instruments,134 need not observe the 
genuineness of indorsements in order to establish a valid 
discharge in his favour. The payment in good faith to 
the purported holder and in reliance on a regular chain of 
indorsements suffices to discharge the drawee banker from 
his obligation. He may debit his customer's i.e. drawer's 
account, with the payment. The original true owner, 
i.e. the party from whom the instrument was stolen and 
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whose signature was forged~ may not demand fresh payment 
from the drawee payoro 
Section 60 BoEoAo reads~ 
"When a bill payable to order on demand is 
drawn on a banker and the banker on whom it 
is drawn pays the bill in good faith and in 
the ordinary course of business~ it is not 
incumbent on the banker to show that the 
indorsement of the payee or any subsequent 
indorsement was made by or under the authority 
of the person whose indorsement it purports to 
be and the banker is deemed to have paid the 
bill in due course, although such indorsement 
has been forged or made without authority."l35 
The purpose underlying the above rule is to enhance 
the business of banking. Due to the large volume of 
instruments processed daily, banks are not able to enquire 
as to the genuineness of indorsements appearing on such 
instruments. Such enquiry would, firstly, disturb the 
business of banking and secondly, it would prevent the 
instrument deposited for payment from being transmit ted 
into money immediately. Its economic function as a 
substitute for money would accordingly faile136 
(iii) The drawee in the Continental Geneva legal systems 
is not under a duty to observe the genuineness of 
indorsements, in making payments. His duty of enquiry is 
confined as to the regularity of the chain of indorsements 
only. Thus if the drawee pays an instrument vitiated by 
a forged indorsement, the drawee would be discharged from 
his liability so far as he acts bona fide and without 
gross negligencei 
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Article 40 GoUoLo(Bills) reads in part 9 
"oooo He who pays at maturity is validly 
discharged unless he has been guilty of fraud 
or gross negligenceo He is bound to verify 
the regularity of the series of indorsements 137 but not the signature of the indorserso" 
Since payment upon a forged indorsement may discharge 
the drawee payor~ the drawer may not compel the drawee 
payor to recredit his accounto The party from whom the 
instrument was stolen and whose indorsement was forged, 
may not compel the drawee payor to make fresh payment to 
him. The above application is a pre G.U.L. rule. Its 
import in the Continental Civil legal systems was due to 
business necessity and the maintenance of consistency in 
the law.l38 
Because drawees do not keep on file counterfoils of 
the payees' and indorsee's signatures, they would not be 
able to detect the forgery of their signatures. The 
imposition of a duty to make enquiry to that effect would 
disturb the business of the drawee, especially bankers, 
and it would disturb the function of negotiable 
instruments. 
On the other hand, bona fide third parties who 
acquired instruments vitiated by forged indorsements 
could, as business practice required, demand payment from 
the drawee and in instances of payment they could retain 
the erroneously paid proceeds.139 It was felt that the 
drawee should, as between himself and the drawer and the 
original true owner be afforded a similar protection. 
He is in no better position than the acquirer to detect 
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forged indorsements? thus his act of payment should be 
upheldo 
The extension of the protection to the bona fide 
drawee payor conforms with the application of the 
"'abBJtiracll: rdillJlCtE'in.®"" which characterises the Continental 
Geneva legal systemsol40 The limitation imposed upon the 
drawee as to the enquiry of the regularity of the chain of 
indorsements only 9 the duty of enquiry is consistent with 
the tendency of construing the instrument with reference 
to its four corners only. The only information from 
which the genuineness of the instrument could be gathered 
by consulting its four corners is the regularity of the 
instrument and the regularity of the signatures 
incorporated in it. Once the regularity of the 
instrument is satisfied, the inquirer is presumed to have 
discharged his duty of enquiry. Any enquiry beyond the 
four corners would be inconsistent with the application of 
the abstract doctrine. 
The Right of Recovery of Payments 
made upon Fqrgcd Indorsements 
(i) As to the drawee's right of recovery from the bona 
fide acquirer recipient, the applications adhered to by 
the legal systems under consideration are dissimilar. 
The English legal system as a general rule allows drawee 
payors to recover erroneous payments from the bona fide 
acquirer recipient.l 4l By reference to the authorities 
cited earlier, 1 42 the English legal system makes an 
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exception in instances where the acquirer recipient may, 
due to the drawee payor's right of recovery~ suffer a 
detriment whereby his position may be altered as between 
himself and prior parties. As it has been established by 
the decision in National Westminster Bank Ltd,, v Barclays 
Bank International and Another143 and as reinforced by 
Goff J. in Barclays Bank v Simms Son and Cooke (Southern) 
Ltde and Sowman, 1 44 for the above exception to apply, the 
acquirer recipient should establish his title to the 
instrument through a genuine indorsement. 
The right of the drawee payor of recovery would not 
arise in instances where the drawee payor is a banker. 
By virtue of Section 60 B. E. A., the drawee payor banker 
would be availed a valid discharge, even if he pays upon a 
forged indorsement .145 Since neither his customer nor 
the original true owner may contest the payment, the 
drawee payor banker need not recover the proceeds of the 
erroneous payment from the acquirer recipient. 
Next to be considered, is the acquirer recipient's 
entitlement to retain the proceeds as against the original 
true owner. The English legal system determines the 
entitlement to the proceeds of the erroneous payment, by 
reference to the status it establishes to the acquirer of 
an instrument vitiated by a forged indorsement. By 
virtue of Section 24 B.E.A., the acquirer of an instrument 
vitiated by a forged signature, does not satisfy the 
holder status. He does not possess to his advantage 
enforceable interests. He may not retain proceeds 
erroneously paid to him.146 The proceeds which he 
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receives as payment are deemed not to be his property. 
They are deemed to be the property of the holder. Since 
the holder status is confined to the original true olv.ner~ 
the property right to the proceeds is deemed to be 
established in favour of the latter. Should payment be 
erroneously made in favour of the acquirer 9 the said party 
holds the paid proceeds in trust in favour of the original 
true owner.147 Ultimately 9 he would have to account for 
the said proceeds in favour of the latter. He would have 
to restore the said proceeds in favour of the original 
true owner in instances where the latter party so demands. 
If he fails to comply with such a duty he would be liable 
to the original true owner for money had and received. 
(ii) The u.c.c. by comparison 9 allows the drawee payor 
to recover in all instances from the bona fide acquirer 
recipient, erroneous payments made upon forged 
indorsements. The u.c.c. approaches the above 
application by imposing upon the acquirer recipient a 
"warranty of good title" to the instrument. 
Article 3-417 u.c.c. reads in part, 
"Any person who obtains payment or acceptance 
and any prior transferor warrants to a person 
who in good faith pays or accepts that 
a) he has a good title to the instrument or 
is authorised to obtain payment or acceptance 148 on behalf of one who has a good title." 
The term "good title" in the above quoted sub-
section, denotes the acquisition of the instrument through 
a genuine chain of indorsements. If the chain of 
indorsements was interrupted by a forgery, the title which 
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the acquirer intends to establish in his favour would not 
be good" If he receives payment from the drawee payor~ 
he would be deemed to have breached the warranty of good 
title imposed upon him. 
(iii) Finally~ the drawee payor's right of recovery 
against the acquirer recipient would not arise in 
the Continental Geneva legal systems. Like Section 60 
B.E.A., Article 40 G.U.L.(Bills) affords the drawee payor 
a valid discharge against the drawer, as well as the 
original true owner, l49 provided that he acts in good 
faith and without gross negligence. Nevertheless, unlike 
the English legal system, the original true owner, the 
party from whom the instrument was stolen and whose 
signature was forged, may not claim the proceeds from the 
bona fide acquirer recipient, provided the latter 
establishes his title to the vitiated instrument through a 
regular chain of indorsements. By virtue of Article 16 
G.U.L.(Bills), the said acquirer may satisfy the lawful 
holder status. 1 5° The forgery of an indorsement does not 
disqualify him from hoJder status. As the lawful holder, 
he may retain the proceeds of the erroneous payment. 
Summary 
( i) From the foregoing, the risk evolving from the 
payment of an instrument vitiated by a forged signature 
could be summarised as follows. The Anglo-American and 
the Continental Geneva legal systems are in agreement that 
the party upon whom the instrument was drawn may not, in 
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instances of paying a forged instrument~ charge the 
purported maker/drawers account with the erroneous 
paymento The risk of forgery is initially allocated to 
the drawee payoro 
As to the drawee's right of recovery against the bona 
fide acquirer recipient, the legal systems under 
consideration are also in agreement in denying to the 
drawee payor the right of recovery against the acquirer 
recipient, so far as the latter establishes his title to 
the paid instrument through a genuine indorsement. Where 
the acquirer recipient establishes his title to an 
instrument forged in toto, the legal systems under 
consideration disagree as to the drawee payors right of 
recovery. The English legal system allows the drawee 
payor the right of recovery. The Continental Geneva 
legal systems ~pparently disentitle the drawee payor the 
right of recovering erroneous payments from the acquirer 
recipient so far as the latter establishes his title to 
the vitiated instrument through a regular chain of 
indorsements, whilst the u.c.c. disentitles the drawee 
payor to rec-over, in all ins-tances the erroneous payment 
from the acquirer recipient. 
As a matter of practice, the fraudulent person, in 
order to facilitate his fraud, would not impersonate the 
purported drawer or the purported payee. To induce a 
bona fide third party to take the instrument in question, 1_, ·, 
he purports to behave as the intended payee or indorsee. 
Thus where he intends to steal somebody's cheque, he 
issues the cheque in his favour as the intended payee. 
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An example of such an instance could be gathered from the 
first hypothetical mentioned above a lSl There 9 Willy 
Williams made the cheque payable to his ordero In his 
capacity as the payee 9 he negotiated the cheque to Billy 
Barnes~ a bona fide third partyo 
Thus 9 in the light of the presumed practice 9 it could 
be concluded that since the bona fide acquirer recipient 
normally establishes his title to the vitiated instrument 
through a genuine indorsement, the risk of forgery in the 
making as far as the Anglo-American and the Geneva legal 
systems are concerned, would be allocated to the mistaken 
drawee payoro 
( ii) In instances where payment is made upon a forged 
indorsement, the legal systems under consideration 
disagree as to the manner of allocating the evolving risk. 
In the English legal system 9 so far as the drawee payor is 
not a banker, he may not charge the drawer with the 
erroneous payment. The original true owner, the party 
from whom the instrument was stolen, and whose signature 
was forged, may demand fresh payment from the drawee 
payor. The risk is initially allocated to the latter. 
Since bona fide acquirer recipients establish their title 
to the vitiated instrument through a genuine indorsement, 
the drawee payor would be disentitled to recover erroneous 
payments from them. The risk evolving from forged 
indorsements would, in practice, be allocated to the 
drawee payor. 
If the drawee payor was a banker, payment by him upon 
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a forged indorsement could avail him a valid discharge. 
The original true owner may not demand fresh payment from 
him. The risk evolving from the payment of an instrument 
vitiated by a forged indorsement 9 would be initially 
allocated to the original true owner. Nevertheless, the 
original true owner may recover the erroneously paid 
proceeds from the acquirer recipient. The latter does 
not possess a property interest to the proceeds of the 
erroneous payment. The risk, accordingly, is shifted to 
the bona fide acquirer recipient. 
The u.c.c. disentitles the drawee payor in general to 
charge to the drawer erroneous payments made upon a forged 
indorsement. The original true owner may demand the 
drawee payor to make fresh payment in his favour. The 
risk evolving from the payment upon a forged indorsement 
is initially allocated to the drawee payor. 
Nevertheless, the latter may shift the evolving risk to 
the bona fide acquirer recipient. The acquirer of an 
instrument vitiated by a forged indorsemen~ does not 
possess a good title to the erroneously paid proceeds. 
The drawee payor may recover the erroneous payment from 
the recipient. The risk evolving from the payment upon a 
forged indorsement would finally be allocated to the 
acquirer. 
The Continental Geneva legal systems allow the drawee 
payor to charge erroneous payments to the drawer when 
payment is made upon a forged indorsement. The original 
true owner may not contest the validity of the payment, 
nor may he demand afresh payment. The risk evolving from 
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the payment upon a forged indorsement is initially 
allocated to the original true owner. However 9 the 
latter is not entitled to recover the proceeds of the 
erroneous payment from the bona fide acquirer recipient. 
The said acquirer qualifies as the la-.;vful holder of the 
instrument. He may establish a good title to the 
erroneously paid proceeds. The risk evolving from the 
payment upon a forged indorsement finally rests with the 
original true owner. 
The Allocation of the Risk Arising from the Payment of an 
Instrument Vitiated by a Forged Signature Under the 
UNCITRAL Convention Relating to International Bills of 
Exchange and International Promissory Notes152 
In regulating the rule of allocating the risk arising 
from the payment of an instrument vitiated by a forged 
signature, the Convention on International Bills of 
Exchange and Promissory Notes distinguishes between 
situations where the paid instrument was vitiated as to 
its making and those situations where the paid instrument 
was properly issued but it contained a forged indorsement. 
As to the former situation, the Convention does not 
regulate the problem of risk allocation in an express 
term. However, it could be inferred from the reading of 
several articles that it allocates the risk of paying a 
vitiated bill or note to the drawee payor. This is 
approached firstly, by denying to the said party the right 
of charging his customer i.e. the person whose signature 
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was forged with the paid amount and secondly, by denying 
to him the right of recovering his erroneous payment from 
the bona fide recipient. 
The rule that the drawee payor may not charge his 
customer with the erroneous payment of a forged bill or 
note could be inferred from two sources. On the one 
hand, the establishment in favour of the drawee payor of 
the right to charge his customer with the erroneous 
payment of a forged bill or note would necessarily 
attribute liability on the document in question to the 
latter i.e. the person whose signature was forged. As 
could be noted, such an application is incompatible with 
the well established rule in the Convention. By virtue 
of Article 33, no person may be made liable on a bill of 
exchange or a promissory note unless he signs it.153 
That is to say that the forgery of somebody' s signature 
does not bind the person whose signature it purports to 
be. It does not attribute to him any enforceable promise 
or undertaking. It does not attribute to him the making 
of a payment order and it does not authorise the person to 
whom it i-s purpe-1"-tcd t-o he directed- t-o a-c-t upon it. 
On the other hand, the Convention enumerates the 
instances in which the drawee payor could validly be 
discharged on the bill or note in those instances where 
the payment is made in favour of the holder of the 
"instrument". In such instances only, the maker of the 
bill or note and the original true owner may not force the 
drawee payor to recredit the erroneously debited amount or 
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make a fresh payment in favour of the original true owner. 
Article 72~ in this context~ reads: 
"1) A party is discharged of liability on the 
instrument when he pays the holder~ or a party 
subsequent to himself who has paid the instrument 
and is in possession of it, the amount due 
pursuant to Article 70 or 71. •o•••• 
3) A party is not discharged of liability if he 
pays a holder who is not a protected holder, 
or a party who has taken up and paid the 
instrument, and knows at the time of payment 
that the holder or that party acquired the 
instrument by theft or forged the signature of 
the payee or an endorsee, or participated in 
the theft or the forgery." 
In this context, the term instrument is defined 
rigidly. By virtue of Article 5 c), it denotes the bill 
of exchange or promissory note.154 By virtue of Article 
3, for a document to qualify as a bill or note it must be 
signed by its drawer or maker.155 Thus the document 
which does not bear the genuine signature of its drawer or 
maker does not qualify as a bill of exchange or promissory 
note. Accordingly, it does not satisfy the concept of 
instrument as utilised in the Convention. Since Article 
72 enumerates the instances in which the drawee payor 
could validly be discharged on the bill or note in those 
instances where the payment is made in favour of the 
holder of an instrument only, it could, by way of negative 
implication, be concluded that the payment of a forged 
bill or note does not, under the Convention, discharge the 
drawee payor. This is due to the fact that a paid 
document in such an instance does not satisfy the 
definition of an instrument the payment of which could 
discharge the drawee payor. 
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The rule that the drawee payor may not recover the 
proceeds of the erroneous payment from the bona fide 
recipient could be inferred from the sections on 
liability a In this context~ the Convention confines the 
extent of the liability of the taker from the forger» for 
the loss resulting from the forgery of a signature and his 
subsequent receipt of the proceeds of the vitiated 
instrument~ to liability tmvards the person whose 
signature was forged and any prior partyo156 Article 25 
does not extend such liability in favour of the drawee 
payor. Accordingly, the latter may not claim from the 
bona fide recipient compensation equal to the loss 
suffered by him as a result of his erroneous payment. 
The rule that the bona fide recipient is not liable 
to the drawee payor for the loss suffered by the latter as 
a result of his erroneous payment is reinforced by the 
fact that the warranties attributable to the holder of a 
bill or note, the breach of which could render him liable 
for the loss resulting from the forgery of the signature 
of the drawer or maker, run in favour of the subsequent 
holder only i.e. the person to whom the property right to 
the bill or note in question is intended to be 
transferred. Article 45 reads in this context: 
"1) Unless otherwise agreed, a person who transfers 
an instrument by endorsement and delivery or by mere 
delivery, represents to the holder to whom he transfers 
the instrument that: 
a) The instrument does not bear any forged or unauthorised 
signature; 
b) The instrument has not been materially altered; 
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c) At the time of transfer 9 he has no knowledge of any 
fact w·hich ~vould impair the right of the transferee to 
payment of the instrument against the acceptor of a 
bill or 9 in the case of an unaccepted bill 9 the drawer 9 
or against the maker of a note. oooooo" 
The Working Group on International Negotiable 
Instruments expressed the view that the holder of a bill 
or note does not 9 by presenting his instrument for 
payment 9 intend to transfer its property right to the 
drawee for the purpose of establishing the holder status 
in favour of the latter. Accordingly, the drawee does 
not benefit from the warranties attributable to the 
recipient. In the last analysis 9 the recipient would not 
be liable to the drawee payor for the breach of the 
warranty that the document in question does not bear any 
forged signature,157 in instances where the disputed paid 
proceeds were those of an instrument vitiated by such a 
signature. 
As far as the first hypothetical is concerned,158 it 
could be noted that the Convent ion allocates the risk 
arising from the payment of the fraudulently made bill or 
note to the drawee payore Due to the fact that the bill 
or note is not made by John Alex, it denies to the drawee 
payor the right of charging the erroneous payment to hime 
It entitles John Alex to demand a recredit of his account 
with the drawee as if payment had not been made. And due 
to the fact that the erroneous payment is not made in 
favour of the fraudulent person or the thief or to a 
person participating in a fraudulent practice or the theft 
of the erroneously paid instrument, the drawee payor may 
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not recover the proceeds of the erroneous payment from 
Billy Barnes o The latter is not accountable to the 
drawee payor for the obtained proceeds and ultimately he 
may establish a perfect title to theme 
As to the situation where the risk arises from the 
payment of a genuine bill or note but which nevertheless 
contains a forged indorsement p the Convention allocates 
the resulting loss to the immediate taker from the forger. 
This is approached firstlyp by establishing a valid 
discharge on the bill or note in question in favour of the 
drawee payor who acts without knowledge of the forgery~ 
and p secondly P by establishing in favour of the person 
whose signature was forged and any prior party who would 
suffer a loss as a result of the forgery and the 
subsequent payment of the document vitiated by it, the 
right to recover the resulting loss from the immediate 
taker from the forger. 
The rule that the drawee who pays a vitiated bill or 
note in favour of its holder without knowledge of the 
forgery vitiating it would be afforded a valid discharge 
on the document in question, is incorporated in Article 25 
as well as Article 72. The former Article expressly 
exonerates the drawee who behaves in the above manner from 
liability to the person whose signature was forged and to 
any prior party for the loss resulting from the forgery 
and his subsequent payment. By necessary implication, it 
disentitles the original true owner i.e. the person whose 
signature was forged as well as any prior party, such as 
the drawee's customer, to claim from the latter 
=290-
compensation equal to the loss resulting from the forgery 
and his subsequent payment o Accordingly, the customer 
may not demand the drawee to recredit his account with him 
as if payment had not been made, nor may the original true 
owner demand from him a fresh payment in his favouro 
Article 25(3) reads in this context~ 
"(3) Furthermore, a party or the drawee who pays 
an instrument is not liable under paragraph 1) 
of this article if, at the time he pays the 
instrument, he is without knowledge of the 
forgery, unless his lack of knowledge is due to 
his failure to act in good faith or to exercise 
reasonable care." 
Article 72 reinforces the rule expressed in the above 
quoted Article. It expressly provides that the drawee 
who pays a bill or note in favour of its "holder" without 
knowledge that the title of the said party is void, would 
obtain a valid discharge on the instrument. That is to 
say that neither his customer nor the original true owner 
may challenge the drawee's right of payment. The 
customer may not demand a recredit of his account from the 
drawee, whereas the original true owner may not demand 
from the latter a fresh payment in his favoure 
72 reads in part: 
"1) A party is discharged of liability on 
the instrument when he pays the holder, or 
a party subsequent to himself who has paid 
the instrument and is in possession of it, 
the amount due pursuant to Article 70 or 71. 
Artjcle 
3) A party is not discharged of liability if he 
pays a holder who is not a protected holder, or a 
party who has taken up and paid the instrument, and 
knows at the time of payment that the holder or 
that party acquired the instrument by theft or 
forged the signature of the payee or an endorsee, 
or participated in the theft or the forgery." 
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In this context 9 the concept of holder is defined 
loosely a By virtue of Article 15 9 it applies to every 
person who is in possession of a regular bill or noteo A 
bill of exchange and a promissory note are deemed to be 
regular when they do not bear an uninterrupted chain of 
indorsements a The genuineness of the incorporated 
signatures is not a requirement for the regularity of the 
instrumento Article 15 reads: 
"1) A person is a holder if he is: 
a) The payee in possession of the instrument or 
b) In possession of an instrument which has been endorsed 
to him, or on which the last endorsement is in blank, and 
on which there appears an uninterrupted series of 
endorsements 9 even if any endorsement was forged or was 
signed by an agent without authority. 
2) If an endorsement in blank is followed by another 
endorsement, the person who signed this last endorsement 
is deemed to be an endorsee by the endorsement in blank. 
3) A person is not prevented from being a holder by the 
fact that the instrument was obtained by him or any 
previous holder under circumstances, including incapacity 
or fraud, duress or mistake of any kind, that would give 
rise to a claim to, or a defence against liability on, the 
instrument." 
Thus, in theory, the forger of a bill or note may 
qualify as its holder. This could be conceived in 
instances where he fraudulently indorses the bill or note 
in quest ion in his favour. In such an instance, the 
lawful indorsee purports to establish his title to the 
bill or note through a regular indorsement. In his 
capacity as the purported indorsee he can, by indorsing 
the bill in his own name in favour of a third person, 
establish the holder status in favour of the latter. In 
such an instance, the ultimate transferee establishes by 
virtue of the forger's indorsement to him, his title to 
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the bill or note in question through a regular 
indorsemento Since the forger could and the taker from 
the forger does 9 in such an instance 9 satisfy the holder 
status 9 the payment of the face value of the bill or note 
could discharge the drawee payor of his obligation towards 
his customer and the original true owner o Neither the 
former nor the original true owner may challenge the 
drawee's act of payment by arguing that it is made on a 
forged signature. The payment of the bill or note in 
favour of its holder immunises the payor against liability 
notwithstanding the holder's entitlement to the paid 
proceeds a 
The rule that the person whose signature was forged 
and any prior party can claim from the immediate taker 
from the forger 9 compensation equal to the loss suffered 
by them as a result of the forgery and the subsequent 
payment of the bill or note vitiated by it 9 is 
incorporated in Article 25 o By virtue of the said 
Article 9 the immediate taker from the forger despite his 
satisfaction of the holder status, is liable to the person 
-.;-Those signature was forged and any prior party for the 
loss resulting from the forgery and the payment of the 
vitiated bill or note to him.159 He would have, in the 
last analysis, to account to the original true owner i.eo 
the person whose signature was forged and any prior party 
such as the maker or drawer for the paid proceeds. 
As far as the second and third hypotheticals are 
concerned,160 it could be noted that the Convention 
allocates the loss arising from Willy Williams' fraudulent 
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practice and the payment of the bill or note in favour of 
Billy Barnes to the latter. On the basis that the 
proceeds of the bill or note are paid to the holder i.e. 
Billy Barnes, the Convention discharges the drawee payor 
on the document in question. It disentitles either John 
Alex or David Dove to challenge the drawee's act of 
payment. Neither may the former demand the drawee to 
recredi t his account with him; nor may David Dove, as 
far as the third hypothetical is concerned, demand a fresh 
payment from hime However, the payment of the face value 
of the bill or note to Billy Barnes does not establish a 
conclusive property right to the paid proceeds. He is 
accountable for them to John Alex and David Dove. Either 
of them can demand the surrender of the proceeds as 
compensation for the loss resulting to them from the 
forgery and the subsequent payment of the bill or note 
vitiated by it. 
The Allocation of the Risk Arising from the Payment of an 
Instrument Vitiated by a Forged Signature Under the 
UNCITRAL Draft ConventJ.on Relati!l&__ to Int_ernat:f._()Jl~aA 
Chegues161 
The Draft Convention on International Cheques 
allocates the risk arising from the payment of a cheque 
vitiated by a forged signature in a manner substantially 
similar to that enforced in the Convention on 
International Bills of Exchange and International 
Promissory Notes. Like the former, it allocates the risk 
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under consideration to the drawee payor in situations 
where it arises fr.om the erroneous payment of a forged 
cheque a This is approached firstly~ by denying to the 
drawee payor the right of charging to his customer (ioeo 
the person whose signature was forged) the payment of the 
face value of the forged cheque 9 and secondly 9 by denying 
to the said party the right of recovering the proceeds of 
his erroneous payment from the bona fide recipiento 
The rule that the drawee payor may not charge his 
customer with the payment of the forged cheque could be 
inferred from Articles 1 and 6lo By virtue of the latter 
Article, for the payor to be discharged he must make the 
payment in favour of the holder of the cheque .162 By 
virtue of Article 1, for a document to qualify as a cheque 
it must be signed by its maker.l63 Thus, if the document 
in question did not bear the genuine signature of its 
purported maker it does not satisfy the definition of a 
cheque. Accordingly, it does not discharge per se its 
payor in instances where it was forged. Ultimately, the 
person whose signature was forged i.e. the drawee payor's 
customer 1 may demand the former to recredit his account as 
if payment had not been made. 
The rule that the drawee payor may not recover the 
proceeds of his erroneous payment from the bona fide 
recipient 
liabilitye 
could be inferred from the articles on 
By virtue of Article 25, the taker from the 
forger's liability for the loss resulting from the forged 
signature and the subsequent payment of the cheque 
vitiated by it is established in favour of the person 
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whose signature was forged and any other party 0164 By 
virtue of Article 6, for a person to be a party to a 
cheque he must sign it.l65 The drawee of a cheque does 
not normally engage on it. That is to say that the 
drawee is not a party to a cheque. Accordingly, he does 
not establish in his favour the right to recover from the 
taker from the forger compensation equal to the loss 
suffered by his payment of a cheque vitiated by a forged 
indorsement. 
In situations where the risk arises from the payment 
of a cheque vitiated by a forged indorsement the draft 
Convention allocates it to the immediate taker from the 
forger. This is approached firstly, by establishing a 
valid discharge on the cheque in favour of the drawee 
payor provided that he behaves without knowledge of the 
forgery,l66 and secondly, by establishing in favour of the 
original true owner (i.e. the person whose signature was 
forged) and any prior party the right to recover from the 
immediate taker from the forger, compensation equal to the 
loss resulting from the forgery and suhseq-ue-n-t- payme:rft of 
th~ ~lEiated cheque. 
The rule that the drawee who pays a cheque vitiated 
by a forged indorsement without knowledge of the forgery, 
and in favour of its holder, establishes a valid discharge 
on the cheque, is incorporated in Article 61. 
Article reads in part ••• 
"1) A party is discharged of liability on the 
cheque when he pays the holder or a party 
subsequent to himself who has paid the cheque 
and is in possession thereof the amount due 
pursuant to Article 59 or 60. 
The said 
2) A party is not discharged of liability if 
he pays a holder who is not a protected holder 
and knows at the time of payment that a third 
person has asse~ted a valid claim to the cheque 
or that the holder acquired the cheque by theft 
or forged the signature of the payee or an 
endorsee or participated in such theft or forgery." 
Like the Convention on International Bills of 
Exchange and Promissory Notes the draft Convention under 
consideration defines the concept of holder in a broad 
sense. It applies to every person who establishes or 
purports to establish his title to the cheque through an 
uninterrupted chain of indorsements. The forgery of an 
indorsement does not affect the regularity of the 
cheque.167 Accordingly 9 the forger and the person who 
derives his title to the cheque from him could qualify as 
the holder. The payment of the face value of the cheque 
to such a person would accordingly establish a valid 
discharge in favour of the payor. In the last analysis 9 
neither the drawee payor's customer nor the original true 
owner may challenge the former's act of payment. The 
customer may not demand the payor to rccredit his account 
with him whereas the original true owner may not demand 
from the latter a fresh payment in his favour. 
Finally, the rule that the original true owner (i.e. 
the person whose signature was forged) and any prior party 
may recover from the immediate taker from the forger the 
loss resulting from the forgery and the payment of the 
cheque vitiated by it is incorporated in Article 25. By 
virtue of the said Article 9 the immediate taker from the 
forger is liable to compensate the person whose signature 
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was forged and any prior party for the loss resulting from 
the forgeryo168 Notwithstanding his satisfaction of the 
holder status he is~ in the last analysis~ accountable to 
them for the receipted value of the vitiated chequea 
As far as the above hypotheticals are concerned,l69 
it could be noted that the Draft Convention on 
International Cheques allocates the loss resulting from 
the forgery of John Alex's signature to the drawee payor 
whilst it allocates it to Billy Barnes in instances where 
it arises from the forgery of Dove and Co a and David 
Dove's indorsementsa In the former instance it denies to 
the drawee payor the right of charging John Alex with the 
erroneous payment of the forged cheque and it denies him 
the right of recovering the proceeds of his erroneous 
payment from the recipient, namely Billy Barnes. In 
instances where the loss arises from the forgery of Dove 
and Coo's and David Dove's indorsements, the draft 
Convention affords the drawee payor a valid discharge as 
long as he behaves in good faith and with reasonable care. 
It denies to John Alex the right of demanding a recredit 
of the debited amount from the drawee whilst it denies to 
David Dove and Dove and Co. respectively the right of 
demanding a fresh payment from him. On the other hand, 
the draft Convention entitles John Alex as well as David 
Dove to the right to claim from Billy Barnes compensation 
equal to the loss resulting to them. Notwithstanding 
Billy Barnes' satisfaction of the holder status, he 
remains liable for the resulting loss in favour of the 
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original true owner and the prior signatory Leo David 
Dove and John Alex respectivelyo 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
BACK NOTES 
1. For a hypothetical scenario of such instance see 
pp.206-207 infra. 
2. cf. Section 21 B.E.A. 
3. cf. Section 54 and 55 B.E.A. and Articles 9 9 15 9 43 
and 47 G.U.L. (Bills). 
4. However not all signatures incorporated on negotiable 
instruments involve the transfer of the instrument in 
question. The acceptance of the drawee and the ~ai> of 
the guarantor are not for example related fs..O--/ the 
transferability of the instrument. Their incorporation 
attributes to the signatory in question a promise or 
undertaking to pay the instrument on its day of maturity 
only. Thus if the drawee's acceptance or the guarantor's 
aval was forged the property right of the instrument would 
not be affected. The liability of parties on the 
instrument remains operative in favour of the 
acquirer/holder provided that no essential signature, e.g. 
indorsement through which the acquirer establishes his 
title, is forged. 
S. Section 1 of English 1981 Forgery and Counterfeiting 
Act, for example defines forgery as the making of a false 
instrument with the intention that it shall be used to 
induce somebody to accept it as genuine, 
"and by reason of so accepting it to do or not do 
some act to his own or any other person's prejudice." 
6. cf. Section 2 B.E.A. and Article 3-102(a) u.c.c. 
The G.U.L.s by comparison do not require actual delivery 
for the purpose of issuance or negotiation. A purported 
delivery on behalf of the signatory suffices to constitute 
a valid t~ansfer. The acquirer of a negotiable 
instrument may qualify as the lawful holder of the 
instrument even if he establishes his title from a party 
to whom the delivery of the instrument did not occur. 
cf. Article 16 G.U.L. (Bills) and Article 21 G.U.L. 
(Cheques). 
7. cf. Glanville Williams, Forgery and Falsity, 
Crim. L. Rev., (1974), p. 75. 
For a contrary opinion cf. Lewis case (1754), 
Fost. 116 168 ER. 57. 
The court held that since "the act is done in the name of 
another person" it is a forgery. Thus as far as the 
above illustration is concerned, since Willy Williams 
signs in the name of another, i.e. Gullible Grocer, his 
act in light of the Lewis case would be interpreted as a 
forgery, even if the party in whose name the signature was 
made, was a non-existent person. 
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8. cf. Article 1-201 (43) u.c.c. 
As far as the Geneva legal systems are concerned the 
debate on Article 8 of the G.U.L.(Bills) clearly 
illustrates the intention of the contracting states, to 
exclude from the scope of the Article, instances in which 
the properly appointed agent misuses his actual authority. 
Article 8 is concerned with instances in which a person 
purports to behave as the authorised agent, and the agent 
who acts in excess of his authority. The theory 
underlying the intention of the contracting states is the 
promotion of negotiable instruments as credit or payment 
devices. To facilitate the said purpose, negotiable 
instruments should be interpreted by reference to their 
body only. Acquirers and parties upon whom negotiable 
instruments are drawn should not in the course of 
acquisition or making payment, refer to extrinsic 
evidence. Such reference would involve time and cost. 
They are both incompatible with the purpose of 
facilitating the acquisition of negotiable instruments as 
substitutes for money. 
9. Phill imore L. J., in Morison v Lo~yn County & 
Westminster Bank Ltd. [1914] 3 K.B. Pts_~ as to the 
proper application of Section 24, 1861 Forgery Act 24 and 
2 5 Viet. c98 expressed the view that the impression that 
the said Section extended to cover instances in which the 
agent misuses his actual authority was an error. The 
correct interpretation of that instance his lordship 
thought was, with deference to the White case 1 Den CC 
208, a false pretence. The signature of an agent in the 
name of his principal and a misuse of the former's actual 
authority although indictable did not constitute a 
forgery. 
10. [1914] 3 KB 
11. Ibid. 
12. [1927] 1 KB 826. 
13. Ibid. 
14. Section 1 1913 Forgery Act contained a substantially 
similar provision to that of the 1981 Forgery and 
Counterfeiting Act. For the defnition of forgery as 
provided in the latter enactment see note 5 above. 
15. cf. R v Dodge [1972] 1 QB 416 
R v Harris [1971] 2 ALL ER 1523. 
16. Kreditbank Cassel Gmb H v Schenkers [1927] 1 KB 826. 
17. Ibid. 
18. cf. Section 54 B.E.A. and Article 28 G.U.L. (Bills). 
19. cf. Section 8 (3) B.E.A. 
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20. cf. Section 20 B.E.A. 
21. cf. Sections 8 (4) and 34 B.E.A. 
22. In the Continental Geneva legal systems cheques 
originally drawn to bearer may not be converted into order 
cheques. The special indorsement appearing on a bearer 
cheque does not make the cheque payable to the named 
indorsee. Any possesor may qualify as the holder. 
cf. Article 20 G.U.L. (Cheques). 
In the Anglo-American legal systems by 
instruments drawn originally to bearer e.g. 
be converted into order instruments. 
indorsement is capable of rendering the 
cf. Section 34 B.E.A. 
comparison, 
cheques, may 
A special 
said effect. 
23. The Imperial Bank of Canada v the Bank of Hamilton 
[1903] A.c~ 49 per Lindley L.J. and The National 
Westminster Bank v Barclays Bank International and Another 
[1957] Q.B. 654 per Kerr L.J. 
24. The Anglo-American and the Continental Geneva legal 
systems are in agreement that as a matter of general 
principle, a collecting agent who bona fide passes the 
proceeds of the collected instrument to its principal, 
i.e. depositor, is not liable to the original true owner 
in instances where the depositor, i.e. the party to whom 
the proceeds of the collected instrument were credited, 
established his title to the collected instrument through 
a forged indorsement. 
Section 4 of the English 1957 Cheques Act and Article 
3-419 u.c.c. illustrate the application of the above rule 
in the Anglo-American legal systems. The former section 
affords the depository agent e.g. the collecting bank, a 
valid discharge against the drawer of the negotiable 
instrument, and its original true owner, if _the collecting 
bank acts in reliance on the regularlty of the instrument. 
He is under. no duty to examine the genuineness of the 
chain of indorsements. 
Article 3-419 by comparison approaches the above 
application by excluding the enforcement of the tortious 
cause of action of conversion against the collecting 
agent. 
As to the Continental Geneva legal systems the rule 
that collecting agents are not liable to the original true 
owner in instances where the collected instrument was 
vitiated by a forged indorsement stems from the 
application of the rules of unjustified enrichment. It 
is submitted in the Continental Civil legal systems that 
for an agent to be accountable for the conversion of the 
property of another, he must be enriched as a result of 
the conversion. If however the said ~gent (bona fide 
alters his position to his detriment in reliarl-c"e on the L. 
prima facie validity of the transaction in which he 
engages on behalf of his principal he would not be liable 
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to the party with whom he transactedo The agent would 
not be deemed to have been enriched once he alters his 
positiono Accordingly neither the mistaken party nor his 
principal~ i o eo the party whose property was 
misappropriated~ may recover from the bona fide agento 
In this connection Article 818 BGB reads 9 
"1) The obligation to return extends to emoluments 
derived and to whatever the recipient acquires 9 
either by virtue of a right obtained by him or 
as compensation for the destruction damage or 
deprivation of the object obtainedo 
2) If the return is impossible on account of the 
nature of the object obtained or if the recipient 
for any other reason is not in a position to make 
the return~ he shall make good the valueo 
3) The obli~ation to return or make good the value 
is exclu ed where the recipient is no longer 
enriched ••.• " 
And Article 1377 Code Civil reads, 
"When a person who through error believed himself 
to be the debtor, discharges a debt, he has the 
right to recover against the creditor. 
Nevertheless this right ceases in the case where 
the creditor cancelled his rights, as a result of 
the payment, saving the recourse of him who paid 
as against the true debtoro" 
However courts in the United States subjected the 
proviso in Article 3-419 u.c.c. to a rigid interpretation. 
One court held that the proceeds of the collected forged 
instrument are deemed to be in the hands of the collecting 
agent even if the latter finally credits the account of 
the depositor. The credited proceeds are deemed to be 
extracted from the collecting bank's own assets. The 
reason underlying the rigid interpretation of the courts 
is two fold. First the courts attempted to reconcile 
Section 3-419 u.c.c. with other sections of Article 3 as 
well as the code. By virtue of Article 3-417 and 4-207 
the collecting bank -.:varrants to thP drawee the genuineness 
of the chain of indorsements. If the collected 
instrument was vitiated by a forged indorsement, the 
drawee may recover from the collecting bank the proceeds 
of the erroneous payment. Whereas by virtue of Article 
3-419 1(c) the drawee is liable in conversion to the 
original true owner for paying upon a forged indorsement. 
Since the risk evolving from the payment upon a forged 
indorsement is indirectly allocated to the collecting bank 
no inconvenience would result once the risk was allocated 
to the ultimate risk bearer directly. The establishment 
of the collecting bank's liability in conversion to the 
original true owner would avoid the multiplicity of action 
situation had the rule been otherwise. 
Secondly the establishment of the collecting bank's 
liability in favour of the original true owner, is 
consistent with the general risk allocation rule adopted 
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in the U. C. C. It determines the bank in general and 
the collecting bank in particular as the best risk 
bearer in instances of payment upon a forged indorsement. 
The collecting bank's ability to provide for insurance is 
deemed to be the test of determining the best risk bearer~ 
cf. Article 3-417 together with its Official Comment. 
To erase the inconsistency and inconvenience caused 
by the proviso of 3-419 u.c.c. the A.L.I. and the 
N.C.C.U.S.L. expressly provided in the new Article 3 that 
collecting banks are liable in conversion to the original 
true owner in instances of paying in, "conversion upon a 
forged indorsement". The proviso appearing in subsection 
3 of the current 3-419 is eliminated in the revised 
Article 3, cf. Progress Report of the A.L.I. 
25. See p.222 infra. 
26. Article 3-404 u.c.c. reads in part, 
"Any unauthorised signature is wholly inoperative, 
as that of the person whose name is signed unless 
he ratifies it or is precluded from denying it, 
nevertheless it operates as the signature of the 
unauthorized signer in favour of any person who 
in good faith pays the instrument or takes it 
for value." 
27. Article 8 G.U.L. (Bills) reads, 
"Whosoever puts his signature on a bill of 
exchange as representing a person for whom he 
had no power to act is bound himself as a party 
to the bill, and if he pays, has the same rights 
as the person for whom he purported to act." 
28. cf. Polhill v Walter (1832) 3 Bd Ad 114. 
Maxform S p A v Mariani & Goodville Ltd. [1981] 2 Lloyds 
Rep 54 C A. 
British Airways v Parish [ 1979] 2 Lloyds Rep 361 and 
cf. Article 108 (4) of 1948 Company Act 
and Section 58 (3) of B.E.A., the latter reads, 
" .... A t-r-ans-fe-ror b-y El-elivery who negotiates a bill 
thereby warrants to his immediate transferee being 
a holder for value that the bill is what it purports 
to be, that he has a right to transfer it, and that 
at the time of transfer he is not aware of any fact 
which renders it valueless." 
29. See pp.206-207. 
30. cf. Section 55 B.E.A. and Articles 9 and 15 G.U.L. 
(Bills). 
31. cf. Section 54, 55 B.E.A. and Articles 9, 15, 28, 32 
G.U.L. (Bills). 
32. For the relationship between the obligation incurred 
under the negotiable instrument and that incurred under 
the independent transaction see pp.42-44 supra. 
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33. For the drawer's vulnerability to double liability 
see pp.216-218 supra. 
34. See p.215 supra. 
35. cf. Baxendale v Bennett (1878) 3 QBD 525. 
36. D~nisart~ 3 Collection des Decisions Nouvelles (1771) 
vo. lettre de change. In accord, decision of Feb. 1761 
cited in Rogue~ Jurisprudence Consulaire 349. 
37. Kessler, Forged Indorsements, 
p.869. 
(1938), 47 Yale L.J., 
38. (1790) 4 Term Rep.28. 3 R.R. 314. 
39. Lord Kenyon C. J. was of the opinion that the bona 
fide acquirer i.e. Mead, should have the property of the 
bill of exchange conferred upon him. If a contrary 
application was approached an insuperable clog would be 
placed on the negotiability attribute of negotiable 
instruments. As authority, he cited the decision of Lord 
Mansfield in Miller v Race. It involved the theft of a 
bank note issued to bearer. The note came into the hand 
of the plaintiff who acquiried it in good faith and for 
value. The banker's clerk, Race, upon learning of the 
theft refused to cash the note or return it to its 
acquirer, Miller, the plaintiff. Lord Mansfield gave 
judgement to the plaintiff, in his decision he relied on 
the money theory. Ibid. p.30. 
Ashurst J. disagreed with the Chief Justice's 
opinion. He was of the view that for an indorsement to 
be valid, it must be made in the hand of the intended 
payee or indorsee. A forged signature cannot effect a 
valid transfer of the property of the instrument in favour 
of a third party. He distinguished the case at bar from 
the case of Miller v Race. In the latter case the 
instrument in question was a bearer instrument whilst the 
instrument in Mead v Young was an order instrument. Ibid 
Po 31. 
Buller and Grase J .J. concurred with Ashurst J. 
They were of the opinion that the plaintiff, Mead, did not 
establish good title to the bill of exchange because of 
the forgery of the indorsement. If he was to escape the 
loss evolving from the forgery the acceptor Young would 
not be able to chase the forger and have him punished. 
Therefore the right of the public to have a criminal 
punished is superior to putting a clog on the 
negotiability of the instrument. Ibid p.33. 
40. (1776) cited Chitty (11 Edtn) p.278. 
41. Ibid. 
42. Holdsworth, The 
Negotiable Instruments 
Origins and 
II, (1915), 
Early History of 
31 L. Q. Rev. p173. 
Beutel, 
Early English 
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Development of Negotiable Instruments in 
Law~ (1937-38)~ 51 Harv. L. Rev.~ p.813. 
Jenks~ The Early History of Negotiable Instruments~ 
(1893)~ 9 L. Q. Rev. 9 p.70 et seq. 
43. Cambium is a form of contract whereby one specie of 
one genus was exchanged for another specie of the same 
genus. The Lombards borrowed the Roman cambium to 
exchange money of one currency for money of another 9 
cf. Holdsw·orth, The Origins and Early History of 
Negotiable Instruments, I, (1915), 31 L. Q~ Rev., pp.16 
and 24. 
Taha, Alqanun Altijari, (Alawraq Altijaria Waliflas), 
(1985 L 
44. The example of the London merchant and his 
involvement with the Venetian merchant is borrowed from 
Farnsworth, Commercial Paper Cases and Materials (1984) 
(3rd Edtn.) pp.42 and following. In the early history of 
negotiable instruments, the issuance of bills of exchange 
involved four parties namely 9 the banker who purported to 
be the drawer, the agent who purported to be the drawee, 
the merchant who intended to remit the money to his 
creditor and the ultimate creditor who purported to be the 
payee. 
cf. Holdsworth, The Origins and Early History of 
Negotiable Instruments II, (1915)i 31 L. Q. Rev. 9 p.173. 
45. Holdsworth, The Origins and Early History of 
Negotiable Instruments II. Ibid. p.173. 
Abbas 9 Al Awraq Altijaria Filtashrea Alkuwaiti, p.21. 
Baxter, What is the future of a cheque. 
Multitude Legum uis unum, (1973), pp.156-157. 
46. The first indorsement to order which appeared on the 
Continent goes back to 1607, 
cf. Jenks, Early History of Negotiable Instruments. 
(1893)~ 9 L. Q. Rev., p.170. 
Holdsworth, Origins and Early History of Negotiable 
Instruments II. (1915), 31 L. Q. Rev., pp.182, 183. 
However, Holdsworth observed that there were attempts in 
Italy to allow the indorsements to order in the second 
half of the sixteenth century but they failed, then it 
appeared in the 17th century. Ibid. 
47. Marius published his advices in 1652. For a brief 
outline see Holdsworth, The Origins and Early History of 
Negotiable Instruments III. (1915), 31 L. Q. Rev., p.385. 
And Holden, History of Negotiable Instruments in English 
Law, (1955), pp.42-52. 
48. Ibid. 
49. Kessler, Forged Indorsements. (1938), 47 Yale L. J. 9 
pp.868, 869. 
(1758) 1 Burr 452. 
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51. (1827) 4 Bing 253. 
52. Ibid. p.766. 
53. Ibid. 
54 0 See pp.237-238 infra. 
55. See pp.205~223 supra. 
56. Article 10 G. U. L. (Cheques) is the conterpart to 
Article 7 G.U.L. (Bills). Its provision is a carbon copy 
of the latter. It substitutes the word cheque for bill 
of exchange. Article 10 reads: 
"If a cheque bears signatures of persons incapable 
of binding themselves by a cheque or forged 
signatures or signatures of fictitious persons, or 
signatures which for any other reason cannot bind 
the persons who have signed the cheque or on whose 
behalf it was signed, the obligations of the other 
persons who have signed it are non the less valid." 
57. Article 3-404 U. C. C. is the counterpart of 
Section 24 B.E.A. It reads in part .~ 
58. 
59. 
60. 
61. 
For 
see 
"1) Any unauthorised signature is wholly inoperative 
as that of the person whose name is signed unless he 
ratifies it or is precluded from denying it, but it 
operates as the signature of the unauthorised signer 
in favour of any person who in good faith pays the 
instrument or takes it for value." 
See pp..-206-207 supra. 
See pp.206-207 supra. 
See pp.206-207 supra. 
(1790) 4 Term Rep 28. 
the facts of the <"'~f'VIe and the decision of the court 
pp.224-225 supra. 
62. As to the right of the original true owner of 
recovering against the drawee payor see pp.273-274 infra. 
63. Kessler, Forged Indorsements. (1938), 47 Yale L.J., 
p.870. 
64. The New German rule was incorporated in the 
Allgemeine Deutsche Recht, Sections 36, 74 and 76. 
65. For a brief outline of the abstract doctrine see 
Zweigert and Kbtz, I, Introduction to Comparative Law, 
(1977), p.177 and following. 
Cohn, Manual of German Law, Vol.I, (1968). 
66. Kessler, Forged Indorsements. (1938), 47 Yale L. J., 
p.871. 
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67. For the counterpart of Article 7 in G.U.L. (Cheques) 
and for the provisions of the said article~ see n. 56 
supra. 
68. The counterpart of Article 16 G.U.L. (Bills) are 
Articles 19~ 20 and 21 (Cheques). 
69. "19. The possessor of an indorssble cheque is deemed 
to be the lawful holder if he establishes his title 
to the cheque through an uninterrupted series of 
indorsements even if the last indorsement is in 
blank. In this connection cancelled indorsements 
shall be disregarded. lvhen an indorsement in blank 
is follow·ed by another indorsement the person who 
signed this last indorsement is deemed to have 
acquired the cheque by the indorsement in blank." 
"20. An indorsement on a cheque to bearer renders 
the indorsor liable in accordance with the 
provisions governing the right of recourse but it 
does not cover the cheque with a cheque to order." 
"21. Where a person has in any manner whatsoever 
been dispossessed of a cheque (whether it is a 
cheque to bearer or an indorsable cheque to which 
the holder establishes his right in the manner 
mentioned in Article 19) the holder into whose 
possession the cheque has come is not bound to 
give up the cheque unless he has acquired it in 
bad faith or unless in acquiring it he has been 
guilty of gross negligence." 
70. Article 21 G. U. L. (Cheques) is the counterpart of 
the second paragraph of Article 16 G.U.L. (Bills). For 
the reading of Article 21 see note immediately above. 
71. For the application of the negotiability doctrine 
and the rights inherent in it see p.36 supra. 
72. cf. Section 2, 21 and 31 B.E.A. 
and Article 1-201 (29) u.c.c. 
73. cf. Article 16 G.U.L. (Bills) and 19 G.U.L. 
(Cheques). 
74. For the purpose of examining the manner of 
determining the effect of forged signatures on the rights 
and liabilities of parties to an instrument vitiated by 
such a signature under the UNCITRAL Convention relating to 
International Bills of Exchange and International 
Promissory Notes and for the purpose of examining its 
application to the general hypotheticals mentioned on 
p.206-207 above, assume the following: 
1) The instruments involved in the said hypotheticals are 
bills of exchange or promissory notes, 
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2) the bill of exchange or the promissory note in question 
is international o That is to say that it indicates on 
its face that its place of making 9 the address beside the 
name of the maker 9 the address beside the name of the 
payee 9 the address beside the name of the drawee and the 
place of payment are not all the same, and 9 
3) assume that the said bill or note incorporates in its 
title as w·ell as its text a phrase which indicates that 
the document in question is governed by the provisions of 
the UNCITRAL Convention on International Bills of Exchange 
and International Promissory Noteso 
The above assumptions are suggested for three 
reasons o Firstly, the scope of the Convention under 
consideration is limited to bills of exchange and 
promissory notes onlyo cf o Article 1. Secondly, for 
the bill of exchange and promissory note to be subject to 
the provisions of the Convention they must be 
international, cf. Article 2. Finally, the Convention 
is not mandatory. The parties who wish their bill or 
note to be governed by the Convention must expressly say 
that in its title as well as its text, cf. Article 1. 
75. See pp.231-242 supra. 
76. The counterpart of the above mentioned rule in the 
Anglo-American and the Continental Geneva legal systems is 
incorporated in Section 24 B.E.A. Article 3-404 u.c.c., 
Article 7 G.U.L.(Bills) and Article 10 G.U.L.(Cheques). 
For the reading of the foregoing sections and articles and 
their implications see pp.231-233 supra. 
77. For a more detailed account of the hypothetical 
under consideration see p.206 supra. 
78. The expression "off the instrument" is borrowed f~cm 
the commentary tu the Convention on International Bills of 
Exchange and International Promissory Notes UN Doc. 
A/CN.9/213 1981 P33. It denotes the extrinsic 
transaction which underlies the engagement on the 
negotiable instrument such as the contract of sale. 
79. cf. Article 69. It reads: 
"1) The holder may exercise his rights on the instrument 
against one party or several or all parties, liable on it 
and is not obliged to observe the order in which the 
parties have become bound. Any party who takes up and 
pays the instrument may exercise his rights in the same 
manner against parties liable to him. 
2) Proceedings against a party do not preclude proceedings 
against any other party, whether or not subsequent to the 
party originally proceeded against." 
80. Article 28 reads in part: 
"1) A party may set up against a holder who is not a 
protected holder. 
a) Any defence that may be set up against a protected 
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holder in accordance with paragraph (1) of Article 30. 
b) Any defence based on the underlying transaction between 
himself and the drawer or between himself and his 
transferee but only if the holder took the instrument with 
knowledge of such defence or if he obtained the instrument 
by fraud or theft or participated at any time in a fraud 
or theft concerning it; 
c) Any defence arising from the circumstances as a result 
of which he became a party 9 but only if the holder took 
the instrument with knowledge of such defence or if he 
obtained the instrument by fraud or theft or participated 
at any time in a fraud or theft concerning it;". 
Article 30 reads in part: 
"1) a party may not set up against a protected holder any 
defence except •• ~. 
b) Defences based on the underlying transaction between 
himself and such holder or arising from any fraudulent act 
on the part of such holder in obtaining the signature on 
the instrument of that party;". 
81. In this respect Article 28 reads in part: 
"2) The rights to an instrument of a holder who is not a 
protected ·holder are subject to any valid claim to the 
instrument on the part of any person but only if he took 
the instrument with knowledge of such claim or if he 
obtained the instrument by fraud or theft or participated 
at any time in a fraud or theft concerning it." 
82. For a detailed account of the hypotheticals under 
consideration see pp.206-207 supra. 
83. cf. The report of the Working Group on Interna tion 
Negotiable Instruments U.N. Document No. A/CN.9/249 1984 
P7. 
84. cf. U.N. Document No. A/CN.9/214, 1981 P40. 
85. The original version of how Article 25 had a broader 
impact on the free circulation of bills and notes. It 
entitled the person whose signature was forged and any 
prior party to claim compensation for the loss resulting 
from the forged signature from the taker from the forger. 
It did not restrict the original true Olmer' s and any 
prior party's entitlement to recover compensation from the 
immediate taker from the forger only, rather it 
established such an entitlement as against any subsequent 
taker. The original version of how Article 2 5 read in 
part: 
"1) A person who acquires an instrument through what 
appears on the face of the instrument to be an 
uninterrupted series of endorsements shall be a holder 
even if one of the endorsements was forged or was signed 
by an agent without authority provided that such person 
was without knowledge of the forgery or of the absence of 
authority. 
~310-
2) Where an endorsement was forged or was signed by an 
agent without authority 9 the drawer or the person -.;vhose 
endorsement was forged or was signed by an agent without 
authority shall have against the forger or such agent and 
against the person who took the bill from the forger or 
such agent the right to recover compensation for any 
damage that he may have suffered because of the operation 
of paragraph 1) of this article." 
From the foregoing 9 it could be noted that no matter 
how many hands the vitiated bill or note passes through 9 
the original true owner i.e. the person whose signature 
was forged and any prior party may recover from the 
ultimate holder the loss resulting from the forgery. The 
latter» notwithstanding his holder status is liable to 
compensate the person whose signature was forged and any 
prior party for the loss resulting from the forgery and 
the enforcement of t.he bill or note vitiated by it in his 
favour. 
86. For a more detailed account 
pp.617-624 infra. 
of this argument see 
87. For a more detailed account of this argument see 
pp.333-334, 337-338 and 608-609. 
88. For the purpose of determining the effect of forged 
signatures on the rights and liabilities of parties to a 
cheque vitiated by such a signature under the UNCITRAL 
Draft Convention oninternational Cheques and for the 
purpose of examining its application to the hypotheticals 
on pp.206-207 mentioned above, assume the following -
1) the cheque in the hypotheticals under consideration is 
international and 
2) that it contains in its title as well as its text a 
phrase which indicates that it is subject to the 
provisions of the UNCITRAL Draft Convention on 
International Cheques. 
This is due to the fact that the Draft Convention under 
consideration is applicable to international cheques, the 
parties to which expressly pr.o~ri ne that their cheque is 
subject to the provisions of the Draft Convention. 
cf. Article 1. 
89. cf. Article 31. 
90. See pp. 206-207 supra for a more detailed account of 
the hypotheticals under consideration. 
91. cf. Article 27. It reads in part: 
"1) A party may set up against a holder who is not a 
protected holder: 
a) Any defence available under this Convention. 
b) Any defence based on an underlying transaction between 
himself and the drawer or a previous holder or arising 
from the circumstances as a result of which he became a 
party. 
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c) Any defence to contractual liability based on a 
transaction between himself and the holder. 
d) Any defence based on the incapacity of such party to 
incur liability on the cheque or on the fact that such 
party signed without knowledge that his signature made him 
a party to the cheque provided that such absence was not 
due to his negligence. 
2) The rights to a cheque of a holder who is not a 
protected holder are subject to any valid claim to the 
cheque on the part of any person." 
92. The rule that the immediate taker from the forger is 
liable to a prior party to compensate him for the loss 
that would result to him from the forgery and the 
enforcement of the cheque against him is incorporated in 
Article 25 1). It reads-
"If an indorsement is forged, any party has as against the 
forger and against the person to whom the cheque was 
directly transferred by the forger, the right to recover 
compensation for any damage that he may have suffered 
because of the forgery." 
93. For a more detailed account of the hypotheticals 
under consideration see pp.206-207 supra. 
94. For the reading of Section 24 B.E.A. and its 
counterpart in the u.c.c. see p.l31 supra. 
95. See Minutes of the Geneva Conference on the 
Unification of Laws relating to Cheques 2nd Sess., L. N. 
Document No. C.194 M.77 1931 II B, pp.311-312. 
96. Ibid. pp.306-311. However, van Zeeland the 
Belgian delegate was of the opinion that the risk of 
paying a forged instrument should be allocated to the 
purported maker/drawer rather than the drawee payor. The 
objective of promoting the institution of negotiable 
instruments would suffer a setback if the risk were 
allocated to the drawee payor. The allocation of risk to 
the drawee payor wo.uld compel the said party to take extra 
precautions to insure against it. This would definitely 
involve the incurrence of cost, not based on sound legal 
or economic grounds. Since the originator of the 
negotiable instrument is its maker or drawer, he is 
presumed to be the party in control of the instrument. 
The forgery of his signature, prima facie presumes fault 
on the part of the purported maker or drawer. Ibid. 
p. 308. Percerou the French delegate was of the opinion 
that no hard and fast rule could be proposed as to risk 
allocation. The courts should determine on the 
particular facts of each case the party to whom risk would 
be allocated. Its determination should be based on the 
degree of negligence of the parties involved. Where no 
clear case of negligence could be attributed to either 
party, the risk should fall on the purported maker/drawer. 
The forgery of his signature presumes a fault in not safe-
guarding his property. Ibid. p.311. 
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Examples of applications of the rule expressed by 
Percerou at the Geneva Conference cf. decisions of the 
Court de Cassations cited in -
Farnsworth~ The Cheque in France and the United States - A 
Comparative Study, (1962)~ 36 Tulane L. Rev., pp.263-265. 
97. cf. the German's statement at the Geneva Conference 
on the Unification of Laws Relating to Cheques, L. N. 
Document No. C.l94 M.77 1931 II B P309. 
98. cf. Farnsworth, The Cheque in France and the United 
States A Comparative Study. (1962) 36 Tulane L. Rev., 
pp.264-265. 
99. Ames, the Doctrine of Price v Neal, (1891) 
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the forger and against the person towhom the cheque was 
directly transferred by the forger, the right to recover 
compensation for any damage that he may have suffered 
because of the forgery." 
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